State v. Estrada
| Decision Date | 13 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 33,861.,No. S-1-SC-35927.,33,861.,S-1-SC-35927. |
| Citation | 377 P.3d 476 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael A. ESTRADA, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Walter Hart, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.
HANISEE
, Judge.
{1} Defendant appeals his conviction for conspiracy to commit forgery, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict and that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. We affirm.
{2} We divide our narrative of the facts into two parts: (A) facts relevant to Defendant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, and (B) facts relevant to Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his conviction for conspiracy to commit forgery. We adopt the district court's findings of fact with respect to its denial of Defendant's speedy trial motion to the extent its findings are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Spearman, 2012–NMSC–023, ¶ 19, 283 P.3d 272
. Similarly, we recite the facts relevant to Defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenge to his conviction in the light most favorable to the jury's guilty verdict. See
State v. Chavez, 2009–NMSC–035, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891.
{3} On November 12, 2010, the State filed a criminal complaint in magistrate court charging Defendant with four counts of forgery in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30–16–10(A), (B) (2006)
. Defendant was arrested on November 19, 2010. On December 9, 2010, Defendant was charged in district court by grand jury indictment of four counts of forgery and one count of conspiracy to commit forgery. The State dismissed the magistrate court case without prejudice the following day.
{4} Defendant was arraigned on the district court criminal complaint on December 27, 2010. The district court set Defendant's bond at $15,000. On January 21, 2011, Aric Elsenheimer, Defendant's public defender, filed an entry of appearance and request for discovery, as well as a demand for speedy trial. On February 21, 2011, Mr. Elsenheimer filed a written motion for a reduction of Defendant's bond.
{5} On February 25, 2011, the State moved to join Defendant's case with pending cases against his two alleged co-conspirators. The district court entered notices scheduling a hearing on the State's joinder motion and Defendant's motion to reduce bond for April 7, 2011. On April 4, 2011, for reasons unexplained in the record, the district court vacated the motion hearing.
{6} On May 2, 2011, Pedro Pineda filed an entry of appearance on Defendant's behalf. (Mr. Elsenheimer did not file a motion to withdraw or substitute, but it appears that this was the effect of Mr. Pineda's entry of appearance because Mr. Elsenheimer did not participate in the case from this point onward.) On July 25, 2011, Defendant posted bond and was released from incarceration. On August 22, 2011, the district court entered a notice scheduling a jury trial for Defendant's charges on October 4, 2011. On September 29, 2011, the State filed a motion to continue the October 4, 2011, trial referencing its pending motion to join Defendant's case with one of his alleged co-conspirator's. The motion stated that “Defense counsel, [Mr.] Pineda, does not oppose this [m]otion.” On September 30, 2011, the district court granted the State's motion to continue and vacated the October 4, 2011, trial setting.
{7} On February 2, 2012, the State filed a request for a hearing on its motion to join. A hearing on the motion was scheduled to take place on February 15, 2012, and on February 16, 2012, the State filed an amended motion to join that sought to join Defendant's case with the case against only one of Defendant's alleged co-conspirators, Richard M. Tow.1 Defendant's attorney did not oppose the motion. On February 17, 2012, the district court entered an order joining Defendant's case with Mr. Tow's. On March 13, 2012, the district court entered a notice setting a jury trial for April 26, 2012.
{8} On April 11, 2012, Defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss counsel. In the motion, Defendant asserted that his attorney, Mr. Pineda, had failed to communicate with him and that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. Defendant noted “[m]y trial is [set for] the 26th of April, and I need an [a]ttorney to prepare for my trial because I am innocent and I am taking this case to trial.” Defendant's motion was mailed to the district court in an envelope that listed the Luna County Detention Center as a return address. On April 13, 2012, the district court scheduled a hearing on Defendant's pro se motion to take place on April 19, 2012.
