State v. Diaz

• Decision Date: 15 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. SC01-2779.,SC01-2779.
• Citation: 850 So.2d 435
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Johnny DIAZ, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

850 So.2d 435

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Johnny DIAZ, Respondent.

No. SC01-2779.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 15, 2003.

Rehearing Denied July 15, 2003.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Chief of Criminal Law, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Petitioner.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Carol J.Y. Wilson, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, for Respondent.

LEWIS, J.

We have for review the decision in Diaz v. State, 800 So.2d 326 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), which certified conflict with the decisions in State v. Wikso, 738 So.2d 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and State v. Bass, 609 So.2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Because the law enforcement officer here had no justification for continuing the restraint of this motorist and obtaining information from him after it was clearly determined that no question remained concerning a violation of law or the validity of the car's temporary license plate, we approve the holding in Diaz. The alleged justification for the continuing detention was found to be clearly erroneous, admittedly removed, and without foundation—reasonable or otherwise.

The lower court detailed the relevant facts:

A Hillsborough County Deputy Sheriff observed a vehicle driven by Diaz pass by with a temporary tag on the top of the rear window. Because he could not read the tag, the deputy initiated a traffic stop. At the suppression hearing, the deputy testified that as he approached the car he could clearly read the tag including the expiration date and found nothing improper. He walked up to the driver's side of the car and obtained information from Diaz, the driver, which ultimately led to the charge against Diaz of felony driving with a suspended license.

Diaz, 800 So.2d at 326-27. The district court of appeal then held that once the officer had found the temporary tag to be proper, no further stop, detention, or inquiry was justified. See id. at 327. Under very similar facts, the appellate courts in both Bass and Wikso have held that once a vehicle is properly stopped, a law enforcement officer may continue the investigation and ask to see the driver's license and registration. See Bass, 609 So.2d at 152; Wikso, 738 So.2d at 390. Based upon the facts presented in this case, and upon consideration of the jurisprudence of this Court and the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, the district court of appeal in Diaz reached the proper conclusion on the totality of the facts presented.

It is undisputed that the stopping of an automobile by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure and detention within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Jones, 483 So.2d 433, 435 (Fla.1986). Although premised upon the very slimmest of rationales, the initial stop here was asserted to be valid based upon the officer's inability to read the expiration date on Mr. Diaz's temporary license plate. The Florida statute regulating temporary license tags provided: "Temporary tags shall be conspicuously displayed in the rear license plate bracket or attached to the inside of the rear window in an upright position so as to be clearly visible from the rear of the vehicle." § 320.131(4), Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added). While the Legislature has required that permanent license plates must be "plainly visible and legible at all times 100 feet from the rear or front," § 316.605(1), Fla. Stat. (2000), the Legislature has failed to mandate a distance at which temporary tags must be fully legible. Notably, the temporary tag statute does not specifically require that the expiration date be legible, and it is the State itself which creates and issues the temporary license tag. See § 320.131(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (2000). The law enforcement officer here used the arguably illegible state-issued temporary tag as a tool for detention, and despite the fact that the driver had no control over the legibility of the expiration date, we assume for the purposes of this case that the initial stop by the deputy sheriff was legitimate, albeit based upon a barely justifiable purpose. With that assumption, we must turn our attention to the actions of the law enforcement officer following the initial stop and upon the further clear confirmation that no possible violation existed.

At the outset, it must be recognized that it is without question that before the personal encounter between Mr. Diaz and the deputy sheriff occurred, the initial alleged purpose for the stop had been satisfied and removed. It is undisputed that the law enforcement officer who made this stop because he was allegedly unable to read the expiration date on the vehicle's temporary tag, was in fact able to read the date upon approaching the car, and was totally satisfied that the temporary tag was valid and no further question remained. Therefore, when the deputy first made personal contact with Mr. Diaz, he was without probable cause, reasonable or articulable suspicion, or any other type of cause to believe or consider that any violation had occurred or was occurring.

In Delaware v. Prouse, the United States Supreme Court held that police officers may not, without violating the Fourth Amendment, randomly stop automobiles to check the validity of the driver's license and registration. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391. There, the high Court wrote:

Accordingly, we hold that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.... We hold only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers.

Id. Following the holding in Prouse, the Court further articulated that under the Fourth Amendment, a citizen "may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion). Additionally, the Court wrote: "The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.... [A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Id. at 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319; see also Cresswell v. State, 564 So.2d 480, 481 (Fla. 1990) (holding a traffic stop may last no longer than the time it takes to write a citation).

Under Prouse and Royer, it appears that once a police officer has totally satisfied the purpose for which he has initially stopped and detained the motorist, the officer no longer has any reasonable grounds or legal basis for continuing the detention of the motorist. Here, as soon as the officer determined the validity of Mr. Diaz's temporary tag, he no longer had reasonable grounds or any other basis, legal or otherwise, to further detain Mr. Diaz. Having completely ascertained the validity of the temporary license plate, the law enforcement officer no longer had any cause or suspicion supporting the existence of a traffic or any other violation. Further, under the facts presented here, he certainly had no articulable or reasonable suspicion to support the detention of Mr. Diaz. There was nothing whatsoever questionable about the vehicle or those persons in the vehicle and there simply was no hint of any criminal activity. While the officer's reason for the initial stop may arguably have been legitimate, once that bare justification had been totally removed, the officer's actions in further detaining Mr. Diaz equated to nothing less than an indiscriminate, baseless detention, not unlike that held to be inappropriate and unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Prouse. The continued detention of Mr. Diaz after full knowledge had been acquired that totally removed any articulated question constituted an infringement upon his Fourth Amendment rights. To hold otherwise would permit law enforcement officers to randomly stop any and all vehicles having a temporary license plate designed and created by the State and conduct a further examination and interrogation of the driver, and later justify the stop by simply claiming the tag, a product created by the State, was unreadable. Such random stops and extended detentions, having no basis, are unconstitutional under Prouse.

Additionally, even if the extension of such stops were valid under Prouse, clearly under Royer such detention must be limited to satisfying the purpose for the initial intervention. Here, the officer stopped Mr. Diaz only because he was allegedly unable to read the expiration date on the temporary license plate. Clearly, this was not a consensual stop and detention—it occurred only after a show of authority by the law enforcement officer. Upon approaching the vehicle and prior to personal contact, the deputy was able to read the tag, which was in a proper location, and clearly determine it to be valid. Therefore, under Royer, when the officer clearly determined the validity of the tag, the purpose for the stop was satisfied, and the continued detention of Mr. Diaz was improper. The investigative procedures and personal examination, requiring the production of further information, was beyond that which was necessary or reasonable to satisfy the stated purpose of...