State v. Tyson, 22181
| Decision Date | 12 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 22181,22181 |
| Citation | 323 S.E.2d 770,283 S.C. 375 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Charles TYSON, Appellant. . Heard |
Deputy Appellate Defender William Isaac Diggs of S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock and Asst. Atty. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Columbia and Sol. Dudley Saleeby, Jr., Florence, for respondent.
Appellant Charles Tyson appeals from convictions for murder and armed robbery. We affirm.
The appellant first asserts failure to quash the indictment denied him a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. This exception is without merit.
Tyson was arrested August 8, 1981 and indicted October 29, 1981. He refused to accept appointed counsel, but instead opted to retain private counsel. He was not successful. Finally, on November 19, 1981, counsel was appointed to represent him. The first trial request was made December 4, 1981.
Until March 1982, both the prosecution and the defense worked diligently toward preparing the case. On March 3, 1982, the solicitor received appellant's second trial request; however, twelve days later, appellant moved to be placed under psychiatric observation. This motion was granted and a psychiatric report was received on March 30, 1982.
Appellant was served with a notice of intent to seek the death penalty in April 1982. Appellant then renewed his desire for trial by a writ of habeas corpus on May 13, 1982. On May 21, 1982, Judge Waller requested that the South Carolina Court Administration set a special term of court for trial. Preliminary motions were heard on August 30, 1982. Trial began September 13, 1982.
Four factors determine the speedy trial issue: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the government's reason for the delay; (3) the time and manner of the defendant's assertion of his rights; and (4) the prejudice suffered by the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). State v. Waites, 270 S.C. 104, 240 S.E.2d 651 (1978). The trial judge correctly ruled that there was no showing of detriment other than the incarceration itself. Nothing in the record suggests the State caused unnecessary delay. It appears that everything possible was done to expedite the case while protecting appellant's rights considering the serious nature of the charges. Furthermore, part of the delay was caused by his initial failure to accept appointed counsel.
Appellant next asserts the trial court erred in admitting items of evidence alleged to have been fruits of a statement taken in violation of appellant's Fifth Amendment rights.
At the time of his arrest, appellant was advised of his full Miranda rights by Officer Hobson. Officer Hobson testified that appellant "appeared to understand". Several hours later appellant was again advised of his rights by Detective Friarson; however, the detective failed to tell appellant he had the right to court appointed counsel. Instead, appellant was advised he could talk to an attorney "if he wished". The disputed evidence was found after subsequent questioning.
Miranda does not mandate rigidity and an effective equivalent of the warnings can fulfill the requirement. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed. 696 (1980). It would appear that Detective Friarson's warnings meet the effective equivalent standard of the familiar Miranda warnings.
However, such a finding is unnecessary to our decision. The earlier warnings given by Officer Hobson negate any defect in the later warnings. The earlier warnings were full Miranda warnings. Appellant appeared to understand the warnings.
A waiver of Miranda rights is determined from the totality of the circumstances. State v. Moultrie, 273 S.C. 60, 254 S.E.2d 294 (1979). An express waiver is unnecessary. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). The Miranda decision itself suggests an express waiver is unnecessary when the Court stated that after warnings are given, if the defendant indicates in any way that he wishes to remain silent, interrogation must ease. 384 U.S. at 473, 86 S.Ct. at 1627 (...
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State v. Tucker
...is no sufficient legal provocation. If Victim did try to grab the gun, she was only trying to defend herself. See State v. Tyson, 283 S.C. 375, 323 S.E.2d 770 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1006, 105 S.Ct. 1873, 85 L.Ed.2d 165 (1985) (evidence that victim was defending himself from armed ro......
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State v. Edwards
...that the length of delay is merely a triggering mechanism which brings additional factors into consideration); State v. Tyson, 283 S.C. 375, 323 S.E.2d 770 (1984) (affirming a trial judge's denial of a speedy trial motion where there was no detriment other than the incarceration); Brazell, ......
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State v. Shuler
...or defend himself from a crime cannot satisfy the sufficient legal provocation element of voluntary manslaughter. In State v. Tyson, 283 S.C. 375, 323 S.E.2d 770 (1984), this Court held evidence of a struggle between the victim and defendant during an armed robbery was not enough evidence t......
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State v. Sprouse
...is evidence from which it could be inferred that a defendant committed the lesser, rather than the greater offense. State v. Tyson, 283 S.C. 375, 323 S.E.2d 770 (1984); State v. Gandy, 283 S.C. 571, 324 S.E.2d 65 (1984). State v. Mathis, 287 S.C. 589, 594, 340 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1986). Accord......