State v. Dodge
| Decision Date | 14 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. Wal–10–308. |
| Citation | 17 A.3d 128,2011 ME 47 |
| Parties | STATE of Mainev.Christopher J. DODGE. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Eric J. Walker, Dep. Dist. Atty. (orally), Waldo County Courthouse, Belfast, ME, for the State of Maine.
Christopher K. MacLean, Esq. (orally), Elliott & MacLean, LLP, Camden, ME, for Christopher J. Dodge.Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶ 1] The State of Maine, upon written approval from the Attorney General, see 15 M.R.S. § 2115–A (2010); M.R.App. P. 21(b), appeals from an order of the Superior Court (Waldo County, Hjelm, J.), suppressing statements regarding criminal drug activity that Christopher J. Dodge made to a Maine State Police detective. These statements resulted in Dodge being charged with aggravated furnishing of scheduled drugs (Class C), 17–A M.R.S. § 1105–C(1)(A)(4) (2010). The State argues that the court should not have granted Dodge's motion to suppress evidence because Dodge was not in custody when he made the statements to the police and because his statements were voluntary. We affirm in part and vacate in part.
[¶ 2] The facts are drawn from an audio recording of an interview between a Maine State Police detective and Dodge, a written transcript of that interview, and the brief testimony of the detective during the hearing conducted by the suppression court.
[¶ 3] On September 11, 2009, a Maine State Police detective drove to Dodge's residence in Waldoboro to investigate allegations of Dodge's possible criminal activity, including an allegation that Dodge had furnished drugs to his then sixteen-year-old sister-in-law. The detective drove his unmarked police cruiser to Dodge's residence, asked to speak with Dodge in his cruiser, and conducted a recorded interview with Dodge that lasted approximately one and one-half hours. Dodge was not aware that he was being recorded.
[¶ 4] The detective began the interview by stating that Dodge was not under arrest, that the cruiser's doors were not locked, and that Dodge could “get out any time” that he wanted.1 Roughly twelve and a half minutes into the interview, the detective questioned Dodge about the sister-in-law's alleged drug use:
Detective: No? [Did she] cause any more problems besides the drinking? Does she do any drugs?
Mr. Dodge: I don't think so, no—I mean, not openly around that I know of, but—
Detective: Smoke pot or cocaine or heroin, anything like that?
Mr. Dodge: I know that she smoked a little pot.
Detective: How do you know that?
Mr. Dodge: Between you and I—
Detective: Yeah.
Mr. Dodge:—because I smoked a little pot.
Detective: Okay.
Mr. Dodge: But I shouldn't—I don't know if I should tell you that. That jeopardizes my job. I mean, I got to be a little careful with that. But I will say yeah, I have now and then. And I know that she has. And I know that some of her friends that she hangs out with do, so I do believe there was some of that going on, but that wasn't something that was done around here in front of anybody or anything like that.
Detective: Yeah. Well, before you go too far, Chris, as far as—I'm not saying you're going too far, but I've done a thorough investigation and, you know, the reason I'm here is the truth, okay. And this is an investigation that's going to go forward. It's going to go to my bosses. It's going to go to other people, okay, as far as district attorney's office, other agencies. I'm here for the truth, and you're starting to tell me the truth. So I just don't want you to know that anything that's said is between you and I because that's not the case.
Mr. Dodge: Okay.
Detective: Okay? Fair enough?
Mr. Dodge: Yes.
Detective: So just (indiscernible) that. And I've done an investigation here, and I know the truth, and I want the truth from you.
Mr. Dodge: Okay.
Detective: Okay. So there's no secrets here.
Mr. Dodge: No. I understand that.
[¶ 5] Roughly six minutes thereafter, Dodge again asked the detective if he could make a statement “between you and I,” to which the detective responded, Dodge then stated, “I don't care” and “I'm just saying this.” Throughout the remainder of the interview, Dodge made numerous statements that he personally used marijuana and furnished marijuana to his sister-in-law.
[¶ 6] Dodge was charged and later indicted with one count of aggravated furnishing of scheduled drugs (Class C), 17–A M.R.S. § 1105–C(1)(A)(4). Dodge moved to suppress evidence obtained from the interview with the detective on the ground that the detective had misled Dodge concerning the confidential nature of his statements.
