State v. Elmore, 22322

• Citation: 286 S.C. 70,332 S.E.2d 762
• Decision Date: 10 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 22322,22322
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Edward Lee ELMORE, Appellant. . Heard
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

Page 762

332 S.E.2d 762 286 S.C. 70 The STATE, Respondent,
v.
Edward Lee ELMORE, Appellant. No. 22322. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard April 10, 1985.
Decided May 16, 1985.

Page 763

[286 S.C. 72] David I. Bruck, Columbia, Greenwood County Public Defender Geddes D. Anderson and John F. Beasley, Greenwood, and S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Asst. Attys. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr. and Carolyn M. Adams, Columbia, and Sol. William T. Jones, Greenwood, for respondent.

GREGORY, Justice.

Edward Lee Elmore was convicted of murder, burglary and criminal sexual conduct. ¹ He was sentenced to death. His direct appeal and mandatory sentence review [S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25 (Cum.Supp.1984) ] have been consolidated for the purposes of this opinion.

Appellant alleges numerous errors in jury selection, and both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. We affirm the convictions and sentence.

I. Jury Selection

Elmore contends the trial judge erred in excusing Bennetta B. Harris as a juror. During voir dire, she repeatedly stated she was opposed to the death penalty; however, at one point, she said she'd have to "listen to the case" though, in the same sentence, she repeated her opposition to the death penalty.

Appellant claims her exclusion violated Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). [286 S.C. 73] We disagree.

A juror's responses to voir dire must be examined in the context of the entire colloquy. State v. Skipper, 328 S.E.2d 58 (S.C.1985). A juror may be excused if it is shown that his views would substantially impair performance of his duties as a juror. Wainwright v. Witt, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Opposition to the death penalty does not have to be demonstrated with unmistakable clarity. Wainwright v. Witt, supra.

Clearly, Mrs. Harris's responses, viewed in their entirety, would have impaired her performance as a juror. Her brief equivocation did nothing to alter this view. We note she never stated she could, in fact, impose the death penalty. Her exclusion was proper.

II. Guilt Phase

After appellant's arrest, he was questioned several times. Prior to each interrogation, he was given Miranda warnings. He was warned that any statement could be used "for or against" him. He claims the warnings were defective, and his subsequent statements should have been excluded at trial. We disagree.

This Court held in State v. Singleton, 326 S.E.2d 153 (S.C.1985) that an identical Miranda warning was proper.

"Miranda does not mandate rigidity and an effective equivalent of the warnings

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can fulfill the requirement." State v. Tyson, 283 S.C. 375, 323 S.E.2d 770, 771 (1984) citing California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981). The warnings given met the Tyson standard. Elmore knew he was in an adversarial situation, and fully understood his rights. This minor deviation from the verbatim Miranda warning had no effect on the validity of appellant's waiver.

Appellant also alleges the trial judge erred in failing to charge the jury they must find he understood and waived his rights, in addition to instructing that they must find his statements voluntary. This contention is completely without merit. State v. Patterson, 327 S.E.2d 650 (1984).

[286 S.C. 74] III. Sentencing Phase

At the beginning of the sentencing trial, the judge told the jury they were not to be concerned with Elmore's guilt or innocence. Appellant contends this precluded the jury from a full consideration of mitigating factors, citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, ...