{9} On April 18, 2012, Defendant's attorney filed a motion to withdraw. In it, Mr. Pineda asserted that Defendant's pro se motion to dismiss him as his attorney had caused “the attorney client relationship [to] deteriorate [ ] beyond repair[.]” Mr. Pineda argued that Defendant's assertion that he had never met or communicated with his attorney was refuted by the fact that the arguments in his motion to dismiss counsel were based on information that could only be gleaned from discovery that the State had provided to Mr. Pineda, which Mr. Pineda had in turn provided to Defendant. Mr. Pineda asserted that Defendant had been arrested for a probation violation on September 8, 2011, and again released on October 13, 2011, but had failed to comply with a condition of release requiring him to stay in contact with his attorney. Mr. Pineda also stated that Defendant was arrested for another probation violation on February 14, 2012, and that “he has been incarcerated ever since.” Mr. Pineda explained that Defendant's dissatisfaction with Mr. Pineda likely stemmed from his being “very unhappy” with the State's plea offer, which Mr. Pineda had conveyed to Defendant. Finally, Mr. Pineda stated that “Defendant ... [has] consulted with local attorney Mike Lilley, [and] Mr. Lilley told [Defendant] he would sue me and he would take over [Defendant's] criminal case as well.”
{10} On April 19, 2012, Defendant, again pro se, filed a motion for setting and telephonic hearing, in which he asserted that the indictment against him should be dismissed for “due process” and speedy trial violations. The district court held a hearing on April 20, 2012. At the beginning of the hearing, Defendant explained that he had filed a separate motion for a telephonic hearing because he lived in Deming, New Mexico. Defendant also admitted that he had in fact met with Mr. Pineda once.
{11} Defendant disputed that he had hired another attorney to replace and sue Mr. Pineda, explaining that Mr. Pineda's assertion in his motion to withdraw must have been the result of a “misunderstanding.” In response, Mr. Pineda called his assistant to give testimony as a witness. Mr. Pineda's assistant testified that she had only spoken to Defendant once, when Defendant had called from jail to say that he planned to hire Mr. Lilley to sue Mr. Pineda for unstated reasons and to represent Defendant in his criminal case.
{12} The prosecutor explained that the State's primary concern was how the delay that would result from granting Defendant's motion to dismiss his attorney would be assigned for speedy trial purposes. Notwithstanding these concerns, the district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss counsel and Mr. Pineda's motion to withdraw. 2 The district court stated that “it appears to this court that the parties will not be prepared for trial” and directed Mr. Pineda to prepare form orders granting each motion and continuing the trial. The district court asked Defendant personally whether he approved the “form” of the orders, and Defendant orally did so.
{13} On May 11, 2012, the district court entered orders granting Defendant's oral motion to continue, his motion to dismiss counsel, and Mr. Pineda's motion to withdraw as counsel. The district court reset Defendant's jury trial for July 31, 2012. On June 11, 2012, Defendant's replacement contract defender, Peter Giovannini, filed a notice of appearance, demand for discovery, and a speedy trial demand.
{14} On July 23, 2012, Defendant's attorney filed a motion to vacate the July 31, 2012, jury trial. The motion cited Defendant's confusion as to who in fact was representing him, Defendant's request to take statements by several witnesses for the State and witnesses that Defendant intended to call to testify in his defense at trial. The motion stated that “[u]ndersigned counsel agrees that any delay arising from this continuance should be attributed to the defense for purposes of any speedy trial analysis.” The district court granted Defendant's motion to continue and vacated the July 31, 2012 trial setting, which was reset for October 11, 2012.
{15} On September 25, 2012, Defendant's attorney filed a motion to vacate the October 11, 2012, trial setting, stating that Defendant had been released from prison to serve the remainder of his sentence at a halfway house, and that “Defendant ... is unable to communicate with undersigned counsel regarding [this case] because [he] is fearful that the [halfway house] will give him an ‘unsuccessful release’ from the program[,] which will violate his probation.” The motion explained that “if the [halfway house] is aware of pending charges, he will be released from the program.” The motion stated that “[u]ndersigned counsel and Defendant respectfully request that this matter be vacated and rescheduled after April[ ] 2014 to allow [D]efendant ... to successfully complete the [halfway house s]ubstance [a]buse [t]reatment [p]rogram[.]” The State opposed the motion.
{16} On October 3, 2012, the district...
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