State v. Eddie Bonilla.

• Decision Date: 13 September 2011
• Docket Number: No. 31927.,31927.
• Citation: 28 A.3d 1005,131 Conn.App. 388
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticutv.Eddie BONILLA.

131 Conn.App. 388

28 A.3d 1005

STATE of Connecticut

v.Eddie BONILLA.

No. 31927.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 1, 2011.Decided Sept. 13, 2011.

Sydney T. Schulman, with whom, on the brief, was Alina Bricklin–Goldstein, for the appellant (defendant).Nancy L. Walker, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, former state's attorney, and Jason Germain, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).DiPENTIMA, C.J., and LAVINE and BEAR, Js.LAVINE, J.

In this case, we are called upon to decide whether the defendant was properly convicted of a felony because he knowingly acted as a spectator at an illegal activity—a cockfight. We conclude that the defendant was properly convicted under General Statutes § 53–247(c) and that his constitutional claims are without merit.

The defendant, Eddie Bonilla, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after he entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of one count of cruelty to animals in violation of § 53–247(c)(4). On appeal, the defendant claims that § 53–247(c)(4) is unconstitutional because it (1) impinges on his rights of freedom of assembly and freedom of association as guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States constitution and (2) violates his equal protection rights as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. We disagree, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this case. On February 28, 2009, police responded to a complaint of ongoing cockfights at 1014 Main Street in Waterbury (property). After obtaining a search warrant, the police discovered evidence of cockfighting at the property and arrested several people, including the defendant, whom the police reported seeing around the cockfighting ring. When arrested, the defendant was in possession of $905.

The defendant was charged in a substituted information with one count each of cruelty to animals in violation of § 53–247(c)(4), cruelty to animals in violation of § 53–247(c)(5) and gambling in violation of General Statutes § 53–278b (a). On January 11, 2010, the defendant filed an amended motion to dismiss the charges against him, alleging that § 53–247(c) violates his rights under the first, fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 8, 14 and 20, of the constitution of Connecticut. The court denied the defendant's motion without issuing a written or oral memorandum of decision.

On January 12, 2010, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of cruelty to animals in violation of § 53–247(c)(4). The defendant's plea, however, was conditioned on his right to appeal the constitutional claims raised in his motion to dismiss.¹ The court imposed an effective sentence of three years imprisonment, execution suspended, and three years conditional discharge. This appeal followed.

“A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the [state] cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.... [O]ur review of the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [denial] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. St. Louis, 128 Conn.App. 703, 717, 18 A.3d 648 (2011).

I

The defendant first claims that § 53–247(c)(4) unconstitutionally infringes on his right of freedom of assembly and freedom of association as guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States constitution. Specifically, the defendant argues that “criminalizing as a felony the mere observation of a criminal act as a ‘spectator’ is an invasive, unconstitutional abridgment of his freedom of assembly [and freedom of association]....” (Emphasis in original.) We disagree.

The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law; see State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 520–21, 847 A.2d 862, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 969, 125 S.Ct. 424, 160 L.Ed.2d 340 (2004); over which our review is plenary. State v. Long, 301 Conn. 216, 236, 19 A.3d 1242 (2011). “We recognize that a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.... While the courts may declare a statute to be unconstitutional, our power to do this should be exercised with caution, and in no doubtful case.... Every presumption is to be given in favor of the constitutionality of the statute.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, Inc., 239 Conn. 708, 754, 687 A.2d 506 (1997). “Unless laws create suspect classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected rights ... it need only be shown that they bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989).

The first amendment to the United States constitution provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” “The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.... The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress.” ² (Internal quotation marks omitted.) De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278 (1937).

The United States Supreme Court, however, also has concluded that the right of assembly “may be abused by using ... assembly in order to incite to violence and crime. The people through their legislatures may protect themselves against that abuse.... If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violation of valid laws.” Id., at 364–65, 57 S.Ct. 255.

Although not expressly enumerated in the first amendment, the right of association has been recognized as a fundamental right under the first amendment as well. “It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.” National Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). “[T]he right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment implies a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.... [I]mpediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's associates can violate the right of association protected by the First Amendment....” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987).

The United States Supreme Court has “referred to constitutionally protected ‘freedom of association’ in two distinct senses. In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984).

In Dallas v. Stanglin, supra, 490 U.S. 19, 109 S.Ct. 1591, the United States Supreme Court further clarified the types of association that are protected under the first amendment. In that case, the city of Dallas passed an ordinance authorizing the licensing of dance halls that restricted admission to persons between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. Id., at 21, 109 S.Ct. 1591. The owner of one of the dance halls sought an injunction, claiming that the ordinance “unconstitutionally infringed the rights of persons between the ages of [fourteen] and ... [eighteen] to associate with persons outside that age bracket.” Id., at 22, 109 S.Ct. 1591.

In addressing the dance hall owner's claim, the court first noted that the dance hall patrons were not engaged in the sort of intimate human relationships referred to in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, 468 U.S. at 617–18, 104 S.Ct. 3244. Dallas v. Stanglin, supra, 490 U.S. at 24, 109 S.Ct. 1591. The court further concluded that the ordinance “limits the minors' ability to dance with adults who may not attend, and it limits the opportunity of such adults to dance with minors. These opportunities might be described as ‘associational’ in common parlance, but they simply do not involve the sort of expressive association that the First Amendment has been held to protect. The hundreds of teenagers who congregate each night at this particular dance hall are not members of any organized association; they are patrons of the same business establishment. Most are strangers to one another, and the dance hall admits all who are willing to pay the admission fee. There...