State v. Eis

• Decision Date: 16 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-942,83-942
• Citation: 348 N.W.2d 224
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Jim EIS and Raymond Dells, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 224

348 N.W.2d 224

STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v.Jim EIS and Raymond Dells, Appellees.

No. 83-942.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 16, 1984.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., John P. Messina, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Stephen J. Petersen, County Atty., for appellant.

Charles L. Harrington, Appellate Defender, and Patrick R. Grady, Asst. Appellate Defender, for appellees.

Considered by UHLENHOPP, P.J., and HARRIS, McCORMICK, McGIVERIN and LARSON, JJ.

McCORMICK, Justice.

In this case of first impression, we uphold the right of a motor vehicle passenger to challenge the constitutionality of a stop of the vehicle in which he was riding.Because we also find the stop was unconstitutional, we affirm a trial court ruling sustaining defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop.

DefendantRaymond Dells was a passenger in a pickup truck owned and driven by Jim Eis which was stopped by a deputy sheriff near Muscatine at 5:00 a.m. on April 29, 1983.After the vehicle was stopped the officer observed copper wire sticking out from underneath a tarpaulin in the bed of the truck.Defendants were subsequently arrested for theft of the wire.They were jointly charged with third-degree theft in violation of Iowa Code sections 714.1(1),714.1(2)and714.2(3)(1983).

A timely motion to suppress the evidentiary use of the copper wire was filed by both defendants.The State denied Dells had standing to challenge the vehicle stop.After hearing, the trial court sustained the motion.The State applied for and we granted discretionary review of the ruling.

The suppression motion was based on the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.We therefore rest our holding on authorities applying the federal constitutional protection against unlawful search and seizure.

The United States Supreme Court has held that standing in fourth amendmentcases is determined by inquiring whether the challenged search or seizure violated an interest of the defendant that the fourth amendment was designed to protect.SeeRakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139-40, 99 S.Ct. 421, 428-29, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 398-99(1978).We have thus recognized that the necessary showing "exists within, and is integrated into, the substantive showing of a Fourth Amendment violation."State v. Henderson, 313 N.W.2d 564, 565(Iowa1981).

Two determinations must be made before a fourth amendment violation is found.One is that the defendant had "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular area searched or the particular objects seized."Id.The second is that the government unreasonably intruded into the protected interest.See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 1101, 91 L.Ed. 1399, 1405(1947).The standing issue inheres in the first determination.We must therefore decide whether Dells had a legitimate expectation of privacy that was invaded when the deputy sheriff stopped the truck in which he was riding.

The Supreme Court decision in Rakas does not answer the question because that case involved a challenge to the searching rather than the stopping of a vehicle.The legality of the stop was not an issue.See439 U.S. at 150-51, 99 S.Ct. at 434, 58 L.Ed.2d at 406(Powell, J., concurring).General principles governing the rights of vehicle occupants to challenge stops were discussed in the Court's later decision in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660(1979).This court reviewed and applied the Prouse principles in State v. Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314, 316-19(Iowa1980).

As we noted in Hilleshiem, one of the principles recognized in Prouse is that the stopping of a vehicle is a seizure of its occupants within the meaning of the fourth amendment.See291 N.W.2d at 316.The vehicle occupants have a protected privacy interest in freedom of movement that is invaded when the vehicle is stopped.Id.The Supreme Court made no distinction in Prouse between the rights of passengers and those of drivers.The accused in that case may have been a passenger.See440 U.S. at 650 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. at 1394, n. 1, 59 L.Ed.2d at 665.The accused persons in Hilleshiem included both drivers and passengers.See291 N.W.2d at 315.

No principled basis exists for distinguishing between the privacy rights of passengers and drivers in a moving vehicle.When the vehicle is stopped they are equally seized; their freedom of movement is equally affected.We therefore hold that occupants of motor vehicles, whether drivers or passengers, ordinarily have a legitimate expectation of privacy which is invaded when the vehicle is stopped by the government.This holding presupposes the occupant's rightful presence in the vehicle.Otherwise the privacy expectation is not legitimate.SeeRakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 430, n. 12, 58 L.Ed.2d at 401.

The majority of courts which have considered the issue have upheld the standing of a passenger to challenge a vehicle stop.SeePeople v. Bradi, 107 Ill.App.3d 594, 63 Ill.Dec. 363, 437 N.E.2d 1285(1982);People v. Green, 121 Misc.2d 522, 468 N.Y.S.2d 309(1983);State v. Scott, 59 Or.App. 220, 650 P.2d 985(1982);State v. DeMasi, R.I., 419 A.2d 285(1980), vacated on other grounds, 452 U.S. 934, 101 S.Ct. 3072, 69 L.Ed.2d 948(1981);Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369(Wyo.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899, 102 S.Ct. 402, 70 L.Ed.2d 216(1981).See also3 W. LeFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the FourthAmendment § 11(e), at 232-34 (Supp.1984);1 W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions§ 11.7(1983).The State acknowledges that courts which have held to the contrary have done so without helpful analysis.See, e.g., United States v. Cardona, 524 F.Supp. 45(W.D.Tex.1981);Kayes v. State, 409 So.2d 1075(Fla.App.1981);State v. Ribera, 183 Mont. 1, 597 P.2d 1164(1979).

We find that defendant Dells had a legitimate expectation of privacy that was invaded by the stop in this case.Like the trial court, we therefore reject the State's contention that he lacked standing to challenge the stop.

The State now seeks reversal on the alternative basis that the officer had reasonable cause to stop the vehicle.Although we have reservations concerning whether this issue was properly presented in the application for discretionary review, we pass that question.We thus make the second determination that is necessary in deciding whether a fourth amendment violation has occurred.We address the reasonableness of the governmental intrusion.

Applicable principles are delineated in State v. Lamp, 322 N.W.2d 48, 51(Iowa1982), and will not be repeated here.The determinative issue in this case is whether the deputy sheriff had reasonable cause to stop the vehicle for investigatory purposes.Reasonable cause means specific and...