State v. Duffy, Def. ID# 84006719DI

• Decision Date: 23 February 2012
• Docket Number: Def. ID# 84006719DI
• Parties: State v. Duffy
• Court: Delaware Superior Court

State

v.Duffy

Def. ID# 84006719DI

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DATE SUBMITTED: November 10, 2011

February 23, 2012

RICHARD F. STOKES JUDGE

Charles Duffy, Sr.

SBI# 0007

S-1-Unit, A-12

James T. Vaughn Correctional Center

1181 Paddock Road

Smyrna, DE 19977

Dear Mr. Duffy:

Pending before the Court are a motion of defendant Charles Duffy, Sr. ("Duffy" or "defendant") seeking the appointment of counsel and alternative motions seeking either postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61") or a sentence correction pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35 ("Rule 35").¹ This is my decision denying the pending motions.²

Defendant claims he is entitled to postconviction relief because the plea colloquy shows that the Court did not explain to him the elements of rape in the first degree. Defendant's other claim to relief stems from the duration of his life sentence. In brief, defendant establishes that he was told, at the time he entered his plea, that his life sentence was equivalent to 45 years. Subsequent thereto, case law has rendered this sentence to be one for his entire life; i.e., he may not be released unless he is paroled. This second argument is a significant one and requires close examination.

Defendant contends his guilty plea was involuntary and consequently, he is entitled to withdraw it because, at the time he entered his plea, the trial judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel all believed and advised him that he was accepting a plea agreement "to a term of imprisonment which meant 45 years." He argues that because he was misinformed about the lawful punishment, he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea. He further develops his argument:

Clearly, in light of the plea colloquy record on its face, the trial judge in this case failed to inform the defendant personally in open court of the correct judgment and sentence as well as any mandatory minimum penalty and of the maximum possible penalty.

He maintains that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because he has shown a reasonable probability that he would not have entered the plea if he had understood the maximum penalty to which he pled guilty "was for the balance of his natural life, and not a maximum 45 year sentence." He argues: "[I]n the instant case, the trial judge, prosecutor and defense counselall believed and advised the defendant personally in open Court that life imprisonment in Delaware actually by law meant 45 years. [Emphasis in original.]"

Defendant's second argument is that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not advise defendant of the actual sentence he was facing.

His third argument is that the plea agreement was breached. He argues as follows:

In the case at bar, the defendant's defense counsel Karl Haller, Esq., Assistant Public Defender confirmed three (3) days after the defendant accepted the plea agreement that on 9/13/85 before judge [sic] Tease with prosecutor Sandy present that Judge tease [sic] sentenced the defendant to life defined as 45 years imprisonment. Twenty years of this mandatory for rape in the first degree. [Sic] See letter dated, September 16, 1985 from Karl Haller, Esq., to the defendant.³ This additionally supports the defendant's claim of Involuntary Plea and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel during defendant's Plea Colloquy proceedings. Judge Tease's Plea Colloquy is both confusing and misleading as to the sentence which invalidates the plea agreement. See Plea Colloquy at page 8. The Guilty Plea record in the defendant's case is clearly deficient in two fundamental respects: (1) the plea colloquy record does not adequately reflect that the defendant was properly advised of - and understood the elements of the offense (rape in the first degree) to which he plead guilty; and (2) in Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539 (Del. 2005), the Court "held that, a life sentence with the possibility of parole imposed prior to the Truth in Sentencing Act of 1989 ("TIS") was not defined as a 45 year term," as such, where at the time the defendant's plea agreement was executed, and defense counsel Karl Haller Esq., the prosecutor Sandy and the trial court Judge Tease all mistakenly believed that "life imprisonment in {Delaware} under first degree rape is considered to be 45 years," and this erroneous information was conveyed to the defendant and he relied on itin accepting the plea, and such erroneous advice about sentencing is a direct consequence of the plea, thus, rendering the guilty plea involuntary. [Emphasis in original; footnote added.]

He asks the Court either to vacate the guilty plea or to honor the understanding of everyone that the sentence was for 45 years.

I turn to the facts.

