State v. District Court of Iowa, In and For Linn County, 56223

• Decision Date: 22 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 56223,56223
• Citation: 218 N.W.2d 641
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT OF IOWA, IN AND FOR LINN COUNTY, and William R. Eads, Judge, Respondents.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 641

218 N.W.2d 641

STATE of Iowa, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT OF IOWA, IN AND FOR LINN COUNTY, and William R. Eads, Judge, Respondents.

No. 56223.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 22, 1974.

William G. Faches, County Atty., and Eugene J. Kopecky, Cedar Rapids, for petitioner.

Robert C. Nelson and Robert M. Fassler, Cedar Rapids, for respondents.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, REYNOLDSON and HARRIS, JJ.

REYNOLDSON, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this case to test the legality of respondent's order suppressing an implied consent blood test on the ground it violated the doctor-patient privilege. We sustain the writ and remand with directions.

At approximately 6:00 P.M. June 17, 1972, Francis Russell Lyman was driving a vehicle which came into collision with another car in Linn County, Iowa. A passenger in the other auto died as a result of his injuries.

Lyman was taken to Mercy Hospital in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for treatment. At about 10:00 P.M. an investigating patrolman, Gabrielson, in a telephone conversation with Dr. Meffert, Lyman's treating doctor, ascertained the patient could understand questions relating to the blood test procedure. The doctor authorized Mrs. Hatfield, a medical technologist who was listening tot he conversation on another telephone, to draw the blood. Gabrielson then went to Lyman's room, placed him under arrest, and invoked the implied consent procedure pursuant to chapter 321B, The Code. Lyman signed the necessary consent form and the blood specimen was withdrawn.

Lyman was indicted for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, and for manslaughter. His counsel moved to suppress any evidence relating to his blood specimen because of the claimed violation of the doctor-patient privilege. At hearing on the suppression motion, in addition to the above facts, there was presented the testimony of Dr. Meffert who said at the time he authorized the blood test he felt it would have diagnostic value in treating his patient.

Respondent found Dr. Meffert to be Lyman's attending doctor who also authorized the blood to be taken from Lyman by medical technologist Hatfield. The court's factual findings included Dr. Meffert's testimony concerning the value of a blood test for diagnostic purposes, and that Lyman at no time waived the doctor-patient privilege.

Respondent suppressed all evidence of the blood test and impliedly held testimony of Dr. Meffert or Mrs. Hatfield would fall within the prohibition of § 622.10, The Code.

I. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress can be reviewed by certiorari. State v. Holliday, 169 N.W.2d 768, 770--771 (Iowa 1969); State v. Rees, 258 Iowa 813, 816, 139 N.W.2d 406, 408 (1966). The hearing here is not de novo and we do not review fact findings of the lower tribunal further than to ascertain they are sustained by competent and substantial evidence. Only questions of law are presented. Rule 306, Rules of Civil Procedure; Harnack v. District Court of Woodbury County, 179 N.W.2d 356, 359--360 (Iowa 1970).

II. Insofar as relevant here, § 622.10, The Code provides:

'No practicing * * * physician * * * or confidential clerk of any such person, who obtains such information by reason of his employment, * * * shall be allowed, in giving testimony, to disclose any confidential communication properly entrusted to him in his professional capacity, and necessary and proper to enable him to discharge the functions of his office according to the usual course of practice or discipline. Such prohibition shall not apply to cases where the person in whose favor the same is made waives the rights conferred * * *.'

The word 'communication' as it appears in § 622.10 has been interpreted to mean all knowledge and information gained by the physician in the observation and personal examination of the patient in the discharge of his duties. Newman v. Blom, 249 Iowa 836, 844, 89 N.W.2d 349, 354--355 (1958); Howard v. Porter, 240 Iowa 153, 154--155, 35 N.W.2d 837, 838 (1949).

Thus the essential elements of communication privileged under the doctor-patient relationship are, 1) the relation of doctor-patient; 2) information acquired during this relation; and 3) the necessity and propriety of the information to enable the doctor to treat the patient skillfully in his professional capacity. State v. Bedel, 193 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Iowa 1971); State v. Tornquist, 254 Iowa 1135, 1154, 120 N.W.2d 483, 494 (1963).

In Bedel, supra, the third essential element required to trigger the § 622.10 privilege was lacking. Consequently we were not there required to confront the basic tension between that privilege and the necessity to lay a proper foundation for admission of the result of a chapter 321B blood test. In the case Sub judice, the doctor's conclusion an alcohol blood test would be helpful to his diagnosis, arrived at several hours after his patient's hospital admission and after the patient had been removed from the trauma center to his room, supplies the factor missing in Bedel.

Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the proper foundation for admissin of the test would merely necessitate Dr. Meffert's testimony that upon request he authorized withdrawal of the blood specimen, and Mrs. Hatfield's testimony concerning the withdrawal of blood and disposition of the vials.

The protective standards of § 321B.4 were obviously adopted both to protect the health of the person submitting to the test and to...