State v. Farnsworth

• Decision Date: 07 June 2013
• Citation: 970 N.Y.S.2d 129,107 A.D.3d 1444,2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 04168
• Parties: In the Matter of the STATE of New York, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Daniel FARNSWORTH, Respondent–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

107 A.D.3d 1444

970 N.Y.S.2d 129

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 04168

In the Matter of the STATE of New York, Petitioner–Respondent,

v.Daniel FARNSWORTH, Respondent–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

June 7, 2013.

Emmett J. Creahan, Director, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Buffalo (Aileen M. McNamara of Counsel), for Respondent–Appellant.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Zainab A. Chaudhry of Counsel), for Petitioner–Respondent.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., PERADOTTO, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Respondent appeals from an order determining that he is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10. The jury found that respondent was sexually motivated in committing his crimes and that he suffers from a mental abnormality ( see § 10.03[i] ). Respondent contends that Supreme Court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process by denying his motion to bifurcate the jury trial on the issues whether he was sexually motivated in his commission of the underlying crimes and whether he suffered from a mental abnormality. According to respondent, the jury may have been confused by the different legal standards applicable to the issues, i.e., whether petitioner established the first issue by proof beyond a reasonable doubt and whether petitioner established the second issue by clear and convincing evidence ( see Matter of State of New York v. Farnsworth, 75 A.D.3d 14, 28, 900 N.Y.S.2d 548,appeal dismissed15 N.Y.3d 848, 909 N.Y.S.2d 20, 935 N.E.2d 812). We note at the outset that respondent failed to preserve for our review his contention that due process required a bifurcation of the jury trial. In any event, we reject respondent's contentions that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for bifurcation and that he was thereby denied his due process rights. Mental Hygiene Law article 10 does not authorize respondent's proposed bifurcation, and “a court cannot amend a statute by inserting words that are not there, nor will a court read into a statute a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to enact” ( Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. v. Jorling, 85 N.Y.2d 382, 394, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1, 649 N.E.2d 1145,rearg. denied85 N.Y.2d 1033, 631 N.Y.S.2d 291, 655 N.E.2d 404 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Moreover, in a previous appeal by respondent, we concluded that “the application of the two different [legal] standards would not confuse a jury” such that bifurcation would be required ( Farnsworth, 75 A.D.3d at 28, 900 N.Y.S.2d 548). Indeed, “the trial record is devoid of evidence indicating the existence of juror confusion” with respect to the different legal standards such that bifurcation would have assisted in clarification or simplification of issues ( Wylder v. Viccari, 138 A.D.2d 482, 484, 525 N.Y.S.2d 882;see generally22 NYCRR 202.42[a] ).

Contrary to respondent's contention, we conclude that the court properly denied his motion for a directed verdict at the close of proof in the jury trial on the ground that the evidence of sexual motivation in committing the underlying crimes was legally insufficient. “A court may set aside a jury verdict as legally [insufficient] and enter judgment as a matter of law only where ‘there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences [that] could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial’ ” ( Matter of State of New York v. Gierszewski, 81 A.D.3d 1473, 1473, 916 N.Y.S.2d 729,lv. denied17 N.Y.3d 702, 2011 WL 2183880 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Here, in his statement to the police, respondent admitted that he entered a residence for a sexual purpose. The evidence further established that respondent unlawfully entered the bedroom of another minor...