State v. Farnsworth
| Decision Date | 07 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 32322-2-II.,No. 32903-4-II.,32322-2-II.,32903-4-II. |
| Citation | 133 Wn. App. 1,130 P.3d 389 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Charles Verdel FARNSWORTH, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Linda J. King, Department of Assigned Counsel, Tacoma, WA, for Appellant.
Todd Andrew Campbell, Pierce Co. Pros. Attorneys Office, Gerald Allen Horne, Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.
PART PUBLISHED OPINION
¶ 1 Charles Farnsworth appeals two first degree robbery convictions and his exceptional sentence. He argues the trial court (1) violated his right to a speedy trial under CrR 3.3; (2) abused its discretion by suppressing evidence in response to the State's discovery violation; (3) incorrectly calculated his offender score; (4) impermissibly found facts to support his exceptional sentence, contrary to Blakely;1 and (5) violated his right to due process of law. He further argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
¶ 2 In a separate personal restraint petition (PRP), consolidated with his direct appeal, Farnsworth argues that (1) he did not receive proper notice of his right to a speedy trial, and (2) CrR 3.3 unconstitutionally placed an unfair burden on him by requiring timely objection to his trial date to preserve his speedy trial rights under the rule.
¶ 3 We deny the State's motion to dismiss Farnsworth's PRP, deny Farnsworth's PRP, affirm his convictions, vacate his exceptional sentence, and remand for resentencing.
¶ 4 On March 9, 2004, Charles Farnsworth used a handgun to rob $250 from a Subway restaurant clerk. The clerk described the robber as a white male, between 40 and 50 years old, wearing a hat, black and blue square glasses, a black and blonde wig, a nose brace that covered his face, and a grey jumpsuit.
¶ 5 Less than two hours later, a Domino's Pizza restaurant clerk reported to police that he had been robbed at gunpoint. This clerk described the robber as a white male in his early forties, wearing a hat, a black and grey wig, a green jumpsuit, black gloves, and pieces of tape or band-aids across his nose and cheek. The clerk saw the man drive off in a brown-colored vehicle. When the police arrived, they spotted a four-door gold Chrysler sedan apparently abandoned in a turn lane down the street.
¶ 6 The officers approached the car, looked inside, and saw a black/grey wig and black gloves in plain view. The officers discovered that the vehicle was registered to Adam Homer, who had loaned or sold it to Charles Farnsworth.
¶ 7 On March 11, 2004, both restaurant clerks viewed six photos of white males, aligned side by side. The Subway clerk identified Farnsworth as the robber; the Domino's Pizza clerk was unable to make a positive identification.
¶ 8 On March 12, 2004, the officers executed a search warrant for Farnsworth's car, in which they discovered a wig, gloves, used band aids, and a return receipt from Shuck's Auto Supply. According to Shuck's records, a customer named "Charles Farnsworth" had returned an oil filter on March 10, 2004.
¶ 9 On March 15, 2004, the officers arrested Farnsworth for two counts of robbery and presented him with a search warrant for his home and a blood sample. They also detained Melody Norman, Farnsworth's girlfriend, for questioning and presented her with the search warrant as well. The officers read their Miranda2 rights to Farnsworth and Norman, who acknowledged that they understood. In Farnsworth's home, the officers found several pairs of blue glasses, a roll of white tape, and a first aid kit.
¶ 10 The officers took Farnsworth and Norman to the police station for an interview. One officer gave Farnsworth a written copy of his Miranda rights and read them to him. Farnsworth initially denied involvement in the robberies. But when the officers confronted him with evidence they had discovered, Farnsworth confessed that he had committed the robberies, told the officers details of the robberies, and explained where they could find the pellet gun he had used in the robberies. After reading Farnsworth his Miranda rights again, the officers recorded his confession.
¶ 11 Norman also agreed to provide the police with a recorded statement. Following a reading of her Miranda rights, she stated that Farnsworth had mentioned that he wanted to commit a robbery and, after the fact, told her that he had robbed Subway and a pizza place. Like Farnsworth, she changed the details of her story several times before the officers recorded her statement.
¶ 12 On March 17, 2004, the State charged Farnsworth with two counts of first degree robbery. Following arraignment that same day, the superior court scheduled trial to begin on May 4. Farnsworth remained in custody. He voiced no objection to the trial date.
