State v. Fields
| Decision Date | 23 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 69211,69211 |
| Citation | 505 So.2d 1336,12 Fla. L. Weekly 198 |
| Parties | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 198 STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Willie FIELDS, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Amy Lynn Diem, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, and Anthony Calvello, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for respondent.
We review State v. Fields, 502 So.2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), because of asserted conflict with Sturdivan v. State, 419 So.2d 300 (Fla.1982), and cases relying thereon; Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
On January 20, 1982, Fields was charged by information with committing an aggravated assault on January 4, 1982. A warrant for his arrest was issued on that date but was not served until August 7, 1985. Fields moved to discharge the information on grounds that the three-year statute of limitations for aggravated assault had expired by reason of section 775.15(5), which reads:
(5) A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay.
In discharging the information the trial judge found that Fields had resided at the same address for the preceding five years, that the state knew his address, and that no attempt had been made to execute the capias until the date Fields was served. Acknowledging that its opinion could be in conflict with Sturdivan, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, nevertheless, affirmed.
In Sturdivan this Court said, "It is settled law in Florida that for the purposes of the statute of limitations, prosecution has commenced when a warrant has been issued and placed in the hands of the proper official for execution." 419 So.2d at 301. If this statement reflects current law, the prosecution of Fields was timely commenced and the delay in service was irrelevant. However, Sturdivan was referring to an arrest warrant issued and delivered to the police in 1971--prior to enactment of section 775.15(5). The cases cited by Sturdivan in support of the foregoing quotation also interpreted earlier statutes which did not contain the present definition of commencement. Furthermore, the issue in Sturdivan was the effect of a late filed indictment rather than the timeliness of the execution of the arrest warrant. Hence, we hold that Sturdivan cannot be considered as having interpreted section 775.15(5). Accord State ex rel. Welch v. Circuit Court of Escambia County, 487 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 492 So.2d 1330 (Fla.1986).
Likewise, we agree...
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Bonel v. State, 94-2251
...without unreasonable delay." The word "executed" has been construed as meaning the completion of service on the defendant. State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1987). In a case of pre-arrest delay, the State must show the reasonableness of the delay and that it was diligent in its efforts t......
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Brown v. State
...2d DCA), review dismissed, 584 So.2d 999 (Fla.1991). The word "executed" means completion of service on the defendant. State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1987). Section 775.15(5) further provides that "[i]n determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent s......
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State v. Hampton
...505 So.2d 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); State v. Chacon, 479 So.2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), disapproved on other grounds in State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1987). We agree with the state. In Wells the issue that was argued to, and addressed by, this court was the time at which a prosecution ......
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State v. Watkins
...v. Circuit Court In and For Escambia County, 487 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 492 So.2d 1330 (Fla.1986). See also State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1987). Time limitations upon criminal prosecutions are solely creatures of statute and are to be liberally construed in favor of th......