State v. Easterling
| Decision Date | 06 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. COA94-999,COA94-999 |
| Citation | 457 S.E.2d 913,119 N.C.App. 22 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. James Vernon EASTERLING. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney Gen. Michael F. Easley by Asst. Atty. Gen. Valerie B. Spalding, for the State.
Appellate Defender Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr. by Asst. Appellate Defender Gordon Widenhouse, for defendant-appellant.
James Vernon Easterling (defendant) appeals from judgments and commitments entered after a jury convicted him of eight counts of first-degree rape, six counts of first-degree sexual offense, one count of second-degree sexual offense, three counts of first-degree kidnapping, and one count of common law robbery during the 15 February 1993 Mixed Session of Guilford County Superior Court. Judge W. Douglas Albright imposed fourteen consecutive life sentences for the first-degree rapes and first-degree sexual offenses, a concurrent forty year sentence for first-degree kidnapping, and a concurrent ten year sentence for common law robbery. Judge Albright arrested judgment on the remaining two kidnapping convictions.
The indictment for the first count of first-degree kidnapping against defendant provided that defendant confined the victim in a motor vehicle
On 14 February 1994, defendant filed a motion to suppress oral admissions and a written statement made by defendant to law enforcement officers while in custody. In this motion and defendant's affidavit supporting the motion, defendant alleged that those statements, "were not freely and voluntarily made but were coerced and were the result of persistant [sic] and repeated interrogations by numerous skillful law enforcement officers and in the absence of counsel and without an intelligent or knowing waiver of counsel."
At the voir dire hearing on defendant's motion, Detective J.F. Whitt (Detective Whitt) testified that he approached defendant in an interview room at police headquarters, stated he "wanted to talk to him about the investigation that was currently underway," and verbally advised him of his rights as required under Miranda v. Arizona. Detective Whitt testified that after he had read defendant his rights, and defendant had initialed and signed the form listing these rights, defendant "indicated at that point that he felt like that he needed to talk to a lawyer." Detective Whitt stopped the interview at that point and informed defendant that although he could not appoint him an attorney, defendant "would have to go for his first appearance through the court process" where the court would appoint an attorney for him.
Detective Whitt left the room, and when he returned not more than five or ten minutes later, he informed defendant Detective Whitt therefore informed defendant again of his rights, At the conclusion of the interview, defendant signed his statement which also contained the following:
By order dated 17 February 1994, the trial court found in pertinent part that Detective Whitt gave Miranda warnings to defendant which he indicated he understood, defendant invoked his right to counsel, and Detective Whitt ceased the interrogation. Subsequently, Detective Whitt asked defendant "Who Sherman was" and defendant responded "White":
18. Some further appreciable time elapsed and the officers started to take the defendant to the magistrate's office. Whereupon, the defendant indicated to the officer in no uncertain terms that he wanted to talk to him without a lawyer present and said, "he wanted to talk." Officer Whitt responded, "Are you sure?" The defendant made it abundantly clear that he was. At this point, Detective Whitt readvised the defendant of all of his constitutional rights as required by the Miranda decision as he gave before.... The defendant again acknowledged his awareness and understanding of each of these rights and reaffirmed his desire to talk to the officer without a lawyer present by signing the Waiver of Rights. The defendant acknowledged in writing that he had read the statement of rights and had his rights explained to him by a police officer, and that knowing these rights he did not want a lawyer at this time. The defendant waived those rights knowingly and willingly agreed to answer questions and/or make a statement;
19. The defendant affirmatively, understandingly, knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to the presence of counsel, retained or appointed, during questioning in writing;
20. ... Under the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that this defendant wanted to talk to the officer without a lawyer present and wanted to do so then and there before being taken to the magistrate's office by the officers....
Based upon these findings, the court concluded "defendant's statement was freely, voluntarily, understandingly and knowingly made without coercion, duress, threat or intimidation" and therefore denied his motion to suppress; however, the court ordered "that the question by Detective Whitt to the defendant to the effect 'Who is Sherman?' and the defendant's answer, 'White,' be" suppressed.
