State v. Smith
| Decision Date | 28 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. SD 30986.,SD 30986. |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Ralph T. SMITH, Jr., Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Kent Denzel, Assistant Public Defender, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.
Chris Koster, Attorney General, Daniel N. McPherson, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
Ralph T. Smith, Jr. (“Defendant”), was charged with the class A felony of robbery in the first degree with what appeared to be a deadly weapon, pursuant to section 569.020, and the class B felony of robbery in the second degree, pursuant to section 569.030.1 A jury found Defendant guilty of both offenses, and the trial court sentenced Defendant as a prior and persistent offender to thirty years in prison on each robbery, with the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appeals his convictions, claiming that the trial court erred in denying (1) his oral pretrial request for an examination to determine if he was mentally fit to proceed, pursuant to section 552.020, (2) his motion to sever the two charges, (3) his motion to dismiss because of a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and (4) his oral request for a new preliminary hearing. Finding no merit in Defendant's claims, we affirm Defendant's convictions.
Factual and Procedural Background
Defendant was arrested on September 1, 2006, following two robberies that occurred earlier that day in Joplin and formed the basis for criminal charges against him. The charges were robbery in the first degree of Charles Souder with what appeared to be a deadly weapon, and robbery in the second degree of Twyla Landrith.2 In the Landrith robbery, which occurred before the Souder robbery, the State claimed Defendant “forcibly stole” Landrith's cash. In the Souder robbery, the State claimed Defendant “forcibly stole” Souder's vehicle and “displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon.” Defendant posted bond and was released from custody pending trial on these charges.
At the end of March 2007, Defendant was arrested on unrelated Jasper County charges of assault in the first degree and burglary in the first degree. The assault and burglary were alleged to have occurred on March 29, 2007. Defendant remained in custody on these charges because he was unable to post bond.
On August 22, 2007, in Defendant's 2007 assault and burglary case, the trial court ordered Defendant committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health because the trial court found Defendant lacked mental fitness to proceed. The record is unclear, but it appears this finding was based on an undated report by Brian D. Petrovich, PsyD, who apparently evaluated Defendant on three days in May, June, and July 2007. Dr. Petrovich's report is not included in the record, but apparently it did not include an opinion on Defendant's mental fitness to proceed. It appears the report was submitted by Defendant's counsel.
In a report dated December 5, 2007 (reflecting an evaluation on November 28, 2007), licensed psychologist Jeffrey S. Kline with the Fulton State Hospital found that (1) Defendant (2) Defendant “currently has the capacity to understand the proceedings against him ..., and is able to assist his attorney in his own defense[,]” and (3) Defendant “does not need to be held in a hospital facility pending further proceedings.” Kline's diagnoses included (1) “cocaine-induced psychotic disorder, with hallucinations, in full remission,” (2) “cocaine-induced psychotic disorder, with delusions, in full remission,” (3) “cocaine dependence,” and (4) “antisocial personality disorder.” Kline's detailed findings included the following:
... there is no evidence that [Defendant] lacks the ability to understand the proceedings against him or lacks the capacity to assist in his own defense.
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There is a distinct possibility that [Defendant] has previously displayed delusional beliefs surrounding a number of issues including the legal system within Jasper County, and the sheriff's department. These delusions likely resulted from his heavy use of cocaine prior to his incarceration. His description of his cocaine use could very well lead to significant delusional beliefs which could linger for several weeks after discontinuation of the drugs. He currently no longer displays any of these delusional beliefs.
Currently, [Defendant] does not suffer any delusional beliefs. He does have overvalued ideas regarding several issues including some suspiciousness of corrections' staff and law enforcement in Jasper County. There is no evidence that these beliefs would interfere with his decision making with regards to his legal case.
