State v. Drakes
| Decision Date | 12 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-0207,18-0207 |
| Citation | 844 S.E.2d 110 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia, Respondent v. Hayden Damian DRAKES, Petitioner |
Matthew Brummond, Esq., Public Defender Services, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for the Petitioner.
Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, John M. Masslon II, Esq., Assistant Solicitor General, Caleb A. Ellis, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Counsel for the Respondent.
The petitioner, Hayden Damian Drakes, was convicted by a jury on one count of second-degree murder. He appeals the February 26, 2018, order of the Circuit Court of Cabell County, West Virginia, denying his Motion to Set Aside the Verdict, and his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, Alternatively, Motion for a New Trial, and sentencing him to a term of forty years in prison, with credit for time served, and no credit for home confinement. The petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that it could convict him of second-degree murder if it found intent to kill or to cause great bodily injury , and in instructing the jury that provocation and heat of passion were elements of voluntary manslaughter. Upon careful review of the parties’ brief and oral arguments, the appendix record, and the applicable law, we find the circuit court erred in its instructions to the jury for both second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, we reverse the petitioner's conviction and remand the case to the circuit court for a new trial.
Both parties agree that the facts are largely undisputed regarding an altercation between the petitioner and Brett Powell, the victim, on March 30, 2016, which led to the victim's death and to the petitioner being charged with second-degree murder. The evidence introduced at trial showed that on March 30, the petitioner and a group of friends went to Club Deception, a bar located in downtown Huntington, West Virginia, to celebrate the petitioner's birthday and the anniversary of two other members of the group, Joshua and Danielle Spurlock. The group went to the outdoor patio area of the bar. While in this area, they were approached by the victim, Brett Powell, who was a stranger to the group. The victim approached the group, introduced himself as "Tim," and asked if anyone wanted to purchase illegal drugs. The members of the group declined and asked the victim to leave.
The victim left, but returned a few minutes later. This time, the victim asked Mrs. Spurlock, who was pregnant, and another member of the group, Liza Slone, if they wanted to purchase any drugs. Mr. Spurlock informed the victim that he was speaking to his wife, that she was pregnant, and that the victim needed to leave. Again the victim left, but then again he returned, after Mr. Spurlock had gone inside the bar to use the restroom. When one of his friends told him that the victim was back and had again approached his wife, Mr. Spurlock returned to the group and expressed his frustrations both to his wife and to the petitioner.
Thereafter, the victim, despite being told that Mrs. Spurlock was pregnant, came up to her, pushing a drink in her face, shoving it towards her mouth. Mr. Spurlock testified that he "smacked the cup out of ... [the victim's] hand." Mr. Spurlock testified that he came "face-to-face" with the victim and told him he needed to leave. Mr. Spurlock testified that he was ready to fight the victim if the victim did not leave the bar. At this point, the petitioner stated to Mr. Spurlock that he was going "to try to play peacemaker and ... just deescalate the situation" by speaking to the victim.
The petitioner found the victim in the patio area of the bar. He told the victim to leave the group alone, after which, in petitioner's recounting of events, although his intent was not to fight or hurt the victim, "[w]e exchanged words." The victim then "grabbed" the petitioner, whereupon the petitioner lost his temper and "just started hitting" the victim. The evidence introduced at trial, which included videos from the bar's security cameras, showed the petitioner punched the victim in the face—seven or eight times—until the victim fell to the ground. When the victim fell, the petitioner stopped hitting him and left the bar with his friends for another bar down the street.
Another patron in the bar, Danielle Hayes, came out on the patio after the incident. She noticed that the victim was having a seizure, so she turned him on his side. When the victim stopped breathing, she performed CPR, remaining with the victim until emergency personnel arrived. The victim later died. The medical examiner testified that the cause of the victim's death was blunt injuries to the head.
The petitioner was arrested in the early morning of the next day in connection with the assault. The petitioner agreed to be interviewed by Detective Shane Bills with the Huntington Police Department. Detective Bills testified that during the interview, the petitioner admitted to hitting the victim, but denied trying hurt him.
On August 17, 2016, the petitioner was indicted on one count of second-degree murder. The petitioner's two-day jury trial began on December 19, 2017. At the close of all the evidence, the events giving rise to the two issues presently before the Court occurred during the instructional phase of the petitioner's trial. The first issue arose during the parties’ discussion with the circuit court about the instructions to be given to the jury, when the State objected to the petitioner's proposed instruction on second-degree murder. The instruction, in relevant part, would have informed the jury that: "Murder in the second degree is the unlawful, intentional killing of another person with malice but without deliberation or premeditation." Conversely, the State's proposed instruction was as follows: "Murder of the Second Degree is committed feloniously, maliciously, but without deliberate or premeditated action and with the intent to kill or to cause great bodily harm. "1 (Emphasis added). In similar vein, the State also sought the following instruction, which was given by the Court:
The Court further instructs the jury that a conviction for second degree murder cannot be sustained without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the requisite criminal intent. In regard to second degree murder, the requisite criminal intent would be the intent to do great bodily harm , or a criminal intent aimed at life.
(Emphasis added). Even while agreeing to give the State's instruction, the circuit court commented that, "I don't like that[,]" explaining, "You are saying you can find him guilty of Second Degree Murder if there is intent to kill or cause great bodily harm. " (Emphasis added). The petitioner again objected, stating "Murder requires specific intent to kill, Judge ...," and the circuit court agreed: "I have always felt that it did." The circuit court stated to the assistant prosecutor, "If you want to give that, I will; but I will leave that up to you." Subsequently, in continuing the argument that intent to do great bodily harm is an element of second-degree murder, as the State continued to insist, the circuit court stated, The circuit court specifically cautioned the State:
The second issue on appeal concerns the voluntary manslaughter instruction that was given to the jury. In this regard, the petitioner asked the circuit court to instruct the jury that " ‘Voluntary Manslaughter’ is the unlawful and intentional killing of another without malice." The circuit court initially agreed to give the petitioner's instruction even though the State argued that its instruction was better because it contained the elements of sudden provocation and heat of passion. The circuit court stated, Despite the circuit court initially agreeing to give the petitioner's proposed instruction, the State pressed the circuit court to use its instruction, which included the elements of sudden provocation and heat of passion. The petitioner countered that these were not elements of the crime; if the jury found that the petitioner did not act with malice, The circuit court ultimately ruled that it would give the State's instruction on voluntary manslaughter: "[T]he Defendant ... did feloniously, unlawfully and intentionally, without premeditation, deliberation or malice, but upon sudden provocation and in the heat of passion kill ... [the victim]."2
During the jury's deliberations, it sent the following message to the circuit court: "Please submit instructions with definitions of Involuntary Manslaughter, Voluntary Manslaughter, and Murder Two." The circuit court gave the jury the same instructions that it had previously read to them, but in writing. The jury convicted the petitioner of second-degree murder. After the circuit court considered the petitioner's post-trial motions, the petitioner was sentenced to the maximum term of forty years in prison.
Both assignments of error concern the instructions given to the jury. Our review of the jury instructions is governed by the following standard of review:
A trial court's instructions to the jury must be a correct statement of the law and supported by the evidence. Jury instructions are reviewed by determining whether the charge, reviewed as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury so they understood the issues...
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