State v. Douglas, 91-41

• Decision Date: 13 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-41,91-41
• Citation: 485 N.W.2d 619
• Parties: 20 Media L. Rep. 1340 STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Robert Ray DOUGLAS, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 619

485 N.W.2d 619

20 Media L. Rep. 1340

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Robert Ray DOUGLAS, Appellant.

No. 91-41.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 13, 1992.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and B. John Burns, Asst. State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., Thomas S. Tauber, Asst. Atty. Gen., Fred McCaw, County Atty., and Christine O'Connell Corken, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and CARTER, NEUMAN, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

SNELL, Justice.

Robert Ray Douglas was charged with one count of murder in the first degree and two counts of attempted murder. A jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree and assault with intent to inflict serious injury on count two. He was acquitted on count three. Douglas has appealed to this court. Issues are raised regarding effectiveness of counsel in not objecting to instructions, media interference with attorney client consultations, evidentiary rulings, and the submission of lesser-included offenses. We affirm in part and reverse in part with directions.

I. Background Facts.

Douglas and his wife, Linda Douglas, were driving from the east coast to Washington state. They stopped at Maquoketa, Iowa, and entered Skeffington's Jack and Jill grocery store. While shopping, Linda Douglas was observed by a store employee placing a package of lunch meat in her purse. They paid for a quart of milk and a loaf of bread and left the store. Three employees followed them to their car where Linda Douglas was asked to return to the store. Robert Douglas responded by saying they were leaving, pointed a handgun at the three employees and asked, "Do you have a problem with this?" The employees backed up and proceeded toward the store while Douglas and Linda Douglas got into their car and drove out of the parking lot. At that moment, Craig Jackson, a Maquoketa city police officer, drove into the lot. He was immediately advised of the situation and that Douglas was armed. He followed the Douglas car and radioed for assistance from other officers.

A prolonged chase ensued at speeds above eighty-five miles per hour, which ultimately included five state trooper cars, a deputy sheriff's car, and two Maquoketa police cars. Numerous attempts to stop the Douglas car failed despite hand signals by the officers to pull over, sirens, and flashing red lights on their vehicles. Trooper Virgil Stammeyer pulled his patrol car abreast of the Douglas car three times motioning him to pull off the road and stop. The third time Douglas fired his handgun twice at Trooper Stammeyer. Two bullets came through the windshield striking him in the shoulder and throat. Trooper Stammeyer was shot eleven days short of his planned retirement, recovered from his injuries, and retired. Trooper Jeffrey Cooper saw that Trooper Stammeyer had been shot and radioed this fact to the other officers. He then initiated bumping and ramming actions to force Douglas's car off the road. This finally resulted in spinning the Douglas car into a pickup truck that had entered an intersection at the Maquoketa city outskirts. The Douglas vehicle stopped.

Matthew Stammeyer, a state trooper and son of Trooper Virgil Stammeyer, participated in the actions to stop the Douglas car. Because he was on a different radio frequency, he was unable to establish radio contact with other troopers and was unaware that Douglas was armed and had shot his father. Upon arriving at the place where the Douglas car had stopped, Trooper Stammeyer yelled at Douglas to stop. He then saw Douglas raise his hand to the back of Linda Douglas's head and discharge his gun. She died as a result.

Trooper Stammeyer yelled for Douglas to stop again. This time Douglas moved his right hand forward in the trooper's direction with the weapon in his hand. Trooper Stammeyer then fired his revolver six times into the vehicle wounding Douglas. Douglas followed an order to throw his gun out the window. Two other troopers removed Douglas from the car, and he was taken to the hospital.

