State v. Dominguez-Martinez
| Decision Date | 02 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | DOMINGUEZ-MARTINE,P |
| Citation | 895 P.2d 306,321 Or. 206 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Jose Aramisetitioner on Review. CC 91CR3018FE; CA A77460; SC S41182. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Eric R. Johansen, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the petition and brief was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.
Robert M. Atkinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen.
On December 8, 1991, an Oregon State Police Trooper saw a 1980 Cadillac with California license plates traveling north on Interstate 5. The automobile exhibited characteristics that the trooper associated with narcotics trafficking. 1 The trooper followed the automobile and, after observing it change lanes twice without signaling, he turned on his overhead flashing lights and stopped the automobile.
The trooper approached the driver's side of the automobile. Defendant, Jose Aramis Dominguez-Martinez, who was driving, told the trooper that Julio Alberto-Mirabal, the passenger, was the registered owner of the automobile. The trooper then took defendant's driver license and Alberto-Mirabal's registration back to his patrol car, where he learned by radio that the license and registration were in order. The trooper took a tape recorder from his patrol car and returned to the automobile.
This time, the trooper went to the passenger side of the automobile, where Alberto-Mirabal was sitting with the passenger door open. The trooper stood in the opening of the door with his arm resting on the upper part of the window and leaned forward to speak with defendant and Alberto-Mirabal. The trooper told the two men that he was tape recording the conversation. The trooper tested the turn signals on the automobile and found that one was defective. The trooper advised defendant and Alberto-Mirabal that he would not issue a citation, but that they should have the signal repaired in the next town. While still leaning forward into the automobile, the trooper returned the license and the registration and said, "You guys are free to go, adios."
Defendant began to start the automobile, but the trooper did not remove his arm from the automobile door. Within one or two seconds, the trooper asked: "Do you mind if I ask you a few more questions?" The trooper told the two men that there was a narcotics trafficking problem on Interstate 5. He asked if they were transporting any drugs, large sums of money, or weapons. They denied transporting any of those things.
The trooper then asked if he could take a "quick look" in the automobile. Alberto-Mirabal stepped out of the automobile. The trooper then asked defendant to step out, and defendant complied. Alberto-Mirabal went around and opened the trunk of the automobile and propped it open with a baseball bat. The trooper searched the trunk and found nothing of significance.
Then, the trooper signaled to Alberto-Mirabal and asked whether he also could search the passenger compartment of the automobile. Alberto-Mirabal said that he could continue the search. The trooper searched the passenger compartment and, under the back seat, discovered three kilograms of a substance that later was determined to be cocaine.
Defendant and Alberto-Mirabal each were charged with delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance. Before trial, both defendant and Alberto-Mirabal moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of the automobile. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions. That court concluded that, "[b]ecause the officer extended the stop after he had concluded his investigation of the traffic infraction, he violated his statutory authority to detain the defendants." Nonetheless, the trial court denied the motions to suppress because Alberto-Mirabal "freely and voluntarily" consented to the search of the automobile.
Pursuant to plea negotiations, defendant and Alberto-Mirabal waived a jury trial and were tried on stipulated facts. Both were found guilty of possession of a controlled substance, 2 and the other counts were dismissed.
Defendant and Alberto-Mirabal appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing, by way of a joint brief, that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions without opinion. State v. Alberto-Mirabal, 126 Or.App. 544, 871 P.2d 133 (1994).
Defendant petitioned this court for review, again arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 3 Defendant relies on both statutory and constitutional grounds.
Before reaching defendant's constitutional claim, we first consider the extent of the trooper's statutory authority in the context of a stop for a traffic infraction. See State v. Holmes, 311 Or. 400, 404, 813 P.2d 28 (1991) (). ORS 810.410(3)(b) defines the parameters of police authority to detain and investigate during a traffic stop:
This court considered the scope of that statute in State v. Porter, 312 Or. 112, 817 P.2d 1306 (1991). In that case, a police officer stopped the defendant because a computer records check showed that there was an arrest warrant for the registered owner of the automobile that the defendant was driving. During the detention, the officer noticed an open beer can behind the driver's seat. After the officer arrested the defendant and put him in the back seat of the patrol car, the officer picked up the can and confirmed that it contained some beer. The facts that the can contained beer and that the can was in the car were sufficient to cite the defendant for an open container violation. See ORS 811.170 (). The officer saw no other evidence of a crime. After examining the beer can, the officer searched the automobile and found methamphetamine, a mirror, and a "cut down straw." Porter, 312 Or. at 114-15, 817 P.2d 1306.
The defendant in Porter argued that the police officer exceeded the statutorily permissible scope of the detention and investigation by continuing to investigate after having found one open container of alcohol. Id. at 116, 817 P.2d 1306. This court agreed with the defendant and suppressed the evidence found in the search, holding that "the search * * * exceeded the scope of investigation permitted by ORS 810.410(3)," because the officer had the authority to investigate only the traffic infraction, and the officer had ended that investigation when he determined that there was beer in the can. This court determined that there was no basis for further investigation and that the officer exceeded the scope of his authority when he searched the automobile. Id. at 121, 817 P.2d 1306. This court concluded:
Id. at 119-20, 817 P.2d 1306. (First emphasis added; second emphasis in original); (Citation omitted.)
This court also explored the scope of a lawful traffic stop in State v. Farley, 308 Or. 91, 775 P.2d 835 (1989). In that case, a police officer stopped the defendant because his automobile had no visible license plates. As the officer walked toward the defendant's automobile, however, the officer saw a valid temporary vehicle permit on the windshield, making it permissible to operate the vehicle without plates. Nonetheless, the officer asked the defendant to produce his driver license. The defendant gave the officer his license and told the officer that he had no insurance. The officer then checked the defendant's license on the computer and cited the defendant for driving while suspended and for driving without insurance. Id. at 93, 775 P.2d 835. Upon review, this court held that, although the initial stop was lawful, the officer had no authority to proceed with the traffic stop after he saw the temporary permit because the officer's authority under the statute ended when he discovered that the traffic infraction that he was investigating had not occurred. Id. at 94, 775 P.2d 835. 4
From those cases, it is clear that, under ORS 810.410, a police officer has authority to stop a vehicle and detain the occupants in order to investigate a traffic infraction that he or she has witnessed. 5 It also is clear, however, that an officer who stops a person for a traffic infraction may investigate only that infraction, unless the state can point to some basis other than the traffic infraction to broaden the scope of the investigation. Moreover, it is clear that, after the investigation reasonably related to the traffic infraction is complete, an officer does not have authority under ORS 810.410 to continue to detain the person stopped for the traffic infraction.
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