State v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc.
Decision Date | 03 December 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 03-97-00817-CV,03-97-00817-CV |
Citation | 981 S.W.2d 509 |
Parties | STATE of Texas, Appellant, v. THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN GOOD SAMARITAN SOCIETY d/b/a Parks Good Samaritan Village, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Dan Morales, Atty. Gen., Rande K. Herrell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Financial Litigation Division, Austin, for appellant.
Randall C. Doubrava, James K. McClendon, Hilgers & Watkins, P.C., Austin, for appellee.
Before Justices JONES, KIDD and YEAKEL. *
The Attorney General, upon referral from the Texas Department of Human Services (the "TDHS"), brought suit against appellee The Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society (the "Society") seeking civil penalties for violations under chapter 242 of the Texas Health and Safety Code regarding the operation of one of the Society's nursing homes. The Society filed a motion to show cause by what authority the Attorney General was authorized to file suit. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 12, the district court, after finding that the Attorney General lacked both statutory and constitutional authority to prosecute the suit, dismissed the case. The State of Texas appeals. We will reverse the district court's order.
This Court must determine whether the district court erred in granting the Society's motion to cause attorney to show authority. The district court concluded that the Attorney General, upon referral from TDHS, did not have authority to bring a suit for civil penalties under section 242.065 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. The district court's finding that an attorney lacks authority to file or maintain a suit is a conclusion of law. Gulf Reg'l Educ. Television v. University of Houston, 746 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied) ( ). As a conclusion of law, we review the district court's finding de novo. See Nelkin v. Panzer, 833 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
The issue of whether the Attorney General has authority to bring suit arises because section 242.065 fails to expressly mention which law enforcement entity should represent TDHS in seeking civil penalties in a court of law. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 242.065 (West Supp.1999). We must, therefore, interpret the legislative intent behind section 242.065 in order to determine which law enforcement agency is appropriate to bring suit. Legislative intent is determined by examining the language used in the statute, reading every word, phrase, and expression as if it were deliberately chosen for a purpose. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 745 S.W.2d 918, 923-24 (Tex.App.--Austin 1988, writ denied). We cannot, however, construe section 242.065 in isolation, but rather, must construe it in the context of the statute as a whole. See Martin v. Department of Pub. Safety, 964 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex.App.--Austin 1998, no pet.). Consequently, before examining section 242.065 directly, we examine the statutory framework established by chapter 242, and the role the Attorney General plays in that framework.
Chapter 242 of the Texas Health and Safety Code is the primary legislation for the regulation and oversight of nursing homes in the State of Texas. Chapter 242 is divided into seventeen subchapters. These subchapters generally fall into three broad categories: administrative requirements, medical care and services, and enforcement. The subchapters within the administrative requirements category deal with day-to-day operation of an institution. 2 See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 242.032-.049, .221-.226, .301-.322 (West Supp.1999). Examples of the types of provisions in this category include those dealing with licensing requirements for institutions and the system for Although the statute gives TDHS the primary responsibility in Texas for regulating nursing homes, the legislature has also articulated an extensive role for the Attorney General. For instance, the Attorney General and TDHS are both required to prepare annual performance reports of the administration of their respective duties under the chapter. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 242.005 (West Supp.1999). Additionally, the long-term care legislative oversight committee is required to review specific recommendations for legislation from the Attorney General as well as TDHS. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 242.653 (West Supp.1999). With regard to legal proceedings, chapter 242 explicitly requires the Attorney General to provide legal assistance as necessary to enforce the provisions of subchapter I in particular, and furthermore to cooperate in any legal proceeding requested by TDHS. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 242.073, .320 (West Supp.1999).
medicaid reimbursements. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 242.032-.049, .221-.226 (West Supp.1999). The medical care and services category includes general requirements about the quality of care patients are to receive and about particular services that are to be provided. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 242.151-.161, .201-.204, .401-.404, .601-.615, .801-.804 (West Supp.1999). Provisions in this category govern, among other things, the administration of medication and the services provided to specific kinds of residents, such as children and residents suffering from Alzheimer's Disease. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 242.601-.615, .201-.204, .801-.804 (West Supp.1999). The category encompassing the majority of the statute's subchapters is enforcement. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 242.061-.073, .094-.099, .1225-.134, .251-.268, .501-.504, .551-.554, .651-.655 (West Supp.1999). Within this category are the provisions concerning resident's rights, appointment of trustees for institutions, reports of abuse and ensuing inspections, arbitration of disputes, and general enforcement. Id
We now focus our attention on subchapter C, General Enforcement, and, in particular, section 242.065, the section at issue in this appeal. It is evident that the legislature's amendments to this subchapter in 1995 and 1997 were an attempt to provide greater protection for the health and safety of nursing home residents. 3 As in other subchapters, the legislature envisioned a key role for the Attorney General.
Subchapter C of chapter 242 provides various enforcement tools for TDHS to use in the regulation of nursing homes. The tools available to TDHS include administrative penalties, trusteeship, criminal penalties, and civil penalties. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 242.065, .069, .094 (West Supp.1999). Administrative penalties are assessed by TDHS for minor violations of the statute. The Attorney General, upon request by TDHS, seeks collection of the administrative penalty if the person or entity charged does not pay the penalty within thirty days. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 242.069 (West Supp.1999). In a trusteeship, the Attorney General seeks appointment of a trustee to operate an institution once certain circumstances arise and TDHS determines that a trustee is needed, such as when an institution is operating without a license or an institution's license has been suspended or revoked. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 242.094 (West Supp.1999). Criminal penalties are customarily handled by the county and district attorneys.
In 1997, the legislature greatly enhanced civil penalties as an enforcement tool available to TDHS. Section 242.065 provides for civil penalties when TDHS determines that a violation has occurred that threatens the health and safety of a resident. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 242.065 (West Supp.1999). Section 242.065(a) reads as follows A person who violates or causes a violation of this chapter or a rule adopted under this chapter is liable for a civil penalty of not less than $1,000 or more than $20,000 for each act of violation if the department determines the violation threatens the health and safety of a resident.
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 242.065(a) (West Supp.1999). Subsection (b) requires that a trier of fact determine the amount of the penalty to be awarded and lists factors for the trier of fact to consider. Id. Thus, unlike the administrative penalties provided for by the statute, the trier of...
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