State v. Law

• Citation: 154 Wn.2d 85,154 Wash.2d 85,110 P.3d 717
• Decision Date: 21 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 74390-8.,74390-8.
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Angela Marie LAW, Petitioner.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

110 P.3d 717

154 Wash.2d 85

154 Wn.2d 85

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Angela Marie LAW, Petitioner.

No. 74390-8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued September 23, 2004.

Decided April 21, 2005.

Donald G. Miller, Spokane, for Petitioner.

Kevin Michael Korsmo, Spokane, for Respondent.

Sheryl Gordon McCloud, Todd Maybrown, Allen, Hansen & Maybrown PS, Seattle, for Amicus Curiae Wash. Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Seth Aaron Fine, Snohomish Co. Pros. Office, Everett, for Amicus Curiae Wash. Ass'n of Prosecuting Attorneys.

BRIDGE, J.

¶ 1 Angela Law pleaded guilty to one count of second degree theft. While the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, established Law's standard range sentence, based on her offense and past criminal history, as 22-29 months, the trial court sentenced her to just 6 months, and further converted 4 of those months to community service. Additionally, the trial court ruled that Law's continued work within her 12-step program would satisfy her community service hours. The Court of Appeals reversed the exceptional sentence, held the conversion of more than 30 days to community service was improper, and disallowed Law's volunteer work with the 12-step program to satisfy the court imposed community service. Law petitioned this court for review.

¶ 2 We hold now, as we have consistently in the past, that the SRA requires factors that serve as justification for an exceptional sentence to relate to the crime, the defendant's culpability for the crime, or the past criminal record of the defendant. Factors which are personal and unique to the particular defendant, but unrelated to the crime, are not relevant under the SRA. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals conclusion that the factors cited by the trial court do not support a downward exceptional sentence because they do not comply with the SRA, and that Law is ineligible for community service as a substitute for confinement. We reverse the Court of Appeals, however, and hold the trial court permissibly allowed Law's work in a 12-step program to count as community service.

I Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3 On August 15, 2001, the Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney's Office charged Angela Law with one count of first degree theft and three counts of forgery. On March 12, 2002, Law pleaded guilty to a single count of second degree theft and, pursuant to the plea agreement, the State dismissed the three forgery counts. Based on her past criminal history, Law had an offender score of nine.¹ Comparing her second degree theft conviction and her criminal history, Law's standard sentence range was 22-29 months. The State and defendant jointly recommended a drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA) sentence² for the midpoint of the above standard range. ¶ 4 At the sentencing hearing on May 6, 2002, numerous witnesses testified as to Law's adjustment and improvements following her being charged and subsequently pleading guilty in this case. Several witnesses testified as to her continuing recovery from substance abuse, her involvement in a 12-step program and church activities, her positive impact on others in recovery, and her building and strengthening of a support system. In addition, there was testimony that she was forming a strong bond with her son, currently in the foster care system, and that a lengthy term of incarceration may have an impact on the retention of her parental rights. Law also has an older daughter, to whom she has previously relinquished her parental rights, and who had been placed in foster care during a previous incarceration. Testimony at the hearing revealed that she has been recently positively involved in this daughter's life as well.

¶ 5 Based on these character references and testimony about her personal circumstances, the trial judge imposed a downward exceptional sentence. Departing from the standard range of 22-29 months, the trial court sentenced Law to 6 months, converting 4 months to community service and permitting the remaining 2 months to be served "on a work release or work crew basis or at Eleanor Chase House." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 22, 29. The court further ordered 24 months of community custody and permitted Law's work in a 12-step program to count towards her community service requirement. Finally, Law was ordered to pay restitution on all charges, including those dismissed.

