State v. Fanning, WD 81158
Decision Date | 24 July 2018 |
Docket Number | WD 81158 |
Citation | 557 S.W.3d 449 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Helen Jean FANNING, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
557 S.W.3d 449
STATE of Missouri, Appellant,
v.
Helen Jean FANNING, Respondent.
WD 81158
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.
Filed: July 24, 2018
Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied August 28, 2018
Application for Transfer Denied October 30, 2018
Joshua C. Bachman, St. Jospeh, for appellant.
Ellen H. Flottman, Columbia, for respondent.
Before Division Two: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Presiding Judge, Lisa White Hardwick and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judges
Lisa White Hardwick, Judge
The State appeals the dismissal of a misdemeanor charge against Helen Fanning for violation of the compulsory school attendance law. The State argues that the circuit court erred in finding that Section 167.031.1, RSMo 2016,1 is ambiguous as to whether a parent’s failure to cause a child between the ages of seven and sixteen to regularly attend school constitutes a misdemeanor under Section 167.061. Because we find that the plain language of Sections 167.031.1 and 167.061 unambiguously criminalizes such conduct, we reverse the circuit court’s dismissal and remand the case.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2017, the State charged Fanning with violating the compulsory school attendance law, Sections 167.031 and 167.061, by failing to cause her son to attend a required academic program on a regular basis. The State alleged in its probable cause statement that Fanning’s son, who was thirteen years old at the time, was habitually absent
or tardy from his middle school and had an attendance rate of 82%.
Fanning filed a motion to dismiss for failure to charge an offense. In her motion, she alleged that the plain language of Sections 167.031 and 167.061 criminalizes only a parent’s failure to cause a child between the ages of five and seven to attend school regularly and does not criminalize a parent’s failure to cause a child who is between the ages seven and the district’s compulsory attendance age, which is sixteen, to attend school regularly.
The court held a hearing on Fanning’s motion. Fanning reiterated her argument that the plain language of Sections 167.031 and 167.061 criminalizes only nonattendance by children between the ages of five and seven. Alternatively, she argued that the statutes are ambiguous and, pursuant to the rule of lenity, should be construed in her favor. Following the hearing, the court agreed with Fanning and found that the statutes are ambiguous and should be construed in her favor. Therefore, the court dismissed the information for failure to charge an offense. The State appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the sufficiency of an information, we consider whether the information:
(1) properly advise[d] the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (2) consist[ed] of a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged; (3) state[d] facts which constitute the offense charged with reasonable certainty; and (4) ma[d]e the averments so clear and distinct that there could be no difficulty in determining what evidence would be admissible under them.
State v. Fernow , 328 S.W.3d 429, 430 (Mo. App. 2010) (citation omitted). In her motion to dismiss, Fanning did not contest the language per se of the misdemeanor information. Instead, she argued that that statutes cited in the information were not intended to define a criminal offense. Hence, the issue before us is one of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is an issue of law, which we review de novo. State v. Jacobson , 526 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Mo. App. 2017).
ANALYSIS
In its sole point on appeal, the State contends the circuit court erred in dismissing the information on the basis that the State failed to charge an offense. The State argues that it alleged facts constituting a violation of a provision of Section 167.031, and the plain language of Section 167.061 criminalizes noncompliance with that provision.
The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislature’s intent from the language used and to give effect to that intent if possible. State v. Jones , 479 S.W.3d 100, 106 (Mo. banc 2016). In doing so, we accord the language its plain and ordinary meaning, and where the language is clear, we must give effect to the language as written. State v. Baldwin , 484 S.W.3d 894, 897 (Mo. App. 2016). We presume "the legislature intended every word, clause, sentence, and provision of a statute to have effect and did not insert superfluous language into the statute." Frye v. Levy , 440 S.W.3d 405, 420 (Mo. banc 2014). We also presume "that all statutes relating to the same subject matter are in pari materia and are intended to be construed together, consistently and harmoniously." K.H. v....
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State v. Capozzoli
...error. Id. (citations omitted). To the extent that we are called on to interpret a statute, our review is de novo. State v. Fanning , 557 S.W.3d 449, 451 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018).The statutory section on which Ms. Capozzoli relies went into effect in 2017: "In a criminal case, an expert witness......