State v. Erickson

• Decision Date: 29 May 1926
• Citation: 104 Conn. 542,133 A. 683
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. ERICKSON ET AL., BOARD OF ASSESSORS.

133 A. 683

104 Conn. 542

STATE v. ERICKSON ET AL., BOARD OF ASSESSORS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 29, 1926

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Newell Jennings Judge.

Application by the State for a writ of mandamus to compel E Victor Erickson and others, as members of the Board of Assessors of the Town of Branford, to include in the assessment list of said town certain property at its true and actual value. Petitioner's motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus was denied, and the respondents' motion to expunge certain paragraphs of the application and their motion to quash the alternative writ were granted, and judgment rendered for respondents, from which petitioner appeals. Error, and cause remanded.

George E. Beers and Albert M. Herrmann, both of New Haven, for the State.

Earle A. Barker, of Branford, for appellees.

MALTBIE, J.

In State ex rel. Foote v. Bartholomew, 103 Conn. 607, 132 A. 30, we sustained the right of the state to a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the board of relief of Branford to place upon the assessment list of that town certain property which the assessors had omitted. The present action concerns the assessment of the same property in the succeeding year, and consists of an application for a peremptory writ of mandamus against the assessors of the town. The gist of the complaint is that the owner of the property having failed to file a tax list, the assessors, in adding the property to the assessment list, propose to disregard the provisions of the statutes which define the rule of valuation for taxation purposes and which require that each parcel of real estate shall be separately described and valued. It is alleged that the assessors are about to fix the value of the land by taking its annual rental at an amount set more than 50 years ago, when it was of trifling value, and determining the principal sum which at 6 per cent. would return interest equivalent to that rental, and that the valuation so reached will be $18,167, whereas the land is really worth more than $500,000; also, that they propose to list the land not by parcels, but in large tracts, one of which comprises some 200 acres. The respondents filed a motion to quash, which, as we pointed out in the Bartholomew Case (page 611 ), serves in a mandamus proceeding the purpose of a demurrer and admits the allegations of the complaint; this motion the trial court granted; and, the applicant failing to plead further, judgment was entered for the respondents, from which this appeal was taken.

In the Bartholomew Case (page 615 ), in pointing out the necessary limitation upon the issuance of the writ of mandamus as applied to officers whose duty requires the exercise of judgment or discretion, we quoted as follows:

" A better statement of the law seems to be, that while a judicial officer, or one exercising discretion or authority, may be compelled to act and to proceed to the performance of his duty, he cannot be controlled in his judgment or compelled to exercise his discretion in a particular manner by means of this writ. * * * Applying these general principles, the law is well settled that where assessing officers fail and neglect in the performance of their duty they may be compelled to act, but where it is necessary to exercise judgment and discretion as to valuations and the like, the court will not decide such questions for the officers and direct by mandamus what the judgment is or should be."

For a court to attempt to determine in advance the conclusion to which an officer ought to come in the exercise of his judgment or discretion would be to pre-empt the very function which the law has reposed in him. Whitney v. New Haven, 58 Conn. 450, 457, 20 A. 666. But where the Legislature has definitely circumscribed the exercise of even a discretionary power, it is just as much a violation of a definite duty for a public officer to go beyond the restrictions imposed as it is for him to refuse to act at all. Huidekoper v. Hadley, 177 F. 1, 9, 100 C.C.A. 395, 40 L.R.A. (N. S.) 505; Ririe v. Randolph, 51 Utah, 274, 169 P. 941.

Where a public officer proposes to proceed in plain disregard of the rules of law established for his governance, capriciously or arbitrarily, and not in the honest exercise of discretion or judgment, his conduct is tantamount to a refusal to act at all and mandamus lies, not only to compel him to act but to direct that action along the prescribed way. Dailey v. New Haven, 60 Conn. 314, 319, 22 A. 945, 14 L.R.A. 69; People ex rel. E. C. T. Club v. State R. Co., 190 N.Y. 31, 82 N.E. 723; Village of Glencoe v. People, 78 Ill. 382, 389; Griffin v. U.S. ex rel. Le Cuyer, 30 App. D. C. 291, 295; State ex rel. Hawley v. Board of Supervisors, 88 Wis. 355, 366, 60 N.W. 266; State ex rel. Davis v. Cutler, 34 Utah, 99, 107, 95 P. 1071; State v. Lane, 89 W.Va. 744, 110 S.E. 180; State ex rel. Mauldin v. Matthews, 81 S.C. 414, 62 S.E. 695, 22 L.R.A. (N. S.) 735, 128 Am.St.Rep. 919, 16 Ann.Cas. 182; Tapping, Mandamus (76 Law Library) 14; 2 Spelling, Injunctions, etc. § 1384.

Where an owner of property subject to taxation fails to give in a tax list, it is made the duty of the assessors to fill out a list for him, putting in the property " at the actual valuation thereof from the best information they can obtain," buildings and house lots to be set in the list " at their present true and actual valuation" and lands other than house lots " at their average present and actual valuation by the acre." General Statutes, § § 1138, 1183. However men might disagree as to the application of these rules in a particular case, they are definite and certain, and it is the clear duty of the assessors to follow them. The determination as to the value of property reached by applying them is not a matter which a court can control by mandamus, but it may require that in making that determination the assessors shall obey them. The distinction is well made in State Board of Equalization v. People, 191 Ill. 528, 552, 61 N.E. 339, 348 (58 L.R.A. 513) where the court said:

" The court does not, by its said order and judgment, undertake to control the discretion or judgment of the respondents in the valuation or assessment of the capital stock, including the franchises, of said corporations. It only lays down the rules of law which govern and the methods which should be pursued by the respondents in making such valuation and assessment."

See, also, Huidekoper v. Hadley, 177 F. 1, 100 C.C.A. 395, 40 L.R.A. (N. S.) 505; United States v. Jimmerson, 222 F. 489, 138 C.C.A. 85, L.R.A. 1918B, 1102; State v. Herrald, 36 W.Va. 721, 15 S.E. 974.

Proof that assessors are valuing property so illegally, capriciously, or arbitrarily as to justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus must often be difficult, and a mere apparent undervaluation could rarely, if ever, suffice. Dillon v. Bare & Carter, 60 W.Va. 483, 505, 56 S.E. 390. But there can be no doubt that under the allegations of the application facts might be shown which would constitute a clear and wilful disregard of the provisions of the statutes and justify the relief sought in this action.

Section 1138 of the General Statutes has a further provision that the assessors, when called upon to make out a tax list for a property owner who has failed to file one, " shall make a separate description and valuation of each parcel of real estate." This imposes upon the assessors the same obligation which in the same section is made to rest upon...