State v. Eastep
| Decision Date | 10 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | CC 13CR0802,SC S064057 |
| Citation | 361 Or. 746,399 P.3d 979 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Thomas Eldon EASTEP, Petitioner on Review. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Laura E. Coffin, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Balmer, Chief Justice, and Kistler, Walters, Landau, and Nakamoto, Justices.**
In this criminal case, defendant arranged to sell another person's truck for scrap. At the time, the truck was in a significant state of disrepair. He was charged with, and ultimately convicted of, unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV). ORS 164.135. At trial, he argued that the state had failed to prove that he had used another person's "vehicle," because the truck that he had arranged to sell was in a state of significant disrepair and was not currently operable. The trial court disagreed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Eastep , 277 Or.App. 673, 371 P.3d 1287 (2016). On review, defendant argues that, at least as used in the statute defining the offense of UUV, a "vehicle" must be capable of operation—which means either currently operable or operable with ordinary repairs—and there is no evidence that the truck was capable of operation. The state argues that the statute contains no requirement that a vehicle be currently operable or that it can become operable with ordinary repairs. In the state's view, a vehicle in need of significant repairs still may qualify as a "vehicle" under the UUV statute.
We agree with the state that the word "vehicle," as it is used in ORS 164.135(1)(a), includes no requirement of either current operability or capability of operation with only ordinary repairs. A vehicle may remain a "vehicle" within the meaning of that statute even if it needs more significant, but still reasonable, repairs. In this case, however, the state failed to establish that the truck that defendant had arranged to sell was in such a condition that it would have been reasonable to restore it to an operable condition. We therefore reverse defendant's conviction.
We review the facts, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the state. State v. Davis , 360 Or. 201, 205, 377 P.3d 583 (2016). Stuart owned a pickup truck that was about 21 years old. The truck's "clutch had gone out," so she had it towed to a location between her property and a nearby boat ramp parking lot. Although the truck was not operable, Stuart used it to store expensive tools. The truck sat by the boat ramp parking lot for four or five months.
Defendant noticed that the truck had been sitting there for a few days. He did not know who owned it. Nevertheless, he called an automobile wrecking company to have it towed. He completed a form certifying that he had a possessory lien on the truck and that he had properly fore-closed on that lien. The company towed the truck and paid defendant $100.
Later that day, Stuart noticed that the truck was gone. She called the police to report it stolen. Police investigated and found that it had been towed away. The automobile wrecking company later returned the truck to Stuart.
Within a month after that, Stuart sold the truck for $321, with the sales price based on weight, to a scrap metal business, in an effort to "[t]o take whatever [she] could get for it." A mechanic working for the business was able to start and run the engine, but the engine and the clutch pedal were "seized," and the engine "was rattling so bad that [it] was no good." He also observed that the interior was torn up and "no good." The mechanic determined that the truck was "not capable of moving" under its own power because either the clutch or the transmission had seized up and that the truck was "no good," "not operable," and "strictly just scrap." The owner of the business planned to have it "scrapped out" by having it demolished after removing and saving a few windows.
Defendant was charged with UUV, for "exercis[ing] control over" the truck without Stuart's consent, ORS 164.135(1)(a). He was also charged with first-degree theft of the truck, second-degree theft of the $100 that he received from the automobile wrecking company, and false swearing. The case was tried to a jury. At the close of the state's case-in-chief, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on the UUV count, arguing that the state was required to prove that the truck had been "operable" at the time that he exercised control over it. The trial court denied the motion. The jury found defendant guilty of UUV, second-degree theft, and false swearing, and the court entered a judgment of conviction and sentence on those counts.
Defendant appealed the judgment, assigning error to the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the UUV count. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that nothing in ORS 164.135(1)(a) required the state to prove that the vehicle had been "operable." Eastep , 277 Or.App. at 678, 371 P.3d 1287.
On review, defendant argues that the UUV statute requires the state to prove that a "vehicle" is "capable of operation." According to defendant, "[a]n 'inoperable vehicle' in the context of UUV is an oxymoron." In his view, "[t]o be a vehicle, something must at least be capable of operating as a means of conveyance or transportation." Defendant acknowledges that a truck or automobile that is in need of ordinary maintenance or repair—for example, one that has a flat tire or an empty gas tank—qualifies as a "vehicle" within the meaning of ORS 164.135(1)(a). But he insists that the term excludes "a wrecked vehicle or an inoperable truck used for scrap." In this case, he argues, the evidence was that Stuart's truck was inoperable, was not capable of functioning as a means of transportation, and was valuable only as scrap. The state counters that, "regardless of whether a broken part or some other malfunction renders a vehicle inoperable, it is still a 'vehicle' for the purposes of the UUV statute," as long as it is capable of becoming operable, even with more than ordinary repairs.
Our task in construing the term "vehicle" in the UUV statute, ORS 164.135, is to determine the meaning that the legislature most likely intended, based on an examination of statutory text, other statutory context, legislative history, and applicable rules of construction. State v. Gaines , 346 Or. 160, 171-72, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009). We begin with the text. ORS 164.135 provides:
"(2) Unauthorized use of a vehicle, boat or aircraft is a Class C felony."
The statute does not define the term "vehicle."1 When statutes do not define their terms, we assume that the legislature intended them to have their plain, ordinary meanings. State v. Dickerson , 356 Or. 822, 829, 345 P.3d 447 (2015).
Webster's defines a "vehicle" as "5 : a means of carrying or transporting something : CONVEYANCE: as a : a carrier of goods or passengers * * * specif : MOTOR VEHICLE * * * b : a container in which something is conveyed * * * c : a piece of mechanized equipment * * * d : a propulsive device." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2538 (unabridged ed. 2002).2 Other dictionaries supply similar definitions. See, e.g. , Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language 2637 (1963) (similarly, "[t]hat in or on which anything is or may be carried; * * * conveyance").
Those definitions do suggest that a "vehicle" is defined in terms of its function, namely, transportation. But none explicitly requires that a means of transporting must be currently operable, or operable with ordinary repairs, to qualify as a "vehicle." That is consistent with common usage; it is not uncommon to refer to currently inoperable trucks or cars—regardless of the extent of disrepair—as "inoperable vehicles," for example. See, e.g. , Sanford A. Kaplan, Westchester Opinion; When There is a Driving Hazard, Report It , New York Times (Sept. 13, 1987) ( )3 ; Anthony C. Carpio, Burbank Officials Discuss "More Aggressive" Code-Enforcement Policies to Catch Violators , Los Angeles Times, June 16, 2017 ("The city could also consider cleanup campaigns * * * to remind residents to address any non-hazardous code violations on their property, such as inoperable vehicles and over-height weeds.").4 In fact, nearly all states have statutes regarding "abandoned" or "junk" vehicles, which are no less "vehicles" merely because they are currently inoperable or in a...
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