State v. Escalante

• Decision Date: 23 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 97268-1,97268-1
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Alejandro ESCALANTE , Petitioner.

195 Wash.2d 526

461 P.3d 1183

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v. Alejandro ESCALANTE , Petitioner.

No. 97268-1

Supreme Court of Washington.

Filed April 23, 2020

Dennis W. Morgan, Attorney at Law, Po Box 1019, Republic, WA, 99166-1019, for Petitioner.

Will Morgan Ferguson, Attorney at Law, 4448 Sunburst Lane, Stevensville, MT, 59870, Timothy Rasmussen, Stevens County Prosecutor, 215 S. Oak Street, Colville, WA, 99114-2862, for Respondent.

González, J

¶1 In our constitutional system of government, individuals have rights that the government and its agents must respect. Among those rights is the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. U.S. CONST . amend V. To protect this constitutional right, no government agent may interrogate someone in custody without first warning them of their right to remain silent and their right to counsel. Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). If Miranda warnings are not given, incriminating statements that result may not be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution. Id.

¶2 In this case, Alejandro Escalante was detained for hours in a secured area at a border crossing and, the State concedes, interrogated by federal agents without Miranda warnings. Statements he made during that interrogation were used by the State to convict him of drug possession. While a traveler briefly detained and questioned at the border is typically not in custody for Miranda purposes, the government’s power to detain and question people at the border without implicating Miranda has limits. Here, those limits were reached. This border detention created the type of inherently coercive environment that demands Miranda warnings to ensure an individual’s choice to speak is the product of free will. We hold that Escalante was in custody when he was interrogated and reverse.

FACTS

¶3 In August 2017, Escalante and three friends went to a music festival in Canada. Transcript of Proceedings at 20-21. On their way home to the United States, they passed through the Frontier border crossing station, where border patrol agents were searching all vehicles coming from the festival as part of a drug enforcement operation. Id. at 19-20, 32, 38. Since they told the first agent that they were coming from the festival, they were directed to the secondary inspection area, and border patrol agents took their documents. Id. at 13, 20-23, 32.

¶4 At secondary, an agent told the men to leave all their belongings in the van and wait in the secondary lobby. Id. at 22-23. The secondary lobby was an 11 x 14 foot secured room that was not accessible to the public or other travelers. Id. at 13-14. The door to the lobby was locked, with entry and exit controlled by an agent who sat inside the lobby behind a glass partition. Id. at 23, 28-29. Multiple groups of travelers could be detained in the lobby at the same time if agents were searching multiple vehicles at once. Id. at 29. Once inside the secured lobby, those detained were not allowed to use the bathroom or access water without getting permission from agents and submitting to a pat-down search. Id. at 14-15, 26. Agents patted down all four men and found narcotics on the driver and one passenger, but not on Escalante or the other passenger. Id. at 35-36, 49-50. The driver and passenger with drugs were moved to 6 x 10 foot detention cells while Escalante and the other passenger continued to be held in the secured lobby. Id. at 18, 43-44, 48-49.

¶5 Agents kept all the men secured, either in the locked lobby or in the detention cells, for five hours while they searched the van. Id. at 45-46, 17. During this time, the agent behind the glass partition watched Escalante and kept his documents. Id. at 28-29. The search uncovered drug paraphernalia and personal items containing drugs, including a backpack with small amounts of heroin and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Id. at 24, 40-41. Without giving Miranda warnings, agents confronted the men with each item of drug paraphernalia and each item in which drugs were found and asked who owned it. Id. at 24-25, 40-43, 49-50. Escalante admitted he owned the backpack. Id. at 42-43. At that time, Escalante and his companion were the only travelers in the secured lobby. Id. at 42. Border patrol agents contacted the United States Attorney’s Office through the Department of Homeland Security. Id. at 44-45. After that office declined prosecution because the small quantity of drugs did not meet the threshold for federal prosecution, agents summoned local law enforcement and held Escalante until they arrived. Id. at 45. These officers formally arrested Escalante and gave him Miranda warnings. Id.

