State v. Featherson
| Decision Date | 17 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. COA00-471.,COA00-471. |
| Citation | 145 NC App. 134,548 S.E.2d 828 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina, Plaintiff, v. Shaquana FEATHERSON, Defendant. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Associate Attorney General Vandana Shah, for the State.
Webb & Webb, by John Webb, Raleigh, for the defendant.
In December 1998, defendant was 20 years old, single with two children, and living with her boyfriend, Jeffrey Lester. During this time, she was employed as a cashier at a Bojangles restaurant in Whiteville, North Carolina.
On 12 December 1998, at about 4:30 p.m., defendant and her boyfriend Lester went to the residence of their mutual friend, Alphonso McDonald. Defendant and Lester spent the night at McDonald's residence. Sometime during that evening, the three discussed robbing the restaurant where defendant was employed.
The next morning (13 December 1998), Lester and McDonald drove defendant to her employment, dropped her off in the parking lot at approximately 6:30 a.m. and drove away. Lester and McDonald drove to a gas station near the restaurant and parked the car behind several trash dumpsters.
Defendant went to the rear door of the restaurant and rang the door buzzer. Defendant had been previously instructed not to use this door. The restaurant manager, Theresa Pittman, and employee Kathy Huggins were inside. Defendant waited for Pittman or Huggins to open the rear door, and when neither appeared, defendant again rang the buzzer. This time Pittman responded.
Pittman went to the door, saw defendant, turned off the alarm and opened the door. Lester and McDonald came from behind defendant, pushed her inside and entered behind her. Both men were wearing masks and McDonald was carrying a nine-millimeter assault rifle. McDonald told defendant, Pittman, and Huggins they were being robbed. Lester forced defendant and Huggins to the floor and then loosely bound them together using duct tape. McDonald forced Pittman to the office and ordered her to open the safe. Usually, the safe only contained one bag of money for deposit, but on this occasion, the safe contained three deposit bags.
When Pittman opened the safe, McDonald grabbed the three deposit bags and fled the office. McDonald and Lester then ran out the rear door. When the two men left, Pittman discovered that defendant and Huggins had already freed themselves. Huggins called the police.
Defendant was charged with robbery with a dangerous weapon, first-degree kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery, by true bills of indictment respectively dated 22 February 1999, 29 May 1999, and 28 June 1999. On 1 November 1999, defendant's case came on for a jury trial and subsequently verdicts of guilty were returned as to each of the three indictments.
After considering the mitigating and aggravating factors, and based on defendant having a prior record level I, the trial court sentenced defendant to the following presumptive active sentences: 1) a term of 64-86 months for robbery with a firearm, with credit for 281 days spent in confinement prior to judgment, 2) 25-39 months for second degree kidnapping, and 3) 25-39 months for conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm. All sentences run consecutively.
Defendant gave timely notice of appeal. By order dated 22 November 1999, the trial court relieved the Office of the Appellate Defender of its duties and appointed attorney John Webb to represent defendant.
On appeal, defendant makes two arguments. First, that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements of McDonald and Lester in evidence regarding defendant's involvement in the crimes charged. Second, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motions to dismiss, arguing that absent the hearsay evidence, the remaining evidence was insufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty.
We find no error as to the convictions of robbery with a firearm and conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm. However, we reverse the conviction of second degree kidnapping of Huggins.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erroneously admitted considerable hearsay evidence against her. Specifically, she argues that the trial court erred in: 1) admitting in evidence the prior written statements of the two co-defendants; 2) allowing the State to elicit testimony from the co-defendants that they told police following their arrest that defendant was involved in the crimes; and 3) allowing the police officers to testify that the co-defendants had implicated defendant in their statements.
Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c). In the instant case, the alleged hearsay evidence was not admitted for its truth. Instead, the evidence was admitted for impeachment. See State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. 343, 350, 378 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1989)
() Id. (citations omitted). Immediately following their arrest, Lester and McDonald made statements to the police that implicated defendant in the crimes. At trial, their testimony exonerated defendant from any participation in the crimes charged. The co-defendants' prior statements were admissable in evidence to attack the co-defendant's credibility. The trial court instructed the jury that the statements were to be considered as impeaching, not substantive evidence. We conclude that the statements were properly admitted.
While impeachment would be a valid theory of admissibility in this case, it is not necessary to address the issue. The trial transcript reveals statements made by co-defendants were also properly admitted as substantive evidence.
"Where evidence is admitted without objection, the benefit of a prior objection to the same or similar evidence is lost, and the defendant is deemed to have waived his right to assign as error the prior admission of the evidence." State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 532, 330 S.E.2d 450, 461 (1985). In McDonald's direct examination, he testified to what he told Detective Benton without objection or timely motion to strike. Defendant objected to the State's attempt to read McDonald's written statement to McDonald, and the objection was sustained. The State then asked McDonald what he told the Detective, and no timely objection was made. Defendant thus waived his right to assign as error the admission of McDonald's written statement. "It is well settled that exception to the admission of evidence will not be sustained when evidence of like import has theretofore been, or is thereafter, introduced without objection." Gaddy v. Bank, 25 N.C.App. 169, 173, 212 S.E.2d 561, 564 (1975). This evidence was admitted without any limitation.
Defendant assigns error on the direct examination of Investigator Coleman to the admission in evidence of the statement made to the Investigator by Lester following Lester's arrest. However, during cross-examination of Investigator Coleman, defendant elicited substantially the same statement. The erroneous admission of evidence on direct examination is held not to be prejudicial when it appears that on cross-examination "the witness was asked substantially the same question and gave the same answer." Hamilton v. Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 47, 52, 75 S.E. 1087, 1089 (1912).
Consequently, even if the written statements and testimony of co-defendants had been improperly admitted, other evidence to the same effect was admitted without objection, motion to strike, request for limiting instruction or were elicited on cross-examination by defendant and may not be claimed to be...
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