¶ 6 In support of its downward departure, the trial court made the following findings: (1) Law is making progress relating to her son who is currently in foster care; (2) facilitating the return of Law's son would further the foster system's goal of returning children to their biological parents and save the state foster care system money; (3) Law's continued participation in a 12-step program would help keep her off drugs and ensure public safety; (4) Law, through her 12-step program, is having a positive impact on others; and (5) Law would be unable to pay restitution while incarcerated. Id. at 20-22. The trial court recognized that none of the statutory mitigating factors listed in the SRA applied in this situation. Noting the legislature intended the statutory factors listed to be illustrative only and nonexclusive, the trial court based its ruling, in part, on the stated purposes of the SRA, found in RCW 9.94A.010.³

¶ 7 The trial court's oral opinion also alluded to SRA purposes (3), (4), (5), and (6) in justifying the exceptional sentence. See Report of Proceedings (RP) at 27-28. In setting forth the basis for the exceptional sentence, the trial court found that Law's punishment, under SRA purpose 3, would be "disproportionate[ly]" harsh as it may impact her child's dependency hearing; under purpose 4, that Law's continued participation in Narcotics Anonymous would "help assure public safety;" under purpose 5, that she has established a "great support system" and should be "commended for her new behavior of the past year"—in other words, she should be offered continued opportunity to improve herself; and finally under purpose 6, that an exceptional sentence would "save the foster care system money" thereby making "frugal use of ... State ... resources." CP at 21; RP at 28. ¶ 8 The State appealed asserting as error (1) the trial court's imposition of an exceptional sentence based on facts unrelated to the offense, (2) the conversion of more than 30 days of confinement to community service, and (3) the allowance that Law's work in her 12-step program could count towards her community service requirement. The Court of Appeals agreed and in an unpublished opinion reversed the trial court's sentence on all three grounds. State v. Law, noted at 117 Wash.App. 1056, 2003 WL 21546228, at **2-3. Law filed a petition for review, which this court granted.

II Analysis

¶ 9 For the purposes of our review we first recognize that "[o]ur precedent ... clearly establishes that statutes defining punishment fall within the province of the legislature." State v. Varga, 151 Wash.2d 179, 193, 86 P.3d 139 (2004) (citing State v. Bryan, 93 Wash.2d 177, 181, 606 P.2d 1228 (1980) ("Determination of crimes and punishment has traditionally been a legislative prerogative, subject to only very limited review in the courts.")). In short, it is settled law that the "`"[f]ixing of penalties or punishments for criminal offenses is a legislative function, and the power of the legislature in that respect is plenary and subject only to constitutional provisions."'" Varga, 151 Wash.2d at 193, 86 P.3d 139 (quoting State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 767, 921 P.2d 514 (1996) (quoting State v. Mulcare, 189 Wash. 625, 628, 66 P.2d 360 (1937))). It is with deference to these well-defined legislative powers that we begin our analysis.

A Exceptional Sentence

¶ 10 The first question posed to this court is whether a downward exceptional sentence may be based on factors that are personal in nature and do not relate to the crime or the past criminal record of the defendant. Law contends that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing her exceptional sentence, asserting the trial court's reliance on the purposes of the SRA, as found in RCW 9.94A.010, was sufficient justification for the downward departure. The State counters that the reasons cited by the trial court do not support a downward exceptional sentence because they are not related to the crime or Law's culpability for the crime.

¶ 11 The SRA provides that "[i]f the sentencing court finds that an exceptional sentence outside the standard range should be imposed in accordance with [former] RCW 9.94A.120(2), the sentence is subject to review only as provided for in [former] RCW 9.94A.210(4)." Former RCW 9.94A.390 (1999), recodified as RCW 9.94A.535. As such, our review is governed by the following statute:

To reverse a sentence which is outside the sentence range, the reviewing court must find: (a) Either that the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not supported by the record which was before the judge or that those reasons do not justify a sentence outside the standard sentence range for that offense; or (b) that the sentence imposed was clearly excessive or clearly too lenient.

Former RCW 9.94A.210(4) (1989), recodified as RCW 9.94A.585. We have construed this statute to establish three prongs, each with its own corresponding standard of review.

An appellate court analyzes the appropriateness of an exceptional sentence by answering the following three questions under the indicated standards of review:

1. Are the reasons given by the sentencing judge supported by evidence in the record? As to this, the standard of review is clearly erroneous.

2. Do the reasons justify a departure from the standard range? This question is reviewed de novo as a matter of law.

3. Is the sentence clearly too excessive or too lenient? The standard of review on this last question is abuse of discretion.

State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wash.2d 834, 840, 940 P.2d 633 (1997) (citing...