State v. Elliott
Decision Date | 17 March 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 52564-0-II,52564-0-II |
Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. PAUL TAYLOR ELLIOTT, Respondent. |
Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
WORSWICK, J. — Paul Taylor Elliott pleaded guilty to one count of first degree theft and 16 counts of first degree identity theft. Under the multiple offense policy, the trial court calculated Elliott's offender score as 16.
At sentencing, Elliott requested an exceptional sentence below the standard range. The State requested that Elliott be sentenced within the standard range on each count. The standard sentence range was 43 to 57 months for first degree theft, and 63 to 84 months for first degree identify theft. The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence downward of 30 months on each count, to run concurrently.
The State appeals the exceptional sentence downward, arguing that the trial court incorrectly applied the multiple offense policy, incorrectly determined that the application of the multiple offense policy resulted in a sentence that was clearly excessive, and incorrectly relied on commensurate punishment when departing from the standard sentencing range. We affirm Elliott's sentence.
Elliott worked as the bookkeeper and office manager for Nichol's Trucking for 12 years. He was responsible for billing, preparing deposit slips, generating invoices, and processing receivables, among other tasks. Elliott was never given permission to use the business credit card.
Elliott stole almost $300,000 from Nichol's Trucking between May 7, 2012 and August 26, 2015, using two different methods. First, Elliott used Nichol's Trucking's credit card 38 times to make payments into his personal Square and PayPal accounts, taking a total of $110,209.71. When the owner questioned Elliott about the Square and PayPal payments, which were mostly expensed as "repairs and services," he told her the businesses in question required payment through Square or PayPal to quickly obtain the parts needed. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 2.
Second, Elliott diverted payments owed by customers to Nichol's Trucking, diverting a total of $188,387.87.1 Elliott hid the diverted payments by making false entries in the Nichol's Trucking ledgers to show the customers did not have any current amounts due.
During the period of Elliott's thefts, Nichol's Trucking suffered financially. The business struggled to pay for fuel, equipment replacement, and payroll for its 40 employees. The owners of the business discussed the financial situation in front of Elliott. Even after hearing the owners' concerns, Elliott continued his thefts.
The owner asked Elliott for Nichol's Trucking's bank statements, but he did not provide them. After the owner located the bank statements, Elliott resigned. Following his resignation,Elliott sent an e-mail to the owner stating, Clerk's Papers (CP) at 19. Elliott later admitted to spending much of the money on prostitutes and strippers.
In total, the Tacoma Police Department found that Elliott stole $298,597.58 from Nichol's Trucking over the course of more than 100 separate thefts.2 Elliott was ultimately charged with one count of first degree theft and 16 counts of identity theft in the first degree (for his uses of Nichol's Trucking's credit card that were not outside the statute of limitations).
Elliott pleaded guilty to all counts. The standard sentence range for first degree theft, with an offender score of 16, is 43 to 57 months. The standard range for first degree identity theft, with an offender score of 16, is 63 to 84 months.
At sentencing, the State requested a sentence within the standard range, and Elliott requested an exceptional sentence downward. The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence downward, sentencing Elliott to 30 months confinement on each count, to run concurrently, and 12 months in community custody.3 In support of its downward departure, the trial court made findings of fact which included:
The trial court's conclusions of law state, in relevant part:
CP at 89-91. The State objected to findings of fact number 3, 4, 6, 8, 10-17, 19, and 20.5
The SRA generally requires that a sentencing court impose a sentence within the standard sentencing range. RCW 9.94A.505(2)(a)(i). The SRA was designed to provide a system for sentencing that "structures, but does not eliminate, discretionary decisions affecting sentencing." RCW 9.94A.010.
A trial court may only depart from the standard sentence range "if it finds, considering the purposes of [the SRA], that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence." RCW 9.94A.535. If a trial court determines that an exceptional sentence is appropriate, a reviewing court may only reverse the exceptional sentence by finding:
(a) Either that the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not supported by the record which was before the judge or that those reasons do not justify a sentence outside the standard sentence range for that offense; or (b) that the sentence imposed was clearly excessive or clearly too lenient.
RCW 9.94A.585(4).
RCW 9.94A.585(4) requires courts to ask three questions, each with a different standard of review.
State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 93, 110 P.3d 717 (2005) (quoting State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 840, 940 P.2d 633 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 696, 358 P.3d 359 (2015)). Here, the State does not argue that the reasons given by the trial court are not supported by evidence, so our inquiry focuses on the second and third questions. Accordingly, the standard of review is de novo and abuse of discretion, respectively.
RCW 9.94A.535(1) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of illustrative mitigating factors which a trial court may use to support its decision to impose an exceptional sentence downward. The mitigating factor in dispute in this matter, the operation of the multiple offense policy, originates from 9.94A.535(1)(g):
The "multiple offense policy of RCW 9.94A.589" referenced above contains five subsections. The subsection relevant to this case is 1(a), which generally requires that when a person is sentenced for two or more current offenses, the offender score for each offense be calculated...
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