* * * *
Evidence suggests that [Defendant] left the [Texas] Department of Corrections in 2006, and began heavy use of crack cocaine and other substances during an approximate nine month period. He describes numerous binge uses of crack cocaine where he would stay high for several days at a time and not sleep for up to seven or eight days straight. He reported during these time frames significant paranoia and the belief that he was being followed and monitored, which were clearly delusional beliefs. He also described sensations which are likely auditory and visual hallucinations during these same time frames. There is some evidence to suggest that these symptoms have lingered for weeks after his arrest and discontinuation of the crack cocaine. It is clear that while [Defendant] suffered from psychotic symptoms in the past, he no longer suffers any symptoms of a psychotic disorder, and while he has some strong beliefs about certain issues, these are not delusional and, therefore, he is currently in full remission. It should be noted that his full remission status is without the use of any antipsychotic medication.
* * * *
A review of available evidence does not suggest that [Defendant] has any difficulty understanding the legal proceedings....
There is also no indication that [Defendant] lacks the capacity to assist in his own defense. At times he may be somewhat difficult in his interactions with his attorney when things do not go his way, but this is the result of his personality disorder and not a result of any form of underlying delusional belief system or other psychotic symptomatology. His decision making does not appear to be the result of any form of psychotic symptoms, but likely the result of his personality disorder and his current situation.
[Defendant] is using medication to help with mood stability and to decrease aggressive acting out. This medication may or may not have helped his behavior while in the hospital. He has had a slight decrease in recent aggressive acting out. There is no indication though that further inpatient treatment is necessary to maintain [Defendant's] competency at this point in time.
Based on Kline's report and the fact that Defendant did not contest the findings in the report or request a second examination, the trial court, in his 2007 assault and burglary case, found that Defendant was mentally fit to proceed in an order filed January 17, 2008.3
Meanwhile, in the instant case, Defendant appeared in court on September 20, 2006, and indicated he would retain an attorney. Reappearance was scheduled for October 11, 2006. Defendant appeared on that date, but did so without an attorney. The State Public Defender's Office was appointed to represent him, and reappearance was scheduled for November 1, 2006.
Defendant did not appear on November 1, but appeared on November 8, 2006, and reappearance was scheduled for November 22, 2006. Defendant did not appear on November 22, and Defendant's attorney requested a continuance to November 29, 2006.
Defendant appeared on November 29, and a preliminary hearing was scheduled for December 20, 2006. On that date, Defendant waived his preliminary hearing, and an appearance for arraignment was scheduled in the circuit court on December 29, 2006. The State filed an information on December 27, 2006.4 The trial court canceled the December 29 appearance and arraignment and reset it for January 26, 2007. On that date, Defendant was arraigned, and trial was set for July 9, 2007.
In June 2007, on its own motion, the trial court reset the trial for November 5, 2007. In November 2007, on its own motion, the trial court reset the trial for February 4, 2008. In January and February 2008, on its own motion, the trial court reset the trial for May 5, 2008.
Defendant's trial defense counsel entered his appearance in the case on April 8, 2008.5
On April 9, 2008, the trial court reset the trial for July 21, 2008. In June 2008, the trial court reset the trial for November 17, 2008.
At a motion hearing on November 14, 2008, defense counsel orally announced that “we are going to be using the defense of diminished capacity, involuntary addiction, as a defense in this matter and that we will be endorsing the [expert] who did Mr. Smith's psychological evaluation at Fulton State Hospital.”
On November 17, 2008, the trial court canceled the trial scheduled for that day.
On December 2, 2008, defense counsel filed a motion for an examination for diminished capacity and a motion to dismiss for violation of Defendant's statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial.
At a motion hearing on December 12, 2008, defense counsel noted that he “was confused” and intended to give notice that Defendant intended to rely on the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity rather than diminished capacity. During that hearing, the trial court overruled Defendant's motion to dismiss for speedy-trial violations. In doing so, the trial court noted two hearing continuances requested by defense counsel in April 2008, and also stated:
We've had numerous trial settings. If the defense had asked for a...
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