During jury selection, the prosecutor, Mr. Panosh, exercised three of his six peremptory challenges to exclude three of the five African-Americans called into the jury box, and defendant's counsel, Mr. Jennings, made a motion for a mistrial based upon Batson v. Kentucky that Mr. Panosh had exercised his peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. Mr. Panosh explained why he exercised three peremptory challenges against prospective African-American jurors:
MR. PANOSH: ... We would submit that he has not set forth a prima facie--sufficient evidence to show a prima faci[e] case of discrimination. However, for the record, juror No. 4, Sherman Hughes was a black male, appeared to be young, in his early twenties, ... he is a shipping clerk for Odell Hardware, that he's worked there for less than a year, that his prior occupation was janitorial staff, he worked there for less than three years, and that he was single. Based upon what I saw of him and the answers to those questions, I determined that he was not the type of juror that I was seeking. I was seeking a juror who was from the mainstream of our community, who was employed for a substantial period of time, had a family and had roots in the community.
Juror No. 6, Edith Allred, indicated that she was also single, that she had worked for the coliseum for three months, that before that her occupation was B & B Temporary Services. Again, this juror did not fit the profile of the type of juror that I was looking for, a person who was employed for a substantial period of time, and who had roots in the community, and was a family individual.
Juror No. 12, Selena Hampton, indicated that she was a student at A & T, studied English, she was not employed, and that she was single. Again, this juror did not fit the profile I was looking for. She was not from the mainstream of our community. She was not employed in a steady occupation, was not married, was not the type of person that I was looking for who could listen to the evidence in this particular case and come to a rational conclusion.
The court, in denying defendant's motion, found that defendant "has failed to make out any prima facie showing that the district attorney discharged jurors in a racially discriminatory manner or for racially discriminatory purposes," "the exercise of the peremptory challenges by the State rested upon racially neutral reasons, and upon an articulable basis set forth by the district attorney that is racially neutral in nature," none of the questions of Mr. Panosh "were protectional or designed to eliminate black jurors for racially discriminatory reasons," and "at this time two black females remain upon the panel." The final jury consisted of two African-American females, six white females, and four white males.
At trial, the alleged victim (Elizabeth), a college student, testified for the State as to the following: On 14 April 1993, she left her part-time job at Bennigan's restaurant in Greensboro just before 2:30 a.m. As she was stopped at a red light at the intersection of Chapman and Spring Garden, a car that had been following her "just plowed right into" her car. Elizabeth pulled over into a parking lot of a hair shop, rolled down her window, and kept her car running while the other car came into the parking lot. She saw defendant get out of the other car and come up to her side window. He reached through the window and punched her in the jaw. The punch must have knocked her unconscious, and when she regained consciousness, defendant was in her car choking her with his hands around her throat.
Elizabeth "tried to get out on the passenger's side and run, and [defendant] pulled [her] back in by [her] hair." After a while, defendant pulled Elizabeth by her hair out of her car, across the...
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...the improper admission of the evidence had no reasonable possibility of affecting the verdict of the jury. See State v. Easterling, 119 N.C.App. 22, 38, 457 S.E.2d 913, 922, disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 422, 461 S.E.2d 762 (1995). In his statement to law enforcement officers, defendant con......
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State v. Stanton
...some appreciable time, it is therefore a mental injury beyond that normally experienced in every forcible rape." State v. Easterling, 119 N.C. App. 22, 40, 457 S.E.2d 913, 924, disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 422, 461 S.E.2d 762 Ms. Barker testified that she stayed out of work for a week foll......
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In re Clapp, No. COA99-290.
...of the bedroom and told her that the juvenile made her take off her clothes and licked her private parts. See State v. Easterling, 119 N.C.App. 22, 42-43, 457 S.E.2d 913, 925, disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 422, 461 S.E.2d 762 (1995). This evidence of force, when viewed in the light most fav......
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State v. Ackerman, COA00-672.
...personal injury" in this context may also include mental injury. Boone, 307 N.C. at 204, 297 S.E.2d at 589. In State v. Easterling, 119 N.C.App. 22, 457 S.E.2d 913, disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 422, 461 S.E.2d 762 (1995), we interpreted We do not read Boone as placing an additional burden ......