State v. Fiddemon

• Decision Date: 27 May 2020
• Docket Number: No. 4D19-0438,4D19-0438
• Citation: 301 So.3d 243
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Edward FIDDEMON, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

301 So.3d 243

STATE of Florida, Appellant,

v.Edward FIDDEMON, Appellee.

No. 4D19-0438

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[May 27, 2020]

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah Koenig, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Erika Follmer, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Gerber, J.

The state appeals from the circuit court's order: (1) granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the state's violation of probation affidavit against him arising from a 2010 case, and (2) declaring his probation in the 2010 case as having been completed while he was incarcerated on a 2012 case. The state primarily argues the circuit court erred because the defendant had to complete his prison terms on both the 2010 and 2012 cases before his probation term began on the 2010 case. We agree with this argument. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court's order.

Procedural History

The 2010 and 2012 cases were resolved separately through negotiated pleas occurring nine months apart, rather than in one sentencing event.

The circuit court first disposed of the 2010 case. In that case, the defendant pled no contest to two charges in exchange for being sentenced to three years in prison to be followed by two years on probation, with the sentences on both charges to be served concurrently.

Nine months later, the same circuit court judge disposed of the 2012 case. In that case, the defendant pled no contest to three charges in exchange for being sentenced to eight years in prison to be served concurrently on all three charges and, in the circuit court's words, "with the sentence you're presently serving in [the 2010 case]." During the hearing, the state acknowledged the 2012 case's concurrent eight-year prison terms would be served "concurrent with the case he's already been sentenced on," i.e., the 2010 case. However, no one at the hearing discussed or asked how the 2012 case's eight-year prison term would affect the 2010 case's two-year probation term.

In 2018, the Department of Corrections released the defendant from prison and placed him on two years’ probation for the 2010 case. Later that year, the state filed an affidavit alleging the defendant violated his probation.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the 2010 case's violation of probation affidavit. The defendant argued that after he completed the 2010 case's concurrent three-year prison term, his two-year probation term immediately began as a matter of law. Thus, the defendant argued, he completed the 2010 case's two-year probation term while serving the middle portion of the 2012 case's eight-year prison term.

The state filed a memorandum opposing the defendant's motion. The state primarily argued the 2010 case's two-year probation term had been tolled as a matter of law until the defendant had completed the 2010 case's three-year prison term and the 2012 case's eight-year prison term.

The circuit court (a successor judge) held a non-evidentiary hearing, during which the parties relied on the same arguments which they had raised in their respective motion and memorandum.

The circuit court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the 2010 case's violation of probation affidavit. The circuit court also declared the 2010 case's two-year probation term as having been completed while the defendant served the 2012 case's eight-year prison term. Relying on case law holding that a sentence must be served without interruption, the circuit court reasoned the 2010 case's three-year prison term and two-year probation term could not be separated by the last five years of the 2012 case's eight-year prison term.

The circuit court then attempted to distinguish case law holding that probation is tolled while a prison term is completed. According to the circuit court, those cases involved courts in different jurisdictions imposing sentences in unrelated cases. Here, on the other hand, the same judge imposed both the 2010 and 2012 sentences, and mentioned the 2012 case's eight-year prison term would be served concurrently "with the sentence you're presently serving in [the 2010 case]."

This appeal followed. The state again primarily argues the 2010 case's two-year probation term had been tolled as a matter of law until the defendant had completed the 2010 case's three-year prison term and the 2012 case's eight-year prison term.

The defendant responds that after he completed the 2010 case's concurrent three-year prison term, his two-year probation term immediately began as a matter of law. Thus, the defendant argues, he had completed the 2010 case's two-year probation term while serving the 2012 case's eight-year prison term, and he was no longer on probation in 2018.

Our Review

Because we have been asked to review an alleged sentencing error under section 948.012(1), Florida Statutes (2010), our review is de novo. See State v. Flynn , 95 So. 3d 436, 437 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ("Because a motion to correct a sentencing error involves a pure issue of law, our standard of review is de novo ."); State v. Dorsett , 158 So. 3d 557, 560 (Fla. 2015) ("The interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de novo standard of review.") (citation omitted).

1. Framing Our Analysis of Section 948.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2010)

The 2010 version of section 948.012(1), Florida Statutes, provided:

Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may, at the time of sentencing, impose a split sentence whereby the defendant is to be placed on probation or, with respect to any such felony, into community control upon completion of any specified period of such sentence which may include a term of years or less . In such case, the court shall stay and withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence imposed upon the defendant and direct that the defendant be placed upon probation or into community control after serving such period as may be imposed by the court . The period of probation or community control shall commence immediately upon the release of the defendant from incarceration , whether by parole or gain-time allowances.

§ 948.012(1), Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added).¹

As emphasized above, section 948.012(1) uses three different phrases to refer to when a defendant is to commence a probation term after completing a prison term: (1) "upon completion of any specified period of such sentence which may include a term of years or less"; (2) "after serving such period as may be imposed by the court"; and (3) "immediately upon the release of the defendant from incarceration."

Those three phrases are easy to reconcile and apply as having one meaning when the defendant's sentence involves a single prison term to be followed by a single probation term. That is, once the defendant has completed the prison term and has been released, the defendant's probation term immediately commences.

However, those three phrases are not as easy to reconcile and apply in this case, where the defendant was sentenced to serve a two-year probation term after the 2010 case's three-year prison term, at a time when he was still serving the 2012 case's eight-year prison term.

Taking section 948.012(1) ’s first and second emphasized phrases in isolation – that a defendant is to be placed on probation "upon completion of any specified period of such sentence which may include a term of years or less" and "after serving such period as may be imposed by the court" – seemingly would have required the 2010 case's two-year probation term to have commenced immediately after the defendant completed the 2010 case's three-year prison term.

On the other hand, taking 948.012(1)’s third phrase in isolation – that a defendant is to be placed on probation "immediately upon the release of the defendant from incarceration" – seemingly would have required the 2010 case's two-year prison term to be tolled until after the defendant had completed both the 2010 case's three-year prison term and the 2012 case's eight-year prison term.

Our duty, however, is not to view any one or more of section 948.012(1) ’s three clauses in isolation. As our supreme court held in State v. Knighton , 235 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 2018) :

[W]e will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute .... Adverting to our catalogue of rules of statutory construction,

[w]e are required to give effect to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute, if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage. Moreover, a basic rule of statutory construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.

Id. at 316 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Applying those principles, our supreme court already has analyzed section 948.012(1) ’s predecessor statute, containing the exact same language. The supreme court's analysis guides our conclusion here.

2. The Florida Supreme Court's Guidance in Analyzing the Statute

In Horner v. State , 617 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1993), the defendant entered a plea on three separate cases and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms followed by concurrent probation terms on each case. Id. at 312. While on probation, the defendant committed new crimes, and the state sought to revoke probation. Id. At the revocation hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to longer concurrent prison terms in the first two cases. Id. Following imprisonment, the defendant was to serve a probation term for the second case followed by a consecutive probation term for the first case . Id. These probationary periods were to be followed by four consecutive longer probationary terms for the third case. Id.

The defendant appealed, arguing her sentence...