State v. Dorsett

• Decision Date: 26 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. SC13–310.,SC13–310.
• Citation: 158 So.3d 557
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Zachariah DORSETT, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

158 So.3d 557

STATE of Florida, Petitioner

v.Zachariah DORSETT, Respondent.

No. SC13–310.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 26, 2015.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL; Consiglia Terenzio, Senior Assistant Attorney General, James Joseph Carney, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Jeanine Marie Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.

Jeanette Anne Bellon of Hamilton, Miller & Birthisel, LLP, Miami, FL, for Respondent.

Opinion

CANADY, J.

In this case, we answer a certified question regarding the knowledge element of Florida's hit-and-run statute, section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006). We have for review, Dorsett v. State, 147 So.3d 532, 536–37 (Fla. 4th DCA), review granted, 122 So.3d 869 (Fla.2013), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that in the prosecution of a driver for willfully leaving the scene of an accident involving an injury the statute requires the State to prove that the driver had “actual knowledge” of being involved in a crash. The district court certified to this Court the following question: “In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006), should the standard jury instruction require actual knowledge of the crash?” 147 So.3d at 533 (emphasis in original). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. To answer the question, we begin by reviewing the facts of the case and then examine the statute and the cases construing it to determine whether a criminal conviction for violation of the hit-and-run statute requires proof of the driver's actual knowledge rather than mere constructive knowledge of being involved in a crash. For the reasons explained below, we answer the certified question in the affirmative.

I. BACKGROUND

Zachariah Dorsett was charged with leaving the scene of a crash resulting in an injury under this state's hit-and-run statute, a third degree felony under section 316.027(1), Florida Statutes (2006). The statute is set out fully in our subsequent discussion. In brief, however, the statute requires the driver involved in a vehicular crash to stop, provide assistance to anyone injured, and provide information to others and the authorities. The district court summarized the underlying facts presented at Dorsett's trial as follows:

The defendant was driving a heavy pickup truck northbound on A1A. According to the defendant, he had his windows rolled up, windshield wipers and air conditioner on, and was listening to the [portable] radio at full volume. He saw a lot of people running across the street from the beach as it began to rain. The people had cleared the street as he drove through the intersection.

According to the defendant, he was unaware that a young teenager had lost control of his skateboard and fell as he crossed the road, hitting the truck's passenger side undercarriage. The defendant continued traveling north at a normal rate of speed and did not stop. He was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and had no hearing or health problems.

Law enforcement stopped the defendant approximately three miles from the accident. When questioned by law enforcement as to why he did not stop, the defendant explained:

The bottom line is if I would have known I had hit somebody, I would have definitely stopped this truck; that's the bottom line. I didn't—there was no—at all but the radio and me driving; I didn't hear anything else, nothing was going on. I just found out about this person getting struck by my truck that I have no idea I had struck.

The State charged the defendant with leaving the scene of a crash involving injury. He entered a not guilty plea and proceeded to trial. There, the officer who stopped the defendant testified that the victim was on his rear end in the crosswalk when he was hit by the truck. The victim went underneath the truck and was dragged almost ninety feet. There was no evidence of braking, skid marks, brake lights, evasive steering, or a change in speed. There was no damage to the front of the truck.

Several witnesses testified that they saw the accident. One saw the truck's wheels go over the victim's body and heard the truck ride over him. A worker testified that he heard the accident from one of the upper floor patios of a building where he was installing windows; he saw the victim skateboard into the street, go underneath the truck, and be dragged down the street. His co-worker testified that he saw the skateboard being spit out from under the truck's right rear tire and heard the skateboard crack in two. He also saw the back right tire of the truck actually raise up or jump up.

Another eyewitness testified that she was in a car at the light when she heard a loud noise at impact through her closed window. Another witness testified that he was about seventy-five to one hundred yards away from the road when he heard a loud thud and the sound of cracking wood. Yet another witness testified that she saw the victim fall off the skateboard and hit the right side of the truck.

A second officer testified that he pulled the defendant's vehicle over within minutes of the accident. The defendant immediately jumped out of the truck and appeared very nervous. He was visibly shaking and stuttering. The defendant repeatedly asked why he had been stopped. According to the second officer, the truck's windows were up, but the radio was not on.

Dorsett, 147 So.3d at 533–34.

Arguing that the hit-and-run statute requires proof that the driver had “actual knowledge” of involvement in a crash, Dorsett proposed a jury instruction that required the jury to find as an essential element that he “knew that he was involved in an accident.” Id. at 534 (emphasis omitted). The trial judge, however, denied the defendant's request and read the standard jury instruction, which provided that the State must prove the defendant “knew or should have known” that he was involved in a crash. Id. at 535 ; see Fla. Std. Jury Inst. (Crim.) 28.4. The jury found Dorsett guilty, and the trial court subsequently sentenced him to twenty-four months in prison for the third-degree felony.

On appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Dorsett again argued “that the standard jury instructions included an incorrect statement of law regarding section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006), because the law requires actual knowledge of the accident. ” 147 So.3d at 534 (emphasis in original). Citing this Court's decision in State v. Mancuso, 652 So.2d 370 (Fla.1995), the district court concluded that proof of a defendant's actual knowledge of the accident is required and the jury should be so instructed. Dorsett, 147 So.3d at 536–37. As a result the Fourth District reversed and remanded the case for new trial but also certified the following question: “In a prosecution for violation of section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006), should the standard jury instruction require actual knowledge of the crash?” 147 So.3d at 533 (emphasis in original).

II. ANALYSIS

Whether Florida's hit-and-run statute requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver had actual knowledge of being involved in a crash is a question of law that requires interpretation of section 316.027 to give effect to the Legislature's intent. “The interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de novo standard of review.” Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Fla.2006). Accordingly, this “Court looks primarily at the plain meaning of the statute to determine the legislative intent.” Id. at 1091. However, when the language of a statute is unclear or ambiguous, we employ rules of statutory construction to discern that intent. Kasischke v. State, 991 So.2d 803, 811 (Fla.2008).

The relevant portion of Florida's hit-and-run statute, subsection 316.027 provides as follows:

(1)(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property that results in injury of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and must remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. Any person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084.

(b) The driver of any vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property that results in the death of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and must remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. Any person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

As the statute plainly states, compliance with the law requires “[t]he driver of any vehicle involved in a crash ... that results in injury of any person” to “immediately stop,” “remain at the scene,” and comply with section 316.062, which requires the driver to provide reasonable assistance to anyone injured and to provide identifying information as specified. § 316.027(1)(a).

Although section 316.027 does not expressly state that actual knowledge is required for a violation, the law does expressly provide that a felony criminal violation requires that the driver “willfully” violate the statute. For the reasons we explain, we conclude that a willful violation can be established only if the driver had actual knowledge that a crash occurred.

In Mancuso, 652 So.2d at 370, we addressed a related claim that section 316.027 contained a requirement of actual knowledge that an injury had occurred. In that case, the defendant was charged under section 316.027 with leaving the scene of an accident involving a personal injury or death. He “struck two young women walking on a dark stretch of Interstate 95 in Palm Beach County,” killing one and injuring the other. Id. Mancuso requested a jury instruction...