Robinson v. State

• Decision Date: 26 April 1972
• Parties: James W. ROBINSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 279

291 A.2d 279

James W. ROBINSON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

April 26, 1972.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court.

Richard Allen Paul, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellant.

John P. Daley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.

CAREY and HERRMANN, JJ., and DUFFY, Chancellor, sitting.

CAREY, Justice:

The appellant, James W. Robinson, was found guilty, after a jury trial in Superior Court, of murder in the second degree, the punishment for which is life imprisonment. He has appealed from that sentence upon two grounds. He first contends that the trial Judge should have directed an acquittal of the second-degree murder charge, because the evidence was inadequate to justify a finding of malice. He contends, secondly, that the trial Judge erred in refusing to accept his tendered plea of guilty to manslaughter, the maximum imprisonment for which is thirty years.

I.

Little need be said concerning appellant's first argument. The killing was done by stabbing. An eyewitness testified that the deceased, the appellant, and the witness had all been drinking, although there was some doubt about the degree of appellant's intoxication; that the deceased and the appellant were arguing; and that appellant stabbed the deceased. The Court clearly informed the jury that drunkenness itself is not a defense to a charge of second-degree murder, that it does not reduce the offense to manslaughter, but that it could be considered along with all the other evidence on the issue of malice. This charge was correct. Dashiell v. State, Del.Supr., 2 Storey 189, 154 A.2d 688 (1959). The degree of guilt was for the jury to determine. We find no merit in this contention.

II.

Before the appellant was indicted, his attorney and counsel for the State agreed upon a plea of guilty to manslaughter. An information was accordingly filed charging that offense. When the appellant was arraigned on that information, he offered a plea of guilty. During questioning by the Judge, however, he declined to say that he had in fact committed the killing. He stated that he had no recollection of the event beyond a time when he was hit by someone, which was before the stabbing. The Court allowed him to read the entire police record. After doing so, he agreed that the State's evidence against him was strong; he recognized that his only defense consisted of his own testimony which, because of his amnesia, was weak; indeed, he could not positively deny the killing or offer any excuse or element of mitigation for it. Despite this, he was still unwilling to state affirmatively that he in fact committed the act. The Court then refused to accept his plea. The Grand Jury later indicted him for second-degree murder. At the trial, the State introduced evidence which had been included in the police report, including the testimony of the eyewitness, who testified as indicated above.

In refusing to accept the plea, the presiding Judge followed a rule which we laid down in Brown v. State, Del.Supr., 250 A.2d 503 (1969) and Muzzi v. State, Del.Supr., 265 A.2d 31 (1970). Those cases required, Inter alia, that an offer of a guilty plea must be refused unless the defendant admits commission of the acts constituting the offense. This ruling was based in part upon a practice usually followed in the Superior Court and in part upon our interpretation of Superior Court Criminal Rule 11, which reads exactly as the federal rule of the same number. In Muzzi, Supra, we quoted language from McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), which we interpreted as requiring 'a direct and personal admission by the defendant of conduct constituting the offense to which the guilty plea is beng entered.' In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), however, the Court specifically held that there is no constitutional bar to a guilty plea even if the defendant is unable or unwilling to admit his participation in the...