State v. Douglas, 3772.

• Decision Date: 05 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. 3772.,3772.
• Citation: 597 S.E.2d 1,359 S.C. 187
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Helen Marie DOUGLAS, Appellant.

359 S.C. 187

597 S.E.2d 1

The STATE, Respondent, v. Helen Marie DOUGLAS, Appellant.

No. 3772.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard December 10, 2003.

Decided April 5, 2004.

Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled May 21, 2004.

Jack B. Swerling, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, all of Columbia; David Michael Pascoe, Jr. and Jonathan S. Gasser, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

CURETON, A.J.:

Helen Marie Douglas was convicted of murder and armed robbery. She received concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for murder and thirty years imprisonment for armed robbery. Douglas appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

Douglas and her husband, Ronnie Douglas, owned two houses in Colleton County. Douglas was in the habit of staying at the river house, and Ronnie usually stayed at the house in town. On the morning of November 3, 1997, Douglas knocked on a neighbor's door across the street from the town house, explaining that something had happened to Ronnie. The neighbor called 911 and went with Douglas to the town house, which she stated appeared to be ransacked. The neighbor also testified that Ronnie's head was surrounded by blood and he did not have a pulse. Douglas and the neighbor then left the house, and the neighbor called Douglas's two sons. Police arrived at the scene and determined there was no evidence of forced entry. A treating paramedic testified that Ronnie was dead and appeared to have a gunshot wound to the head.¹

Douglas gave two statements to police in the days following Ronnie's murder. On each occasion, officers advised Douglas of her Miranda² rights before openly tape-recording her statements. Douglas later called Investigator Stanfield, the investigating officer, and asked him to come speak to her at the river house. The officers decided to send Stanfield out to the house with a hidden tape recorder. When he met with Douglas he did not advise her of her Miranda rights. Though Douglas did not make any incriminating comments about Ronnie's murder, she did admit that she had lied to the police about having an extramarital affair at the time of Ronnie's death. Though finding the secret tape-recording a "very, very, very poor practice," the trial judge allowed admission of a redacted version of the recording at trial.

Douglas's son, Ronald, testified that Douglas gave her house keys to his brother, Tony, when she was arrested. Ronald testified that he made a copy of these keys without informing either Tony or Douglas. Ronald stated he used these keys to enter the river house at least three times — once by himself and twice with his ex-wife. He said he wanted to retrieve his video camera, his daughter's clothing, and some of his father's personal possessions. During one of these searches, Ronald's ex-wife discovered a bag of .25-caliber bullets and an empty box containing a receipt for a .25-caliber pistol. Ronald took several items from the house to the police, explaining he was searching for his father's wallet. Ronald also told police that, in the course of searching the pool pump house, he cut off the lock and threw it into the creek. Investigator Stanfield stated, "we told [Ronald] if anything came up with the investigation that needed our attention, please bring it to our attention."

Approximately eighteen months after Ronnie's murder, some homeowners found a garbage bag in the creek in their backyard. Douglas's river house was located on the nearby river. The bag contained rocks and a brick. A second bag, which was within the first bag, contained surgical gloves, two shirts, and a pair of jeans. One of Douglas's daughters-in-law testified one of the shirts was Douglas's, and that the jeans were in Douglas's size. However, the only hair sample found on the clothing did not match Douglas. After these items were turned over to police, the police conducted an underwater search of the creek. Police found a cinder block used to weigh down Ronnie's wallet and a . 25-caliber handgun.³

In further support of its theory that Douglas killed her husband, the State presented testimony from an insurance agent, Gary Wayne Walker. Walker testified that he ran into Douglas at the river house in September 1997. Walker stated Douglas was interested in purchasing a life insurance policy on Ronnie's life. Walker advised Douglas that he could not issue such a policy without Ronnie's consent. Walker later discussed prices with Douglas, but did not actually give her the quotes.

At the close of the State's case, Douglas moved for a directed verdict on the murder charge, arguing the State's case was purely circumstantial in nature. The trial judge denied the motion. Douglas also moved for a directed verdict on the armed robbery charge, arguing the State had not proved the essential elements of the offense. The trial judge denied the motion. The jury subsequently found Douglas guilty of both murder and armed robbery. Douglas renewed her motions for a directed verdict after the verdict was handed down. The trial judge denied these post-trial motions. The trial judge levied a life sentence on the murder charge and a concurrent sentence of thirty years imprisonment for armed robbery. Douglas appeals both of her convictions as well as her sentence for murder.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only. We are bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. This same standard of review applies to preliminary factual findings in determining the admissibility of certain evidence in criminal cases." State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5-6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001) (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Admission of Evidence

Douglas argues the trial judge erred in allowing the admission of several types of evidence. She states the following should not have been admitted at trial: (1) Walker's testimony about Douglas's interest in an insurance policy; (2) the secretly-taped statement given to Investigator Stanfield; (3) the items found by Ronald during his searches of the river house; and (4) the items found in the creek.

Relevant evidence is defined as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Rule 401, SCRE. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 403, SCRE.

"The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 121, 551 S.E.2d 240, 244 (2001). To warrant reversal, an appellant must show not only an alleged error, but also resulting prejudice. State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 502, 409 S.E.2d 420, 424 (Ct.App.1991) (stating the admission and exclusion of evidence is largely a matter of the trial judge's discretion, and the judge's rulings will not be overturned on appeal unless the judge committed a manifest abuse of discretion and the defendant suffered prejudice as a result).

A. Insurance Testimony

Douglas contends the trial judge erred in admitting the testimony of Gary Wayne Walker. She asserts the probative value of the testimony was outweighed by the unfairly prejudicial effect.

Walker testified he had known Douglas and her husband since the early 1970's. In September of 1997, approximately two months before the murder, Walker came in contact with Douglas. He stated he was in the area near Douglas's river house looking at property when he saw Douglas near the road. Walker stopped and spoke with Douglas. During the conversation, Douglas inquired whether Walker was still employed at the fire department. Walker told Douglas he had left the fire department and gotten into the insurance business. Walker testified Douglas asked about types of insurance and, then, "from there the conversation led to she was interested in some insurance on Ronnie, asked me if I could get her a quote on some insurance, which I did." Walker acknowledged that in order to issue an insurance policy he would have needed Ronnie's permission. Walker stated that some time after this conversation he again came in contact with Douglas. At that time, Walker informed Douglas that he had the insurance quotes. Walker testified he never gave these quotes to Douglas. Our Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence of a life insurance policy on the victim in a homicide case may be admissible to establish a defendant's motive. To be admissible, however, the evidence must show that the defendant would derive some benefit from the proceeds of the policy. See, e.g., State v. Needs, 333 S.C. 134, 150, 508 S.E.2d 857, 865 (1998)

(holding evidence that defendant carried a life insurance policy on the victim may be admissible to show defendant's motive for the homicide); State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 327, 339, 468 S.E.2d 626, 633 (1996),

cert. denied, Williams v. South Carolina, 519 U.S. 891, 117 S.Ct. 230, 136 L.Ed.2d 161 (1996) (finding evidence that defendant had substantially increased life insurance benefits for wife and son immediately prior to the homicides constituted some circumstantial evidence of defendant's motive); State v. Vermillion, 271 S.C. 99, 100, 245 S.E.2d 128, 129 (1978) (holding "it is not necessary to show that the defendant was the beneficiary under a policy of life insurance on the life of the deceased in order to render it relevant and admissible if there is some showing that the defendant would derive some benefit from the proceeds of the policy").

Here, there was no policy from which Douglas could derive some benefit. Instead, the testimony only established that Douglas inquired about a policy and never...