State v. Echols
| Decision Date | 28 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-19-00209-CR,11-19-00209-CR |
| Parties | THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v. RANDY VIRGIL ECHOLS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 220th District Court Comanche County, Texas
The State reindicted Appellee, Randy Virgil Echols, on two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021 (West 2019). Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that his speedy-trial rights were violated. The trial court agreed and dismissed the indictment. In two issues on appeal, the State contends that (1) Appellee's right to a speedy trial was not violated and (2) Appellee's due process rights were not violated. We reverse and remand.
Background Facts
On September 4, 2011, Appellee was arrested for aggravated sexual assault of a child. The offenses were alleged to have occurred on or about the same day. On October 27, 2011, Appellee was indicted on three counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child. Appellee's trial began on May 21, 2012. On May 24, 2012, the jury found Appellee not guilty of one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child and guilty of indecency with a child, and the final two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child resulted in a hung jury. The trial court declared a mistrial for the two counts of aggravated sexual assault that had resulted in a hung jury. Appellee was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment upon being convicted of indecency with a child.
Appellee appealed his conviction of indecency with a child to this court, and we issued mandate affirming the conviction on March 6, 2014. See Echols v. State, No. 11-12-00149-CR, 2013 WL 9674604 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 22, 2013, pet. ref'd) (). Appellee's petition for discretionary review was refused by the Court of Criminal Appeals on November 27, 2013. The State dismissed the two remaining indictments on October 30, 2015. On May 3, 2017, Appellee filed a pro se Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus contending, among other things, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to watch and utilize a video of the child-complainant's prior statements to a counselor containing clearly exculpatory evidence on his conviction for indecency with a child. After the trial court subsequently issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on the writ of habeas corpus issues, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that Appellee's trial counsel was ineffective and set aside the conviction on October 10, 2018.
On July 31, 2018, a few months before the Court of Criminal Appeals set aside the conviction, the State reindicted Appellee on the two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child that had resulted in a mistrial. On April 23, 2019, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial on the current indictment. After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court granted Appellee's motion and dismissed the indictment with prejudice. This appeal ensued.
Standard of Review
A trial court's ruling on a speedy-trial claim is reviewed under a bifurcated standard of review. Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). We review a trial court's determination of legal issues de novo, and we review factual issues under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. A review of the individual Barker1 factors necessarily involves fact determinations and legal conclusions, but "[t]he balancing test as a whole . . . is a purely legal question." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648 n.19). Under an abuse of discretion standard, we view all of the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ultimate ruling. Id. We defer not only to a trial court's resolution of disputed facts, but we also defer to the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts. Kelly v. State, 163 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The trial judge may disbelieve any evidence so long as there is a reasonable and articulable basis for doing so. Id. at 728. This court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of a speedy trial "in light of the arguments, information, and evidence that was available to the trial court at the time it ruled." Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Where, as here, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in favor of Appellee, we presumethat the trial court resolved any factual disputes or credibility determinations in favor of Appellee. See Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648.
Analysis
In its first issue on appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution affords all criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right was made applicable to State criminal prosecutions by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967).
After a person is arrested or charged, a speedy-trial claim is triggered by a passage of time that is unreasonable enough under the circumstances to be "presumptively prejudicial." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Post-accusation delay that approaches one year "marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992). To determine whether an accused has been denied his right to a speedy trial, courts balance the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 313. We apply the Barker factors, evaluating (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his speedy-trial right, and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Courts analyze a "speedy-trial claim by first weighing the strength of each of the Barker factors and then balancing their relative weights in light of 'the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant.'" Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281 (quoting Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648); see Hopper v. State, 520 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). No single factor is necessary or sufficient to establish a violation of the right to a speedy trial. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281; Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 313.
"While the State has the burden of justifying the length of delay, the defendant has the burden of proving the assertion of the right and showing prejudice." Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531); see Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)). "The defendant's burden of proof on the latter two factors 'varies inversely' with the State's degree of culpability for the delay." Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280 (quoting Robinson v. Whitley, 2 F.3d 562, 570 (5th Cir. 1993)). "Thus, the greater the State's bad faith or official negligence and the longer its actions delay a trial, the less a defendant must show actual prejudice or prove diligence in asserting his right to a speedy trial." Id. at 280-81.
The only possible remedy for a violation of the right to a speedy trial is to dismiss the prosecution. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973). "Because dismissal of the charges is a radical remedy, a wooden application of the Barker factors would infringe upon 'the societal interest in trying people accused of crime, rather than granting them immunization because of legal error.'" Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 121 (1966)). In sum, the Barker factors have no "talismanic qualities," and we must therefore analyze the balancing test "with common sense and sensitivity to ensure that charges are dismissed only when the evidence shows that a defendant's actual and asserted interest in a speedy trial has been infringed." Id. at 281; see Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648.
"The length of delay is a double inquiry: A court must consider whether the delay is sufficiently long to even trigger a further analysis under the Barker factors, and if it is, then the court must consider to what extent it stretches beyond this triggering length." Hopper, 520 S.W.3d at 924. The delay is measured from the time the defendant is arrested or formally accused. Marion, 404 U.S. at 313; Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Although the Supreme Courthas generally held that a delay approaching one year is sufficient to trigger a speedy-trial claim, the precise length needed is dependent upon the particular facts of the case. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1. For example, "the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Additionally, "the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652. Thus, the longer the delay beyond the triggering length, the more prejudicial that delay is to the defendant. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649. In calculating the length of delay where, as here, there is no evidence that the State dismissed the indictments in bad faith and the defendant is not subject to actual restraints on his liberty, the time period between dismissal of the indictments and the subsequent reindictment is not considered in a speedy-trial analysis. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1986); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982); Deeb v. State, 815 S.W.2d 692, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (citing MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1).
Here, the parties dispute the precise length of the delay and how the length of the delay should be calculated. The State contends that the speedy-trial clock in this case should begin at the time of mistrial, not arrest, because Appellee...
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