State v. Downey
| Decision Date | 15 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. M2005-02335-SC-R11-CD,M2005-02335-SC-R11-CD |
| Citation | 259 S.W.3d 723 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee v. Robert T. DOWNEY. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Robert T. Bateman, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Robert T. Downey.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Brent C. Cherry, Assistant Attorney General (on appeal); John Wesley Carney, Jr., District Attorney General; Dan Brollier, Assistant District Attorney General (at trial); for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, CORNELIA A. CLARK, GARY R. WADE, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined.
The defendant in this case was convicted of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and reckless endangerment. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his convictions but remanded for re-sentencing. We granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal to consider the following issues: 1) whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress his written statement; 2) whether the trial court erred by overruling defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment when the State violated rules of discovery; 3) whether the State failed to prove the use of a deadly weapon; 4) whether there was sufficient evidence of conspiracy to use a deadly weapon; and 5) whether the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Neither party appealed the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to remand for re-sentencing. After considering these issues, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress and motion to dismiss. We also hold that there was sufficient evidence to support all of the convictions. We therefore affirm the defendant's convictions, while remanding to the trial court for re-sentencing under the Court of Criminal Appeals' order.
In April 2001, Barbi Michelle Brown, a co-defendant and girlfriend of the defendant, Robert T. Downey, was living with her aunt, Patricia Rye, and the aunt's husband, James Neil Rye. While living with the Ryes, Ms. Brown met the victim, Charlie Rye, who was James Rye's father.
On the night of April 11, 2001, Ms. Brown approached the defendant about the possibility of robbing the victim. She knew the victim to be a "small, older man" who lived alone and typically carried a lot of cash with him. She described the victim's trailer and how it was laid out. The defendant agreed to participate in the robbery and asked co-defendant Marcus Green to participate as well. The three discussed what they would do if the victim were present or if he were asleep and woke up during the robbery. The defendant suggested that if this happened, they should "knock him out."
Later that night, Ms. Brown drove the defendant and Mr. Green to the victim's residence. Ms. Brown remained in the vehicle while the two men went into the home. The defendant was carrying a red metal flashlight with him. When the men entered the trailer, the victim woke up. The defendant struck him six or seven times in the head with the flashlight. The men left with approximately $3,200 in cash from the victim's pants, the victim's television, and a large jar full of change. The three divided the cash, Mr. Green kept the jar of change, and the defendant kept the television, which he later sold.
The next morning, Mr. James Rye drove past the victim's home and noticed that the door was open and that the victim's truck was still there. Mr. Rye found this unusual because his father should have been at work. He entered the home and found the victim on his bed beaten, bleeding, and incoherent. The victim's pants and wallet were on the end of the bed. Mr. Rye noticed blood all over the victim and the wall. The victim's head had been severely beaten, his eyes were swollen shut, and there was blood in his mouth. As a result of his injuries, the victim was hospitalized for over a month. According to one of his attending physicians, his skull injuries were potentially life-threatening.
On May 5, 2001, the Montgomery County General Sessions Court issued an arrest warrant for the defendant, based on information the police obtained from "individuals, including a co-defendant." On May 8, 2001, the Clarksville Police Department received a tip as to the defendant's location. Officer Kelly Hewett called in the "TACT team" to make the arrest, after which time the defendant was placed in Officer Hewett's patrol car for transportation. Once in his custody, Officer Hewett asked the defendant if he needed any medical attention due to the fact that the TACT team had used some diversionary explosive devices, commonly known as "flash bangs,"2 in making the arrest. The defendant stated that he did not and that he had planned to turn himself in the next day after he got an attorney. Officer Hewett drove the defendant to the Criminal Justice Complex (CJC).
