State v. Evans

Decision Date11 December 1929
Docket Number425.
Citation150 S.E. 678,198 N.C. 82
PartiesSTATE v. EVANS.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from Superior Court, Richmond County; Clement, Judge.

Ray Evans was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. No error. Criminal prosecution tried upon an indictment charging the prisoner with the murder of one W. D. Smith. Verdict: Guilty of murder in the first degree. Judgment: Death by electrocution. The prisoner appeals, assigning errors.

W. R Jones and J. C. Sedberry, both of Rockingham, for appellant.

D. G Brummitt, Atty. Gen., and Frank Nash, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

STACY C.J.

There is evidence on behalf of the state tending to show that on the afternoon of June 12, 1929, the prisoner, Ray Evans, a colored man, shot and killed W. D. Smith, a township constable of Richmond county, while the latter was attempting to arrest the former or to prevent his forcible escape from custody. The officer had a warrant for one Lander Ingram and, in looking for him, stopped at the home of Lula Belle Mitchell to inquire as to where Ingram lived. While obtaining this information, the deceased saw the defendant run out of the back door of Lula Belle Mitchell's house with some fruit jars of liquor, which he dropped in a dewberry patch not far away. The officer and his son picked up the liquor, and came back to the front of the house, where the deceased met the prisoner, caught him by his left arm, and said: "You are under arrest." The prisoner inquired, "What for?" The deceased replied: "For liquor." Whereupon the prisoner said: "I am not going," and he jerked loose from the officer, drew a pistol from his overalls with his right hand which had been in his pocket all the while, and shot the deceased three times, one of which proved fatal. The prisoner later told the sheriff, while in jail, that the reason he shot three times, or more than once, was because the deceased did not turn him loose. The officer never drew his pistol; he had a jar of liquor in one hand, and was holding the prisoner with the other. The prisoner had been to South Carolina earlier in the day and returned with a gallon and a quart of liquor, which he carried to the home of Lula Belle Mitchell. The shooting took place about first dark. The defendant ran away, but was apprehended in Roanoke, Va., and returned to Richmond county jail ten or twelve days after the homicide.

The prisoner testified that he thought the deceased was reaching for his pistol at the time he shot, but the jury did not accept this version of the matter. It is the contention of the defendant, however, that in no view of the case can he be guilty of more than murder in the second degree, and, in support of this position, he relies upon State v. Rhyne, 124 N.C. 847, 33 S.E. 128, and cases there cited. The crucial point, therefore, is whether the evidence tending to show premeditation and deliberation is sufficient to warrant a verdict of murder in the first degree. We think it is. State v. Miller, 197 N.C. 445, 149 S.E. 590; State v. Steele, 190 N.C. 506, 130 S.E. 308; State v. Merrick, 172 N.C. 870, 90 S.E. 257; State v. Cameron, 166 N.C. 379, 81 S.E. 748; State v. McClure, 166 N.C. 321, 81 S.E. 458; State v. Daniels, 164 N.C. 464, 79 S.E. 953; State v. Exum, 138 N.C. 599, 50 S.E. 283; State v. Thomas, 118 N.C. 1113, 24 S.E. 431; State v. Norwood, 115 N.C. 789, 20 S.E. 712, 44 Am. St. Rep. 498.

The prisoner was violating the prohibition laws; he had armed himself with a concealed weapon; he tried to hide his liquor and to get away from the officer; he was notified of the purpose of his arrest; he whipped out his pistol with his right hand, which had been under his overalls for quite a while, and shot the deceased three times without cause. The jury found that the homicide was the culmination of a preconceived plan or design, executed deliberately and with malice. The evidence warrants the finding, and this is murder in the first degree. C. S. § 4200; State v. Benson, 183 N.C. 795, 111 S.E. 869.

In determining the question of premeditation and deliberation it is proper for the jury to take into consideration the conduct of the prisoner, before and after, as well as at the time of, the homicide, and all the attendant circumstances. If the killing took place simultaneously with the formation of the intent to kill, there would be no premeditation. Nor would flight be evidence of it. State v. Steele, supra. But, if the prisoner weighed the purpose of killing long enough to form a fixed design, and at a subsequent time, no matter how soon or how remote, put it into execution, there would be sufficient premeditation and deliberation to warrant the jury in finding him guilty of murder in the first degree. State v. Teachey, 138 N.C. 587, 50 S.E. 232; State v. Dowden, 118 N.C. 1145, 24 S.E. 722. It is immaterial, in determining the degree of murder, how soon after resolving to kill the prisoner carried his purpose into execution. State v. Covington, 117 N.C. 834, 23 S.E. 337. ...

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