¶ 13 On April 8, at the State's request, the trial court ordered a mental competency examination and stayed the proceedings pending this examination. Farnsworth did not object.
¶ 14 On June 10, the trial court found Farnsworth to be competent, and then reset trial for July 27. Farnsworth did not object to this new trial date.
¶ 15 On the day set for trial, July 27, 2004, Farnsworth moved to dismiss the charges because his trial did not commence within the 60-day period required under CrR 3.3. He contended that by the time of the July 27 rescheduled trial date, 69 days had passed, since his arraignment, excluding the time for his competency proceedings.
¶ 16 The trial court denied Farnsworth's motion to dismiss, ruling that because Farnsworth had failed to object within 10 days of notice of the July 27 trial date, he had waived his right to object under CrR 3.3.
¶ 17 Farnsworth also moved to dismiss the charges based on the State's alleged discovery violation. He asserted that on May 26, 2004, he had requested a transcript of Norman's interview, implicating him in the robberies. He acknowledged that the State had already provided him with a copy of the police report, which summarized Norman's interview. But Farnsworth contended that the police report summary might have been inaccurate or incomplete.
¶ 18 The State responded that it had attempted to locate Norman's taped statement. But several detectives had worked on the case, and the officers with whom Norman had spoken were unaware of her recorded statement. The State denied that the police had willfully violated its discovery obligation, explaining that: (1) the police had nothing to hide because Norman's statement about Farnsworth's culpability in the robberies was not exculpatory; (2) as soon as the State learned that the tape existed, it had given Farnsworth a copy of the transcript; and (3) Farnsworth suffered little, if any, prejudice from the lack of this inculpatory transcript because he had already confessed and provided details about the robberies.
¶ 19 The trial court ruled that (1) the State's failure to produce Norman's taped statement earlier had not prejudiced Farnsworth; (2) the police report summary and transcript of Norman's statement did not differ from her taped statement, except for minor details; and (3) the police report included enough information in its summary of Norman's statement to prevent prejudice to Farnsworth. The court denied Farnsworth's request to dismiss the case.
¶ 20 The trial court also ruled, however, that the State could not call Norman as a witness or introduce evidence of her statement to police, including her name. Farnsworth did not object to this restriction and indicated he did not intend to call Norman as a defense witness.
¶ 21 In July, the trial court conducted a CrR 3.5 hearing to determine the admissibility of Farnsworth's confession, and found that Farnsworth had voluntarily confessed to the two robberies without coercion, and ruled his confession admissible. Thereafter, Farnsworth signed a stipulation waiving his right to a jury, waiving his right to confront State witnesses and to call witnesses to testify on his behalf, and agreeing to a bench trial based on the facts in the police reports, its attached materials, and exhibits.
¶ 22 On August 2, 2004, just before the trial court rendered its verdict and without acting through counsel, Farnsworth submitted his own written statement, asking the court to revoke the stipulated trial and to provide additional time for him to call Norman as a witness. Defense counsel explained that (1) Farnsworth's statement was not a motion; and (2) he and Farnsworth had considerable disagreement over trial strategy.
¶ 23 The trial court denied Farnsworth's request, and rendered its verdict, finding Farnsworth guilty on both counts of first degree robbery.
¶ 24 At sentencing in September, the State argued that several out-of-state convictions should be included in Farnsworth's offender score. The trial court used four convictions: one California vehicular manslaughter conviction, one Utah federal firearm possession conviction, and the two current Washington first degree robbery convictions.
¶ 25 Farnsworth conceded that his California conviction was based on a statute identical to an equivalent Washington criminal statute. The trial court compared the Utah indictment, conviction, and statute with Washington's equivalent crime and found these statutes and crimes comparable.
¶ 26 Calculating Farnsworth's offender score at four, the court sentenced him to 68-months confinement, the highest end of the standard sentencing range.
¶ 27 Farnsworth appeals his convictions and sentence.
¶ 28 In November 2004, Farnsworth also filed a PRP with the Washington Supreme Court. The State moved to dismiss because it was his second PRP,3 filed without showing good cause. The Supreme Court transferred Farnsworth's...
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