Cantu v. State
| Citation | 253 S.W.3d 273 |
| Decision Date | 07 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. PD-1176-07.,PD-1176-07. |
| Parties | Alberto CANTU, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
John T. Blaylock, Harlingen, for Appellant.
Lawrence J. Rabb, Asst. D.A., Brownsville, Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State's Attorney, Austin, for the State.
Appellant, Alberto Cantu, was arrested for DWI on March 5, 2003. He was released on bond the next day, but was not formally charged for this offense until July 6, 2004, more than a year later. Shortly thereafter, he filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Appellant then pled guilty and appealed the trial court's ruling. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that, under Barker v. Wingo,1 appellant was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.2 We granted the State's petition to determine whether the court of appeals properly deferred to the trial court's factual findings under the four Barker speedy-trial factors.3 We find that it did not.
Harlingen police arrested appellant at the scene of an accident. They found him still behind the wheel of his truck, which was embedded in a chain-link fence. He posted bond the next morning, but a DWI (second offender) information was not filed for sixteen months. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial less than two months later.
The trial judge held a hearing to consider whether appellant had been denied his right to a speedy trial under the four Barker speedy-trial factors: 1) length of the delay, 2) reason for the delay, 3) assertion of the right, and 4) prejudice to the accused.4 The judge took judicial notice that the delay was sufficient to trigger the Barker test. The State's witnesses explained that the delay in filing charges was because the Harlingen police "lost" the file for an entire year. Appellant's counsel stipulated that the district attorney's office was not at fault for the missing file, but he argued that police negligence is not a good reason for delay. The trial judge agreed.
Appellant then testified as to "prejudice." He said he was sixty-two years old, had lived in Cameron County all his life, and had retired from a job with the City of Harlingen. He currently worked as a hunting guide in Mexico and did some "easy" maintenance work for friends. He said that he had been "nervous" about the case and was a "nuisance" to his own attorney; he was not "at ease," and his unease put pressure on his family; finally, he had to call his bondsman every Monday, which was a constant "reminder of what's hanging there." All in all, he said,
it's like having something hanging over my head. You know get — you know, it's — to me why waiting so long? You know, I want — want to get this over. I call — call my attorney, you know, and ask, you know. There's days that sometimes I have trouble sleeping. And recently I went into the hospital, I got an ulcer. I don't know that — I didn't have —I'm not saying this caused it, but, I mean, it's a bad ulcer and it's being treated —
Appellant also testified that he had talked with his attorney about putting an ad in the paper to find the driver of the red Camaro that he said caused the accident. But he did not think anyone would come forward because it was a "hit and run." He said it would be even harder to find that driver now — a year later. The trial judge questioned appellant about the accident and about why he did not begin looking for the other driver right after it. Appellant said that he had a copy of the accident report that listed the names and addresses of other drivers and witnesses, but he said that he did not seek any other information because his insurance company took care of everything and told him not to intervene. Appellant's counsel explained that they chose not to put an ad in the paper because
Appellant's counsel then testified about his "assertion of the right" to a speedy trial. Counsel said he made several calls to the DA's office in an effort to get the case filed.5 The trial judge questioned him on whether he made notes. Counsel said he'd made one note on August 26, 2003, that he talked to his client, after calling the DA's office, about whether to try to plead guilty before September 1, 2003, when a new law went into effect that would add civil fees. "[H]e struggled with that decision, I put in my notes."
Court: Who struggled with that decision?
Defense Attorney: He struggled with the decision whether I should — whether we should try to plea before September 1st or just wait until they filed it normally.
. . .
[H]e wanted to take care of it at first and then I couldn't get the case filed and so he told me that — after that he just said, okay, we'll just have a trial because he didn't think he was guilty anyway.
The trial court then asked to see the August 26 note which read "TTC," meaning "talked to client." The trial court said, "It doesn't say you talked to the DA's office, it says you talked to the client." Counsel said he was "just telling [the trial judge] out of my memory" that he had
After hearing the evidence, the trial judge agreed that the length-of-delay and reason-for-delay factors were on appellant's side, but that his evidence was "weak" on the third and fourth factors. Addressing appellant's ulcer as possible evidence of prejudice, the trial judge commented, The trial judge said that appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice to his defense because and "they witnessed your client and the Camaro racing down the street at over 70 miles an hour before the collision." The trial judge also noted that The trial judge concluded that appellant had not "crossed the hurdle" on factors three and four.6 After the trial judge denied his speedy-trial motion, appellant entered a negotiated plea of guilty, and the trial judge placed him on community supervision for twelve months.
The court of appeals, like the trial judge, found that the first and second factors weighed against the State,7 but it disagreed with the trial judge on the latter two factors.
Regarding the third factor, assertion of the right, the court of appeals stated,
Given the particular facts of this case, we find it understandable that Cantu first framed his speedy trial complaint in a motion seeking dismissal. Because of the State's delay in charging him, he could not have made a speedy trial complaint in any form for sixteen months after he was arrested; a court that had jurisdiction to entertain a speedy trial complaint simply did not exist. Because Cantu asserted his speedy trial rights promptly after the State filed a charge, this third factor also weighs in Cantu's favor.8
Regarding the fourth factor — that of prejudice — the appellate court agreed with the trial judge in rejecting appellant's testimony that the delay impaired his defense by limiting his ability to find witnesses. It stated, "Cantu gave no adequate reason for why he was precluded from placing the ad until after he was formally charged."9 But the appellate court disagreed with the trial court's skepticism concerning appellant's testimony about his personal anxiety, noting,
The State did not challenge this testimony during Cantu's cross-examination, nor at any other time. As a result, Cantu's testimony "is at least some evidence of the type of `anxiety' that the Supreme Court considers under the prejudice prong of Barker." Cantu also testified that since his arrest, he has had to report to a bondsman every Monday, which supports an inference of actual prejudice. In light of this testimony, we find that the fourth factor favors Cantu.10
Concluding that all four Barker factors weighed in appellant's favor, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed the conviction and dismissed the prosecution with prejudice.11 In our Court, the State argues that the court of appeals failed to provide the appropriate deference to the factual findings of the trial court and that it viewed the facts "myopically" instead of "in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling."12
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a speedy trial.13 A speedy trial protects three interests of the defendant: freedom from oppressive pretrial incarceration, mitigation of the anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation, and avoidance of impairment to the accused's defense.14
The right attaches once a person becomes an "accused" — that is, once he is arrested or charged.15 Supreme Court precedent requires state courts to analyze federal constitutional speedy-trial claims "on an ad hoc basis" by weighing and then balancing the four Barker v. Wingo factors: 1) length of the delay, 2) reason for the delay, 3) assertion of the right, and 4) prejudice to the accused.16 While the State has the burden of justifying...
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