¶6 Escalante was charged in state court with possession of heroin and LSD. He moved to suppress his statement claiming ownership of the backpack because it was obtained in custody by interrogation without Miranda warnings. The State conceded that Escalante was interrogated but argued Miranda warnings were not required because he was not, in the State’s view, in custody at any time while detained at secondary. The trial court admitted Escalante’s incriminating statement. Escalante was convicted at a stipulated facts trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Escalante , No. 35812-7-III, 2019 WL 2000561 (Wash. Ct. App. May 7, 2019) (unpublished).¹ We granted review. Order, State v. Escalante , No. 97268-1, 458 P.3d 1181 (Wash. Oct. 4, 2019).

ANALYSIS

¶7 Escalante does not challenge any of the trial court’s findings of fact, making them verities on appeal. State v. Lorenz , 152 Wash.2d 22, 30, 36, 93 P.3d 133 (2004) (citing State v. Broadaway , 133 Wash.2d 118, 131, 942 P.2d 363 (1997) ). Whether Escalante was in custody is a question of law we review de novo. Id.

¶8 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that individuals will not be compelled by the government to incriminate themselves. U.S. CONST . amend. V.² "[O]ur accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth." Miranda , 384 U.S. at 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (citing Chambers v. Florida , 309 U.S. 227, 235-38, 60 S. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940) ). The Fifth Amendment protects an individual’s right to remain silent, in and out of court, " ‘unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’ " Id. (quoting Malloy v. Hogan , 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964) ).

¶9 In Miranda , the United States Supreme Court recognized that an individual interrogated while in custody is subjected to inherently compelling pressures "which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist." 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602 . The Court explained that in-custody interrogations largely take place in an incommunicado police-dominated atmosphere where there is potential for physical brutality and psychological ploys aimed at inducing suspects to confess. Id. at 445-48, 86 S. Ct. 1602 . Even in the absence of explicit coercion, when the government significantly curtails an individual’s freedom of action, the individual may be effectively compelled to speak when, in a freer setting, they would exercise their right to remain silent. Id. at 455-56, 86 S. Ct. 1602 . To assure an individual freely makes the choice to talk to the police, Miranda requires that before custodial interrogation, the police inform a suspect of their right to remain silent and their right to the presence of an attorney, appointed or retained. Id. at 479, 86 S. Ct. 1602 . If Miranda warnings are not given before custodial interrogation, incriminating statements that result may not be used as evidence against the person who made the statements in a criminal prosecution.³ Id. ¶10 The parties agree that Escalante was interrogated. Interrogation is questioning or conduct by the police that is "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980) (footnote omitted). Asking an individual to acknowledge ownership of an item containing drugs is interrogation. See State v. A.M. , 194 Wash.2d 33, 40-41, 448 P.3d 35 (2019). The only issue before us is whether Escalante was in custody for Miranda purposes at the time of that interrogation.

¶11 The Miranda court defined "custody" as "all settings in which [a person’s] freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602 . Since then, the Court has narrowed "custody" to circumstances where "a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’ " Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler , 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1275 (1983) ). Therefore, even if a person is "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—such that a reasonable person in their position would not feel free to leave or otherwise terminate the encounter with law enforcement—they are not necessarily in "custody" for Miranda purposes. Id. at 442, 104 S. Ct. 3138 . Ultimately, in Miranda case law, " ‘custody’ is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion." Howes v. Fields , 565 U.S. 499, 508-09, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 182 L. Ed. 2d 17 (2012).

¶12 The custody inquiry is an objective one that asks how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the circumstances. Berkemer , 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138 . To determine whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would feel restrained to the degree associated with formal arrest, a court examines the totality of the circumstances. Relevant circumstances may include the nature of the surroundings, the extent of police control over the surroundings, the degree of physical restraint...