State v. Ealy, No. WD

• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
• Writing for the Court: DIXON
• Citation: 624 S.W.2d 490
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Theorist EALY, Defendant-Appellant. 32271.
• Docket Number: No. WD
• Decision Date: 27 October 1981

Page 490

624 S.W.2d 490 STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Theorist EALY, Defendant-Appellant. No. WD 32271. Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District. Oct. 27, 1981.

Page 491

James W. Fletcher, Public Defender, Gary L. Gardner, Asst. Public Defender, Kansas City, for defendant-appellant.

John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Rosalynn Van Heest, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.

Before MANFORD, P. J., and DIXON and NUGENT, JJ.

DIXON, Judge.

Defendant appeals a judgment and conviction upon a jury verdict of guilty of three counts of sale of a controlled substance, § 195.020 RSMo 1978. The sentence was for five years on each count to run concurrently. The controlling issue requiring reversal is the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in overruling a challenge for cause to a juror.

Only a brief statement of facts is required. The state's evidence consisted of testimony by an undercover police officer and a chemist employed by the police laboratory. The policeman testified that he accompanied an informant to an apartment where he purchased two "Demerols" from defendant. He further testified that he returned to the same apartment on two other occasions, each time purchasing several Percodan tablets from the defendant.

An expert in forensic chemistry, employed at the police laboratory, testified that a tablet from the first purchase contained pethidine and that tablets from the two later purchases contained oxycodene.

Defendant took the stand and claimed that she had never seen the police officer prior to trial, and specifically denied selling him Demerols or Percodans at any time. She said she was not occupying her apartment on one of the dates the sales took place. She said she was staying with her mother in another apartment in the same building following the death of her father. Under this evidence, the issue of guilt or innocence turned on the credibility of the police officer.

Page 492

In this factual context, the defendant asserts the trial court erred in overruling the defendant's challenge for cause directed to juror Cota. The issue developed in the voir dire when defense counsel asked, "Is there anyone whose friends or family members have worked in the criminal justice system?" Venireman Cota replied that a cousin was with the F.B.I. and a former son-in-law was a police officer. The dialogue continued:

MR. ROGERS: ... First of all, did you form any general impression of the honesty or dishonesty of either or both of these men?

MS. COTA: Yes.

MR. ROGERS: Different impressions or the same impression?

MS. COTA: No, the same.

MR. ROGERS: Okay. Was that a good impression?

MS. COTA: Yes, I think both are very dedicated.

MR. ROGERS: As I understand, both of these are the only two police officers you have known personally?

MS. COTA: Yes.

MR. ROGERS: Would you tend to think that since both of the police officers you knew personally were honest people that the State's witness, who is also a police officer, would be honest?

MS. COTA: Yes. I might tend to think that.

MR. ROGERS: You would tend to think that any more than anyone else who will testify that is not a police officer?

MS. COTA: I don't know. I might be more prejudiced that way.

MR. ROGERS: You might be more likely to believe a police officer than another witness, just because he's a police officer?

MS. COTA: Probably.

MR. ROGERS: Thank you very much.

No further questions were asked of Ms. Cota by counsel or the court, and the defendant's challenge for cause was overruled. The record shows that Ms. Cota did not serve on the jury, but it does not indicate whether defendant used one of her peremptory challenges to remove Ms. Cota from the panel.

The state first argues that the matter is not preserved. The argument is that under this record the juror may have been excused by the court on some other ground or may have been removed from the panel by peremptory challenge by the state. Cited in support are State v. Webster, 539 S.W.2d 15 (Mo.App.1976); State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319, 296 S.W. 132 (1927); State v. Brauch, 529 S.W.2d 926 (Mo.App.1975); State v. Battles, 357 Mo. 1223, 212 S.W.2d 753 (1948); State v. Mears, 588 S.W.2d 519 (Mo.App.1979).

The state argues that defendant's point is not properly before this court for review because the record fails to show whether defendant was forced to expend a peremptory challenge to remove Ms. Cota from the jury panel and Ms. Cota did not serve on the jury. The state's argument and its cited cases fail to address State v. Morrison, 557 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. banc 1977), which held that a defendant need not show that he has exhausted his peremptory challenges or that he used a peremptory challenge to dispose of the venireman in order to challenge on appeal the action of the trial court in overruling his challenge for cause. Id. at 447; State v. Taylor, 602 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Mo.App.1980); State v. Watson, 595 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Mo.App.1980). In so holding, the court in Morrison reiterated the well-settled principle in Missouri that a defendant is entitled to a full panel of qualified jurors before the exercise of his peremptory challenges. State v. Lovell, 506 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo. banc 1974).

What is troublesome is that the Morrison opinion in a footnote, supra at 447, n. 2, reserved opinion on...