[¶ 7] The court conducted a hearing regarding the voluntariness of Dodge's statements 2 at which both a CD recording and a transcript of the interview with Dodge were admitted. The detective also testified. After identifying the burden of proof and addressing the key components of the interaction between Dodge and the detective, as set out above, the court found that Dodge “acknowledged that he understood” the detective's clarification regarding confidentiality and the premise that there were “no secrets here.” The court then framed the critical question:
The remaining question is whether all of the defendant's statements became involuntary, even after [the detective] told him that his statements would be disclosed to other investigators, prosecutors and representatives of other agencies, and even after the defendant acknowledged that he understood this.
[¶ 8] In addressing the law on point, the court cited State v. McConkie, 2000 ME 158, ¶ 10, 755 A.2d 1075, 1078,3 and concluded that the initial affirmative response to Dodge's “Between you and I?” could not be overcome by the detective's detailed and consistent reminders that nothing was secret or confidential. Although the court found as fact that the detective's conduct had been less egregious than the conduct involved in McConkie, the court relied on McConkie in concluding that, once the detective uttered the initial “Yeah,” all statements thereafter had to be declared involuntary. The court ultimately determined that the detective's subsequent clarifications regarding confidentiality could not cure the initial faulty assurance and that the State had not shown that Dodge's disclosures “were free of the taint created by the initial inducement.”
[¶ 9] Accordingly, the court granted Dodge's motion to suppress all statements that Dodge made to the detective after the detective's one-word response to Dodge's “Between you and I” question. Upon approval of the Attorney General, see 15 M.R.S. § 2115–A; M.R.App. P. 21(b), the State appealed.
[¶ 10] “We review the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to factual findings and de novo as to issues of law.” State v. McDonald, 2010 ME 102, ¶ 5, 6 A.3d 283, 285 (quotation marks omitted). Because the facts here are not in dispute, we review the motion court's application of the law to those facts de novo. Id. Based on the undisputed facts regarding the detective's actions during the noncustodial interrogation, we must determine whether Dodge's statements were voluntary, 4 as a matter of law, when the detective provided a one-word response to Dodge's question regarding confidentiality, quickly corrected his brief misstatement, and ascertained from Dodge that Dodge understood that nothing he said would remain confidential.
[¶ 11] The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Maine Constitution also guarantees that “[t]he accused shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself or herself.” Me. Const. art. I, § 6. Consistent with the protection of these rights, it is a fundamental principle of due process that an accused's confession must be voluntary in order for it to be admitted against the accused at trial. State v. Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d 497, 500 (Me.1983); see U.S. Const. amend. V (); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (); Me. Const. art. I, § 6–A ().
[¶ 12] If a criminal defendant challenges the voluntariness of a confession, a court must determine if the confession resulted from the “free choice of a rational mind,” was “not a product of coercive police conduct,” and “if under all of the circumstances its admission would be fundamentally fair.” 5 Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d at 501; see State v. Poblete, 2010 ME 37, ¶ 24, 993 A.2d 1104, 1109–10; State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 10, 704 A.2d 387, 390–91. This assessment of voluntariness is based on the totality of the circumstances, and includes
both external and internal factors, such as: the details of the interrogation; duration of the interrogation; location of the interrogation; whether the interrogation was custodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of officers involved; the persistence of the officers; police trickery; threats, promises or inducements made to the defendant; and the defendant's age, physical and mental health, emotional stability, and conduct.State v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 88, ¶ 9, 772 A.2d 1173, 1176. For instance, statements made in response to threats, see Coombs, 1998 ME 1, ¶ 12, 704 A.2d at 391, or in response to police promises of leniency, see State v. McCarthy, 2003 ME 40, ¶¶ 12–13, 819 A.2d 335, 340, may be determined to be involuntary.
[¶ 13] With these standards in mind, we must determine whether, based on the totality of circumstances, Dodge's statements were voluntary. See Mikulewicz, 462 A.2d at 501. Dodge does not argue that the...
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