On June 19, 1984, defendant was arrested for committing the crime of rape in the first degree in violation of 11 Del. C. § 764(2)⁴ as well as other crimes. In December, 1984, defendant was indicted on ten charges, including the charge of rape in the first degree. The applicable sentencing provisions for the crime of rape required life imprisonment with the first twenty years being mandatory and not subject to reduction in any manner. 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(1)⁵ and§4209A.⁶ Particularly pertinent to defendant's sentence was the parole statute, 11 Del. C. § 4346.⁷ It provided in pertinent part as follows:

(a) A person confined to any correctional facility administered by the Department may be released on parole by the Board if he has served 1/3 of the term imposed by the court, such term to be reduced by such merit and good behavior credits as have been earned, or 120 days, whichever is greater.***⁸

(b) Consistent with the law, the Board, upon written recommendation of the court which imposed the sentence, or the Department, may reduce the minimum term of eligibility when the Board is satisfied that the best interest of the public and the welfare of the person will be served by such reduction. ***

(c) The Board shall have authority to act where the maximum term has been commuted by the Governor. For all purposes of this section, a person sentenced to imprisonment for life shall be considered as having been sentenced to a fixed term of 45 years. [Emphasis added.]

In a letter dated January 28, 1985, defendant's trial attorney, Karl Haller, Esquire, enclosed a Guilty Plea Form to defendant. The blanks in the Guilty Plea Form were empty but for the following exception:

What is the total consecutive maximum possible penalty provided by law for the charges to which your guilty plea is offered: Rape I (life = 45 years - - 20 mandatory) [Emphasis added.]

The phrase, "Rape I (life = 45 years - - 20 mandatory)", was typed onto the form.

Defendant ultimately entered a plea to rape in the first degree in exchange for the Stateagreeing to nolle prosse the remaining nine charges. The Plea Agreement, which defendant signed, and which, according to the defense attorney, the prosecutor filled out,⁹ provided that defendant would enter a Robinson¹⁰ plea to rape in the first degree and it states: "life imprisonment - no good time or parole eligibility for at least 20 years." [Emphasis added.] The Guilty Plea Form referenced above was completely filled out.

Defendant entered his plea on July 8, 1985. The transcript of the plea colloquy, starting at page 2, states:

MR. SANDY [The Prosecutor]: *** Rape in the first degree is a Class A felony punishable by life imprisonment. There is no good time or parole eligibility for at least twenty years. ***

MR. HALLER: Yes, Mr. Duffy is to your right ... and he is indeed pleading guilty to Count I which is rape in the first degree.

Now, Investigator Kitchen and myself have been over this with Charles and he understands that by pleading Your Honor doesn't have any discretion as to what sentence to impose; namely, you have to impose life equals forty-five years and

of this twenty years has to be served.

***

THE COURT: What is the sentence that must be imposed by the Court? MR. DUFFY: Forty-five.

THE COURT: Actually deemed by law to be a forty-five year sentence, but is a sentence for the balance of your natural life. For parole purposes and other purposes, excluding the twenty year business, it is a life sentence and to be deemed to be a forty-five year sentence. Is that your understanding?

MR. DUFFY: Yes.

THE COURT: About the first twenty years, do you understand that that first twenty years is a mandatory minimum period of time which is not susceptible to any reduction of any kind?

MR. DUFFY: Yes.

THE COURT: Not subject to parole, probation or any other reduction. Do you understand that?

MR. DUFFY: Yes.

Transcript of July 8, 1985 Proceedings at 2-8. [Emphasis added.]

The Court did not sentence defendant on the day he entered the plea. A presentence investigation was undertaken and a report was prepared during the time between his plea and sentencing. During this time frame, defendant explained in a letter to Judge Tease dated August 28, 1985, that part of the reason he entered the plea was because his attorney informed him that the prosecutor planned to pursue an habitual offender designation against defendant. Although it never is expressly stated, the implication is that defendant thought if he was sentenced pursuant to the habitual offender statute, then he would have to spend the rest of his life in jail without any chance of release.

Judge Tease sentenced defendant on September 13, 1985. The sentence provided:

IT IS THE SENTENCE OF THIS COURT THAT YOU:

***

2. Be imprisoned for the balance of your natural life beginning June 18, 1984. The first twenty years of this term of imprisonment is a minimum mandatory sentence and not subject to suspension, probation or parole.

Over the years, defendant referenced his life sentence in various filings and letters. He did not discuss the duration of his sentence, however, until 2005. Defendant's December 25, 2005,¹¹ letter clarified that he was aware he might be serving a life sentence and not a 45 year sentence which was subject to...