Larry Hodge, a Criminal Investigator from the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department was on call and was asked to conduct an interview with the defendant when he was brought to the CJC. Sergeant Patrick Vaden was also present. Investigator Hodge advised the defendant of his Miranda3 rights, and the defendant read and signed the admonition and waiver. Investigator Hodge told him that two other people had been apprehended and interviewed and that their statements had been videotaped. The defendant asked to see the tapes of the other two interviews. Investigator Hodge and Sergeant Vaden stepped out of the room to discuss the request, at which time Investigator Hodge realized that the videotape that was intended to record the defendant's interview had not been inserted and was not recording. He started the tape. Thus, when they re-entered the room, the remainder of the interview was recorded on videotape.
The defendant gave an oral confession, detailing the events of April 11, 2001. The investigators then asked the defendant to write out his statement. Investigator Hodge told the defendant that by cooperating with them by writing out a statement, he could not hurt himself, but might help. The defendant asked if he could make a phone call, and he was told that he could do that after he finished his statement. He then asked if he could give his written statement later and was told no. At that point, he sat down and wrote out his statement.
The defendant was indicted in June 2001 for conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, theft, and attempted first degree murder. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the videotaped and written confessions. An evidentiary hearing was held on June 8, 2004, after which the trial court denied the motion.
Following a jury trial held on September 27 and 28, 2004, the defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and reckless endangerment. The trial court dismissed the charge of theft. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to eight years for the conspiracy, three years for aggravated burglary, one year for reckless endangerment, and twenty years for especially aggravated robbery. The court ordered the twenty-year sentence to run concurrently with the eight-year sentence. The court further ordered the one-year sentence to run consecutive to the three-year sentence, which in turn was to run consecutive to the twenty-year sentence, for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years.
The defendant appealed, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress his videotaped statement and written statement to police, the trial court's denial of his request to dismiss the indictments against him based upon the State's violation of a Rule 16 discovery request, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions for especially aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction but remanded for a sentencing hearing so the trial court could properly include the findings required for consecutive sentencing. The defendant filed a timely application for permission to appeal with this Court, which we granted.
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress both his videotaped statement and his written statement. A hearing was held, at which time Investigator Hodge, Lieutenant Vaden, and Officer Hewett testified, and the videotaped and written statements were introduced into evidence. At the close of the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress.4
When reviewing the correctness of a trial court's denial of a pretrial motion to suppress, the court on appeal must uphold the trial court's decision unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. State v. Williams, 185 S.W.3d 311, 314 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn.1996). "Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact." Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. We afford the prevailing party the "`strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.'" State v. Carter, 16 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tenn.2000) (quoting State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn.1998)). Our review of a trial court's application of law to the facts, however, is conducted under a de novo standard of review. Williams, 185 S.W.3d at 315; State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn.2001).
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...bring a motion to suppress your client’s statement because of a violation of the state’s telephone call statute. See State v. Downey , 259 S.W.3d 723, 734-35 (Tenn. 2008). D. Medical Privilege §12:45 Uncommon Occurrence If prosecutors try to use a statement your client made to a doctor, the......
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Other Grounds for Suppressing Confessions
...bring a motion to suppress your client’s statement because of a violation of the state’s telephone call statute. See State v. Downey , 259 S.W.3d 723, 734-35 (Tenn. 2008). D. Medical Privilege §12:45 Uncommon Occurrence If prosecutors try to use a statement your client made to a doctor, the......
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Other grounds for suppressing confessions
...bring a motion to suppress your client’s statement because of a violation of the state’s telephone call statute. See State v. Downey , 259 S.W.3d 723, 734-35 (Tenn. 2008). D. Medical Privilege §12:45 Uncommon Occurrence If prosecutors try to use a statement your client made to a doctor, the......
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Other grounds for suppressing confessions
...bring a motion to suppress your client’s statement because of a violation of the state’s telephone call statute. See State v. Downey , 259 S.W.3d 723, 734-35 (Tenn. 2008). D. Medical Privilege §12:45 Uncommon Occurrence If prosecutors try to use a statement your client made to a doctor, the......