State v. Drakeford
| Decision Date | 05 July 1922 |
| Docket Number | 10901. |
| Citation | 113 S.E. 307,120 S.C. 400 |
| Parties | STATE v. DRAKEFORD. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Clarendon County James E. Peurifoy, Judge.
B. K Drakeford was convicted of unlawfully keeping in possession and storing intoxicating liquor, and appeals. Affirmed.
W. C Davis, of Manning, for appellant.
Frank A. McLeod, Sol., of Sumter, for the State.
The defendant was indicted and convicted at the spring term, 1921, of the court for Clarendon county, Judge James E. Peurifoy presiding, of violation of the prohibition law upon three counts of an indictment charging (1) the unlawful receipt, (2) the unlawful keeping in possession, and (3) the unlawful storing of alcoholic liquor.
Upon the conclusion of the testimony for the state, the defendant moved for the direction of a verdict. The motion was granted as to the counts in the indictment charging manufacturing and transporting, and refused as to the three foregoing counts.
Appellant's counsel, in his printed argument, groups exceptions 2, 9, and 12, and states that they allege error in not directing a verdict, in not setting aside the verdict, and in not granting a new trial on the counts of the indictment charging the unlawful storing and keeping in possession. Exceptions 1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, and 14 are directed to the count of the indictment charging an unlawful receipt and acceptance for an unlawful purpose. These exceptions are grouped in appellant's argument, and the nature of the error thereby alleged is therein stated to be, in substance, that there was no evidence to support the verdict.
The validity of the appeal, based upon the exceptions specified, is thus clearly rested upon the contention that this court should hold as a matter of law that the evidence adduced upon the trial below was insufficient to sustain a conviction.
The defendant introduced no testimony. The evidence for the state consisted of the testimony of three rural policemen to the effect that they went to the defendant's place of business in Clarendon county to look for liquor; that they found in his store a jug containing four or five gallons of corn whisky; that this jug was under a barrel; that a Coca-Cola bottle containing whisky was found under one counter and a ginger ale bottle containing whisky was found under another counter; that both bottles had crowns on them; that the contents of the jug had been duly sampled by one of the witnesses, and the alcoholic character thereof duly verified; that the defendant Drakeford's store had been raided before, but no liquor found. The jug and bottles, with the so-called sou-cat contents, appear to have been introduced in evidence.
We have no difficulty in agreeing with the view of the circuit judge that the evidence adduced was amply sufficient to justify the verdict.
Careful examination of the judge's charge upon the issues raised by the counts as to storing and keeping in possession discloses no error. The jury were properly charged under the express provisions of section 14 of the act of 1917 (30 Stat. 72) that storing or having in possession "any quantity" of intoxicating liquor "for any purpose" in a room in which is maintained or conducted a "store" is unlawful. The jury were further given the full benefit in the judge's charge of defendant's contention that storing and keeping in possession imply habit or continuity.
As to the issue raised by the count as to "unlawfully receiving and accepting for unlawful use," appellant's contention, as we understand it, is that, even if there was evidence tending to establish violation of law as to storing and keeping in possession, there was no evidence whatever tending to establish an unlawful receipt or acquirement of the liquor for an unlawful purpose. In the absence of testimony furnishing the basis of any reasonable inference to the contrary, it is somewhat difficult to conceive of how liquor unlawfully stored and kept in a country store, a portion of it bottled and crowned, apparently ready for sale, could have been acquired and received for a lawful and innocent purpose. Certainly from those facts it was entirely competent for the jury to draw the inference that it was not so lawfully received.
The judge correctly charged that, if the liquor was secured or received for an unlawful purpose, that would in itself constitute a violation of the law. The issue made was properly submitted to the jury.
It would seem too obvious for argument that the trial judge did not charge upon the facts (exception 3) in saying to the jury, "It is simply a question of fact for you to decide under the testimony as you have heard it and from the exhibits that you have in evidence," nor in saying, "You have heard the testimony and you have the exhibits."
The remaining exceptions (4, 5 and 6) impute error to the trial judge in the conduct of the trial and grow out of the following incidents and circumstances: After the jury had been out for a while (the record fails to disclose how long) at 6:30 p. m. the jury came into court and asked for instructions upon a question of law. After charging the jury in response to that request, the judge at 7 p. m. called the foreman of the jury (defendant's counsel stating there was no objection to such course of action) and gave him instructions as to bringing in a sealed verdict when agreed upon. The foreman upon receiving these instructions asked: "Suppose we can't agree?" To which the judge replied: "Oh, but you must agree; we would'nt consider a mistrial in this case." The next morning at 9:30 the judge...
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Buff v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPT. OF TRANSP.
...jury to deliberate a third time where there was no indication of unwillingness on the part of the jury to retire. In State v. Drakeford, 120 S.C. 400, 113 S.E. 307 (1922), the trial judge gave the foreman instructions on how to deliver the verdict when reached. The foreman inquired, "[s]upp......
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Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
...a *** judge may not coerce a jury, he is not precluded from indicating very plainly that he will not be coerced by the jury.' State v. Drakeford , 113 S.E. 307. After being sent back to their room, the jury returned less than half an hour with the verdict which was rendered--a result just a......
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State v. Gibert
...Coast Line R. Co., 191 S.C. 345, 4 S.E.2d 273, 280, and under like circumstances. The court there held, quoting from State v. Drakeford, 120 S.C. 400, 113 S.E. 307: "While a *** judge may not coerce a jury, he is precluded from indicating very plainly that he will not be coerced by the jury......
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State v. Dawson
... ... to urge a jury to reach a verdict provided nothing like ... coercion takes place. State v. Jones, 86 S.C. 17, 67 ... S.E. 160; Nickles v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 74 S.C ... 102, 141, 54 S.E. 255, 268; Coleman v. Stevens, 124 ... S.C. 8, 117 S.E. 305; State v. Drakeford, 120 S.C ... 400, 113 S.E. 307 ... [203 ... S.C. 175] The question of whether or not the supplemental ... charge to the jury, when considered as a whole, amounted to ... coercion as a matter of law should be considered in the light ... of a long line of decisions of this ... ...