State v. Ferguson
| Decision Date | 13 December 1910 |
| Citation | 128 N.W. 840,149 Iowa 476 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA v. WILLIAM FERGUSON, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Sac District Court.--HON. F. M. POWERS, Judge.
Defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of the crime of burglary and from the judgment imposed appeals.
Affirmed.
William Fergusen, pro se.
H. W Byers, Attorney General, and Chas. W. Lyon, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
The indictment reads as follows: "On the 23d day of November in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and nine in the county of Sac in the state of Iowa did unlawfully, feloniously, and burglariously break and enter a certain office, to wit, the ticket office of the Chicago, Milwaukee & Saint Paul Railway Company in Sac City in the county aforesaid, in which said office there was then and there kept for use valuable things, to wit, money, with the specific intent then and there unlawfully, feloniously, and burglariously to steal, take, and carry away of the property of the said Chicago, Milwaukee & Saint Paul Railway Company, the money, then and there being kept for use as aforesaid contrary to and in violation of law."
It is contended that it is insufficient, in that it does not sufficiently allege the ownership of the property. There is no merit in this contention. It is charged that the office broken into and entered was the ticket office of the railway company in Sac City in which said railway kept its property. It was unnecessary to allege that the railway company was a corporation, for the name sufficiently imports that such is the case. Nor was it necessary to state that it was organized under the laws of any state or nation. Indeed, it need not be more than a de facto corporation. Possession of the ticket office by the company is sufficiently alleged, and from this ownership will be presumed if that be necessary. This exact point is ruled by State v. Watson, 102 Iowa 651, 72 N.W. 283; State v. Burns, 109 Iowa 436, 80 N.W. 545; State v. Rivers, 68 Iowa 611, 27 N.W. 781.
The statute under which the indictment was found reads as follows: "If any person, with intent to commit any public offense, in the daytime break and enter, or in the nighttime enter without breaking, any dwelling house; or at any time break and enter any office, shop, store, warehouse, railroad car, boat or vessel or any building in which any goods, merchandise, or valuable things are kept for use, sale or deposit, he shall be imprisoned," etc. Code, section 4792. The indictment was sufficient in that it charged that the building broken was an office, etc. It need not appear that this office was an independent building, for it is well known that it is burglary for one to break and enter an inner door or window, although the culprit entered through an open outer door; and in such cases the breaking is held to be of the house itself. People v. Young, 65 Cal. 225 (3 P. 813); Daniels v. State, 78 Ga. 98 (6 Am. St. Rep. 238); State v. Scripture, 42 N.H. 485. The Daniels case, supra, is exactly in point.
II. The testimony shows that defendant entered the waiting room of the railway company through an open door, that he pried open the window of the ticket office,...
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