State v. Duforat
| Decision Date | 31 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 08-22-00049-CR |
| Parties | THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. SANDRA FLORALIE DUFORAT, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Do Not Publish
Appeal from the 112th Judicial District Court of Pecos County, Texas (TC# P-4141-112-CR)
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.
When there is a stop sign alongside a road accompanied by a clearly marked stop line on the road, a motorist is required to stop at the line. Here, we are called to determine what "at" means in this context. The State of Texas charged Appellee, Sandra Floralie Duforat, with one count of possession of a controlled substance in penalty group one (methamphetamine) in an amount less than one gram. Duforat moved to suppress the narcotics evidence, arguing that the officer seized the methamphetamine from her vehicle following a traffic stop for failing to stop at a stop line under Tex Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010(c). Following a hearing, the trial court granted Duforat's motion to suppress based on a dispute over whether the officer properly pulled her over for failure to stop where the law required. The State now appeals the trial court's order granting the motion arguing that the trial court misinterpreted the meaning of the word "at" as that term applies in section 544.010(c). For the following reasons, we agree with the State and reverse the trial court's order.
During the suppression hearing, Trooper Luca Walter of the Texas Department of Public Safety, testified that on October 31 2019, he was on patrol in Fort Stockton, Texas. Also present in the vehicle was Trooper Ingalls, Walter's field-training officer. While on patrol, Walter observed a vehicle Duforat was driving, approach an intersection on a county road. Walter saw that prior to coming to a complete stop, the vehicle "went over the line at a stop line that had a stop sign with it," and the vehicle "stopped over the line at the stop line waiting for traffic to clear so [Duforat] could turn left." From Walter's recollection, the vehicle's front tire "was completely over the line," and the line was "probably closer to the middle of the vehicle" when the vehicle came to a complete stop. Walter described the stop line as "a lot wider and bigger than a fog line." The stop sign was partially knocked down but still visible. There was no crosswalk at the intersection.
Walter stopped Duforat for a violation of Texas Transportation Code § 544.010(c). When asked about the requirements of section 544.010(c), Walter testified that the statute requires a vehicle to stop "behind the white line" and "before going over the line," and that "[n]o part of the vehicle can cross that white line." Walter stated that the purpose of the stop line was "in order for vehicles to know where they are having to stop so they are not too far into the road that they are trying to get onto." After making contact with Duforat Walter smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle and initiated a search that yielded a quantity of methamphetamine. Walter arrested Duforat and the passengers in the vehicle for possession of methamphetamine.
Following the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court orally granted the motion to suppress from the bench. The court subsequently entered the following relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law:
Findings of Fact
This interlocutory appeal follows. In its sole issue, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress because it misinterpreted section 544.010(c)'s requirement that a vehicle stop "at" the stop line to not necessarily require stopping before the line is crossed.
Appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard. See State v. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). "A trial court's findings of historical fact and its determinations of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility and demeanor are afforded almost total deference if they are reasonably supported by the record." See id., citing Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). A trial court's application of the law of search and seizure to the facts is reviewed de novo. See id. Likewise, all purely legal questions are reviewed de novo, including whether a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Johnston, 336 S.W.3d 649, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). When the trial court makes findings of fact, a reviewing court determines whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the court's ruling, supports those findings. See Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The prevailing party is afforded the "strongest legitimate view of the evidence," along with all reasonable inferences that can come from it. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), quoting State v. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Here, Duforat argues that the trial court's ruling should be upheld because the evidence that Walter saw the vehicle cross the stop line is equivocal. But based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court appears to not have based its ruling on a determination of historical fact, such as the credibility of Walter's testimony that he saw Duforat's vehicle cross the stop line before coming to a stop. Rather, the court's decision rests solely on Walter's purported legal misunderstanding of section 544.010(c)'s requirement that a motorist must stop before crossing the stop line. As such, the trial court's ruling is based on its legal interpretation of section 544.010(c), and we review the court's ruling de novo. See Johnson, 336 S.W.3d at 657 ().
In relevant part, section 544.010 of the Texas Transportation Code provides as follows:
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