State v. Farris

• Citation: 877 S.W.2d 657
• Decision Date: 03 June 1994
• Docket Number: 18920,Nos. 17718,s. 17718
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Joseph W. FARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. Joseph W. FARRIS, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 657

877 S.W.2d 657

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Joseph W. FARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.

Joseph W. FARRIS, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

Nos. 17718, 18920.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

June 3, 1994.

Judith C. LaRose, Office of the State Public Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Mary Moulton Bryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

FLANIGAN, Presiding Judge.

A jury found defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and he was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. Defendant appeals, and that appeal is Case No. 17718. After the jury trial, defendant filed a motion under Rule 29.15, ¹ seeking post-conviction relief. That motion was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant's appeal from that denial is Case No. 18920. The appeals have been consolidated and will be dealt with separately in this opinion.

Case No. 17718

Defendant's sole point is that the trial court committed plain error in denying him a speedy trial, in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution, "in that defendant waited in jail for three years and two months before being brought to trial, a presumptively prejudicial length of time for no justifiable reason. This delay resulted in a manifest injustice to defendant."

Defendant concedes that his point was not properly preserved for appeal in that it was not raised in his motion for new trial as required by Rule 29.11(d). Defendant requests review under Rule 30.20 which authorizes this court, in its discretion, to consider plain errors affecting substantial rights when this court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial...."

In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Court identified four factors the courts should assess in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial. The factors are: (1) length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.

The court also said at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193:

"We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out with full recognition that the accused's interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution." (Emphasis added.)

In Barker, 407 U.S. at 523, 92 S.Ct. at 2188, the Court found "no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months." If a defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, dismissal is "the only possible remedy." Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 2263, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973).

The Barker guidelines "have been followed and applied in Missouri in cases where it is claimed a violation of defendant's rights to a speedy trial occurred." State v. Buckles, 636 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Mo. banc 1982). The Barker factors will be considered in order.

Length of Delay

Unless factor (1) is present, there is no need to inquire into the presence of the other factors. State v. Bolin, 643 S.W.2d 806, 813 (Mo. banc 1983); State v. Bohannon, 793 S.W.2d 497, 503 (Mo.App.1990).

Speaking of this factor, the court, in Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992), said at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2690-2691[2, 3]:

"The first of these is actually a double enquiry. Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay ... since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a 'speedy' trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness. If the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.... This latter enquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis because, as we discuss below, the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time."

In Doggett, at ---- n. 1, 112 S.Ct. at 2691 n. 1, the court said:

"Depending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay 'presumptively prejudicial' at least as it approaches one year.... We note that, as the term is used in this threshold context, 'presumptive prejudice' does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry."

Missouri courts have stated that a delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial. State v. Darnell, 858 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Mo.App.1993); State v. Smith, 849 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Mo.App.1993); State v. Ingleright, 787 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Mo.App.1990); State v. Robinson, 696 S.W.2d 826, 831-832 (Mo.App.1985); State v. Holmes, 643 S.W.2d 282, 287 (Mo.App.1982).

Defendant was arrested on April 3, 1988, and remained in jail until the commencement of the trial on June 19, 1991. This delay is presumptively prejudicial and requires inquiry into the other factors.

Reasons for the Delay

"Our speedy trial standards recognize that pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable. The government may need time to collect witnesses against the accused, oppose his pretrial motions, or, if he goes into hiding, track him down. We attach great weight to such considerations when balancing them against the costs of going forward with a trial whose probative accuracy the passage of time has begun by degrees to throw into question." Doggett, 505 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2693.

"Barker made it clear that 'different weights [are to be] assigned to different reasons' for delay.... Although negligence is obviously to be weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused's defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun. And such is the nature of the prejudice presumed that the weight we assign to official negligence compounds over time as the presumption of evidentiary prejudice grows. Thus, our toleration of such negligence varies inversely with its protractedness ... and its consequent threat to the fairness of the accused's trial." Id.

"Where the defendant 'has contributed to the delay by asking for and being granted continuances, he cannot later successfully allege the denial of his constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial.' ... Delays attributable to the defendant weigh heavily against the defendant." State v. Darnell, 858 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Mo.App.1993) (citing authorities).

"Reasons for the delay are weighed. Delays deliberately intended to hamper the defense are weighed heavily against the State.... Delays attributable to the State's negligence or overcrowded court dockets are weighed less heavily against the State.... Delays for valid reasons, such as unavailability of witnesses, are justified and are not weighed against the State." State v. Raine, 829 S.W.2d 506, 512 (Mo.App.1992) (citing authorities).

Where the defendant contributes to the delay by asking for and being granted a continuance or a change of venue, or a change of judge, those reasons for the delay are weighed heavily against him. State v. Robinson, 696 S.W.2d at 832. Similarly, time spent for mental examinations, at least where the accused himself has put in issue his mental competency to stand trial, is weighed against defendant. State v. Brown, 502 S.W.2d 295, 301-302 (Mo.1973). See also State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 115, 125 n. 5 (Mo.1981).

"Still, it is ultimately the duty of the state to bring a defendant to trial." State v. Bolin, 643 S.W.2d at 814 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 527, 92 S.Ct. at 2190.)

The following is a chronology of the significant events:

1988

April 3--Date of offense. Defendant arrested.

[Circuit Court of Shannon County]

April 3--State files complaint alleging defendant committed the felony of murder in the first degree.

May 31--Preliminary hearing. Defendant bound over to circuit court for arraignment.

June 7--Information filed, charging murder in the first degree (Count I) and armed criminal action (Count II).

June 13--Defendant appears with attorney Fred Martin and enters plea of not guilty.

Defendant files notice of intention to rely on defense of "mental disease or defect excluding responsibility."

Trial court orders defendant to be examined by a qualified person pursuant to Chapter 552 RSMo.

June 17--Examination of defendant set for June 28 at Farmington State Hospital.

Nov. 4--Report of examination filed in trial court.

Nov. 28--Court reviews medical report and finds that defendant is capable of aiding his own defense.

Case Continued by agreement to December 27.

Dec. 12--Case continued by agreement to January 9, 1989.

1989

Jan. 3--Defendant's new attorney, Peter Sterling, files entry of appearance.

Jan. 10--Defendant appears with his "attorneys." At defendant's request, case continued to February 14.

Feb. 14--Defendant appears with attorney. Prosecuting Attorney not present. Case continued to March 13...