State v. Walker, 22454

• Decision Date: 17 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 22454,22454
• Citation: 129 Idaho 409,925 P.2d 413
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent. v. Phillip D. WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 413

925 P.2d 413

129 Idaho 409

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent. v. Phillip D. WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22454.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Oct. 17, 1996.

Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public Defender; Amil N. Myshin, Jr., Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; L. LaMont Anderson, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

LANSING, Judge.

We are called upon to review the reasonableness of the sentence imposed upon Phillip D. Walker for first degree murder, I.C. §§ 18-4001, -4003(d). The charges stemmed from the death of Walker's two and one-half-year-old stepson after Walker had anal intercourse with the child. The death was caused by peritonitis resulting from lacerations in the child's colon. Walker pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in which the State agreed not to seek the death penalty and to limit its sentencing recommendation to a unified life sentence with a minimum period of thirty years' incarceration. The district court imposed a unified life sentence with a minimum term of twenty-nine years. On appeal, Walker challenges the sentence, contending that it is excessive.

When reviewing a sentence on appeal, we independently examine the record, focusing upon the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, to determine if there has been an abuse of the sentencing court's discretion. State v. Young, 119 Idaho 510, 511, 808 P.2d 429, 430 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct.App.1982). An abuse of discretion will be found only if, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500, 861 P.2d 67, 70 (1993). A period of confinement is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case. State v. Shiloff, 125 Idaho 104, 106, 867 P.2d 978, 980 (1994); State v. Espinoza, 127 Idaho 194, 196, 898 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Ct.App.1995); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App.1982).

The determinate portion of Walker's sentence, twenty-nine years, is treated as the probable term of confinement for purposes of appellate review. State v. Kysar, 116 Idaho 992, 999, 783 P.2d 859, 866 (1989); State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776, 769 P.2d 1148 (Ct.App.1989). Therefore, Walker bears the burden to show that this twenty-nine-year term is unreasonably harsh in light of the governing criteria and the facts in the record.

In examining the nature of Walker's offense, we find nothing that militates in favor of a lesser sentence. Walker anally penetrated a very small child, callously disregarding the severe physical pain and psychological trauma that he was inflicting upon the child. In the days that followed, Walker declined to obtain medical treatment that might have saved the child's life. Walker acknowledged that he saw blood in the child's diaper following the molestation, but did not disclose this to the child's mother or contact a doctor because doing so would likely trigger a criminal investigation.

Walker argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider his age, eighteen at the time of the offense, when fashioning the sentence. The record does not support this argument. The trial court explicitly addressed...