State v. Fauntleroy

• Decision Date: 08 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 27016.,27016.
• Citation: 921 A.2d 622,101 Conn.App. 144
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Darryl FAUNTLEROY.

921 A.2d 622

101 Conn.App. 144

STATE of Connecticut v. Darryl FAUNTLEROY.

No. 27016.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 15, 2007.

Decided May 8, 2007.

David J. Reich, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy F. Costello, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Richard L. Palomba, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

SCHALLER, DiPENTIMA and GRUENDEL, Js.

DiPENTIMA, J.

The defendant, Darryl Fauntleroy, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempt to commit burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-103(a), attempt to commit larceny in the sixth degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-125b, and criminal mischief in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-117. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the state produced insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty of all charges and that the trial court was thus obligated to render a judgment of acquittal, (2) the court improperly instructed the jury on an essential element of larceny in the sixth degree, (3) § 53a-125b(a) is unconstitutionally vague and (4) General Statutes § 53a-121(a)(3) unconstitutionally relieves the state of its burden of proof under the larceny statute. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. During the early morning hours of October 15, 2004, the defendant was observed by a Yale University police officer, Gregg Curran, walking through a well lit public parking lot on the Yale University campus looking through the windows of parked cars. The defendant stopped at a Nissan Pathfinder with tinted windows and began pulling on the door frame of the driver's side door and shaking the vehicle. The Pathfinder contained two coats that had been placed in the locked vehicle earlier in the evening by its owner. After a few moments, the defendant moved to the rear driver's side door, paused to look around the lot and then began striking the rear driver's side window of the vehicle with a heavy object. Curran called for backup help and left his position to block the nearest exit from the lot. From his new position, Curran heard a car alarm sound in the lot. Sergeant Jeannine Hemenway was the first officer on the scene and stopped the defendant as he was attempting to exit the lot. Curran joined Hemenway and identified the defendant as the person attempting to break into the Pathfinder. At the time he was apprehended, the defendant did not have either of the coats in his possession. The defendant was arrested and charged. After the state rested at trial, the defendant made an oral motion for a judgment of acquittal with respect to the attempted burglary, attempted larceny and criminal mischief charges, which the court denied. Following the jury trial, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to five years incarceration, execution suspended, and three years of probation with special conditions. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant's first claim on appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to form the basis of a conviction for attempt to commit burglary in the third degree, attempt to commit larceny in the sixth degree and criminal mischief in the third degree. Specifically, the defendant argues that the state failed to prove that (1) he had the requisite specific intent to steal the coats, (2) he took a substantial step toward completing the charged crimes and (3) he was not given permission to enter the vehicle. We are not persuaded.

In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, we apply a two part test. "First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Straub, 90 Conn.App. 147, 153-54, 877 A.2d 866, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 927, 883 A.2d 1252 (2005).

"While . . . every element [must be] proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Moreover, [i]n evaluating evidence that could yield contrary inferences, the [jury] is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence. . . . As we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [jury], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the jury's verdict of guilty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leon-Zazueta, 80 Conn.App. 678, 682, 836 A.2d 1273 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 901, 845 A.2d 405 (2004). With this standard of review in mind, we will review the defendant's sufficiency claims together, as the defendant juxtaposes his arguments with respect to each conviction.

"Burglary in the third degree is defined in General Statutes § 53a-103 as enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henning, 220 Conn. 417, 429, 599 A.2d 1065 (1991). As defined in General Statutes § 53a-100(a)(1), a vehicle comes within the definition of building.

With respect to larceny, "Connecticut courts have interpreted the essential elements of larceny as (1) the wrongful taking or carrying away of the personal property of another; (2) the existence of a felonious intent in the taker to deprive the owner of [the property] permanently; and (3) the lack of consent of the owner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Flowers, 69 Conn.App. 57, 69, 797 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 929, 798 A.2d 972 (2002). General Statutes § 53a-125b provides: "Larceny in the sixth degree: Class C misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of larceny in the sixth degree when he commits larceny as defined in section 53a-119 and the value of the property or service is two hundred fifty dollars or less."

With respect to criminal mischief, "[t]he essential elements of the crime of criminal mischief in the third degree¹ are (1) that tangible property of another was damaged, (2) that the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused the damage and (3) that the defendant has no reasonable ground to believe that he had a right to do so." State v. Hoskins, 35 Conn.Supp. 587, 595, 401 A.2d 619 (1978).

The defendant was charged with attempt to commit burglary in the third degree and attempt to commit larceny in the sixth degree. "An attempt of a crime is accomplished when a person intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. . . . The defendant also must have possessed the specific intent to commit the underlying crime. An attempt is an inchoate crime, meaning that it is unfinished or begun with the proper intent but not finished. . . . [T]he attempt is complete and punishable, when an act is done with intent to commit the crime, which is adapted to the perpetration of it, whether the purpose fails by reason of interruption . . . or for other extrinsic cause." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 96 Conn.App. 634, 641, 902 A.2d 17, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 919, 908 A.2d 544 (2006).

A

The crux of the defendant's first sufficiency claim is that because the coats in the vehicle were not in view and the type and quality of the coats were unknown, the state failed to prove that the defendant had the specific intent necessary to sustain a conviction for attempt to commit larceny in the sixth degree. Because larceny formed the basis of the attempt to commit burglary charge, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain that conviction as well.

On the night of the incident, Lisa Smith had parked the Pathfinder in the lot while she and a friend went to local area clubs. She returned to the vehicle after it had been parked to put her coat and her friend's coat in the backseat. After putting the coats in the backseat, she locked the doors. When questioned about her actions, Lisa Smith testified that she returned the coats to the car because the weather was warmer than she had anticipated and she did not want to leave them in the club.

"It is well established that [t]he question of intent is purely a question of fact. . . . The state of mind of one accused of a crime is often the most significant and, at the same time, the most elusive element of the crime charged. . . . Because it is practically impossible to know what someone is thinking or intending at any given moment, absent an outright declaration of intent, a person's state of mind is usually proven by circumstantial evidence. . . . Intent may be and usually is inferred...