II. Admissibility of Subsequent Police Conduct.

At the crash scene, fifteen police vehicles were assembled. Douglas characterizes this and the chase of Douglas's car by seven police cars as police panic that culminated in the use of excessive force. The argument is that the police conduct generated a fear in Douglas that caused him to act in self defense. At trial, he sought to introduce evidence to support this theory that purported to show the aggressive character of the police. We permit evidence under Iowa Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(A) of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of a crime offered by an accused. Citing this rule, Douglas offered evidence of police conduct that occurred after the arrest of Douglas. The evidence showed that several police officers saw a black man sitting in his car bearing Ohio license plates in a church parking lot. They approached him with guns drawn, including shotguns, and forced him out of the car and down on the pavement. It turned out that he was a retired military man who was lost and was waiting for someone to come and get him. The trial court refused to allow presentation of this evidence. Our review of a ruling on the admissibility of evidence is for abuse of discretion. State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 93 (Iowa 1986).

In State v. Dunson, 433 N.W.2d 676, 679-81 (Iowa 1988), we adopted the rule allowing evidence of subsequent conduct as well as prior conduct to show character traits. At the same time, we cautioned that the district court must still exercise its discretion as to its admissibility under Iowa Rule of Evidence 403. In the instant case, the court properly excluded the proffered testimony as being not relevant. Only one police officer participated in both events so that the conduct exhibited at the church parking lot would not reflect the conduct of different officers involved in the car chase and arrest of Douglas. Further, under rule 403, the prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value of this evidence.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim.

Douglas pleaded as part of his defense that he was entitled to the benefit of the diminished responsibility defense. This defense was recognized in State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d 285 (1964). This common law doctrine "permits proof of defendant's mental condition on the issue of defendant's capacity to form a specific intent in those instances in which the State must prove defendant's specific intent as an element of the crime charged." Id. at 139, 126 N.W.2d at 288. The mental condition claimed by defendant was that he suffered from epilepsy.

Dr. Mark Fortson testified, being called as a witness for defendant, on the nature of epilepsy. Practicing neurology, he specializes in treatment of disorders of the nervous system of the brain. He testified that there are many different kinds of epileptic seizures that are caused when neurons, which are cells that control brain function, get out of control. Evidence was presented to the jury that Douglas was taking medication for an epileptic condition he had had for many years.

The trial court submitted an instruction on diminished responsibility on the issue of specific intent to kill Linda Douglas. As an alternative to this charge of first-degree murder, the court instructed that defendant could be convicted of first- degree murder if, as an element thereof, he was participating in the offense of first-degree robbery or attempted murder. This alternative did not include an instruction on specific intent or diminished responsibility. Douglas claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to these omissions in instructing on alternative B. He argues that specific intent is required as an element of the crimes of robbery and attempted murder, the underlying felonies in the murder charge of alternative B. As such, the diminished responsibility defense is as applicable to the felony murder charge of alternative B as to the specific intent required by alternative A to prove first-degree murder. Our review of this constitutional claim is de novo on the totality of the circumstances. Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 79-80 (Iowa 1989).

Two reasons appear persuasive to reject Douglas's assertion of error. First, the expert testimony by Dr. Fortson belies the suggestion of a nexus between Douglas's acts and his condition of epilepsy. Dr. Fortson stated that an epileptic has no physical or voluntary control over what is happening during a seizure. He testified "if a person has control that almost excludes the possibility that it's a seizure." Evidence was presented that Douglas may have experienced two seizures after being taken to the hospital to treat his injuries. However, there is no evidence that any seizure activity occurred during the car chase; in fact, the length of time Douglas drove his car in an attempt to elude the police is nearly irrefutable evidence that he was in voluntary control of his actions. The defense of diminished responsibility based on Douglas's epilepsy lacked evidentiary foundation.

Second, we believe Douglas received the benefit of this defense as to the felony murder count through other instructions by the court. In jury instructions thirty-two and thirty-five, the jury was told that, with respect to attempted murder, the State had to prove that Douglas acted with specific intent to cause death. Jury instruction twenty-three instructed that to convict on the charge of first-degree robbery, the State had to prove that Douglas acted with the intent to commit a theft. In State v. Miles, 344 N.W.2d 231 (Iowa 1984), we adopted the standard, now expressed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Under that standard, we find a lack of sufficient prejudice to Douglas's presentation of the diminished responsibility defense to...