State v. O'Donnal
| Decision Date | 24 April 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 2491,2491 |
| Citation | 110 Ariz. 552,521 P.2d 984 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Max O'DONNAL, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Phoenix by John S. O'Dowd, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tucson, Charles L. Weninger, Certified Third-Year Law Student, University of Arizona, Tucson, for appellee.
Clay G. Diamos, Tucson, for appellant.
The appellant Max O'Donnal pled guilty to an information charging the unlawful possession of heroin and to one count of an indictment charging the unlawful sale of heroin. His plea was accepted by the trial court, and he was sentenced to confinement for not less than five nor more than seven years for the unlawful possession of heroin and not less than 15 nor more than 20 years on the unlawful sale of heroin. The sentences were to be served concurrently.
Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the punishment provisions of A.R.S. § 36--1002 and A.R.S. § 36--1002.02; further he contends that the sentence imposed in this case was excessive, and finally he questions the inclusion in the presentence report of the comments by the county attorney's staff on the appellant's reputation.
The appellant contends that the punishment sections of the statutory provisions proscribing the use, sale and possession of heroin are cruel and unusual punishment for a person such as the appellant who is an admitted heroin addict. It is his position that his status is in effect being punished rather than any criminal act. Appellant concedes that Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962) does not support his position specifically, but he argues that his acts arise from his addiction rather than any so-called antisocial behavior.
In Robinson the United States Supreme Court struck down the California statute which made it an offense for an individual to be a narcotics addict. The federal Supreme Court held that the status of addiction could not be the subject of a criminal offense and that Court held that the infliction of a criminal penalty for such a status was the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the Court in Robinson recognized that there was a distinction between the status of narcotics addiction and the use, sale or possession of narcotics. The Court in Robinson recognized the validity of state acts which seek to regulate under their police power the sale, possession, use, and administration of dangerous and habit-forming drugs.
'A State might impose criminal sanctions, for example, against the unauthorized manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics within its borders.' 370 U.S. at 664, 82 S.Ct. at 1419.
The State of Arizona under its police power has the constitutional authority to regulate or prohibit the use of narcotics and the legislature of the State may prescribe strong penalties designed to enforce the public policy against the use of such substance. State v. Mendoza, 104 Ariz. 395, 454 P.2d 140 (1969); State v. Wadsworth, 109 Ariz. 59, 505 P.2d 230 (1973).
The position of the appellant is without merit, for it is not his status which is being punished; it is his activities in possessing and dealing in a forbidden substance--a substance which the public policy of this State seeks to remove totally from use.
Appellant contends that even if the punishment imposed was not cruel and unusual in violation of the Constitution the sentence imposed was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Appellant recognizes that this Court has held on many occasions that the trial courts are given great latitude in imposition of sentences in criminal cases and that, when sentences are within statutory limits, they will be altered by this Court only in cases in which there is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Carpenter, 105 Ariz. 504, 467 P.2d 749 (1970); State v. McCline, 109 Ariz. 569, 514 P.2d 490 (1973).
Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13--1717B. this Court has been granted the power to modify the sentence imposed when the circumstances warrant it. Appellant contends that this Court has been given the statutory authority to modify sentences and that we should exercise this authority to harmonize sentences with the modern trend which appellant contends reserves the imposition of extended terms of confinement to habitual and dangerous criminal behavior.
Much has been written on the subject of appropriate terms of confinement for various types of offenses. The subject has been studied by the American Bar Association and various Presidential Commissions, See: American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice. Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, Approved Draft, 1968. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Report on Corrections (1973). The recommendations of these authorities, if accepted, would substantially reduce the maximum term of confinement authorized for most crimes to not more than five years. In effect, appellant suggests that this Court accept the suggested standards and reduce appellant's sentence to a shorter term.
Laying aside for the moment the question whether appellant may in fact be considered either a dangerous or habitual criminal, the position advocated by appellant fails to consider the fact that sentencing in Arizona is part of a complex system of legislative, judicial, and executive action. The statement of the revisers of the New York Penal Law (1964) quoted in the ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (p. 89) aptly describes this State's system:
'The approach of the proposed sentencing structure is to rely upon the gravity of the offense as the legal criterion for the length and nature of the authorized sentence (except for certain recidivists), and to balance control over the sentence among the legislative, executive and judicial branches so that each of these agencies exercises authority in accordance with the individual factors that lie within its special areas of competence.
* * *
* * *
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Com. v. LeBlanc
...3 L.Ed.2d 579 (1959). Cf. United States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009, 1015 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. deniedState Cases:State v. O'Donnal, 110 Ariz. 552, 555, 521 P.2d 984 (1974). State v. Pierson, 296 So.2d 324, 325 (La.1974). Henry v. State, 273 Md. 131, 148--150, 328 A.2d 293 (1974). People v......
-
State v. Steelman
...The convictions are based on the acts of the accused and not on his emotional disorders. See State v. O'Donnal, 110 Ariz. 552, 521 P.2d 984 (1974). We find no error. c. Whether M'Naghten violates defendant's rights under the Fourteenth Defendant next questions the application of the M'Naght......
-
State v. Buchholz
...constitutions, the roles of the courts, penal institutions, and parole authorities are defined by the legislature. State v. O'Donnal, 110 Ariz. 552, 521 P.2d 984 (1974). The legislature, having determined what punishment is appropriate for a given crime, leaves to the judiciary the exercise......
-
State v. Janise
...U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962); United States v. Moore, 158 U.S.App.D.C. 375, 486 F.2d 1139 (1973); State v. O'Donnal, 110 Ariz. 552, 521 P.2d 984 (1974). Although we appreciate the severity of Arizona's alcohol related problems, see e. g. Arizona Legislative Council Interim ......