State v. Fields, No. A04-2474 (MN 2/28/2006)
| Decision Date | 28 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. A04-2474.,A04-2474. |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. William Leroy Fields, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court, Otter Tail County, File No. K8-03-2290.
Michael A. Hatch, State Attorney General, John B. Galus, Assistant Attorney General, and David J. Hauser, Otter Tail County Attorney, (for respondent).
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Marie Wolf, Assistant Public Defender, (for appellant).
Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge, Peterson, Judge, and Dietzen, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
This is an appeal from conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury that the complainant's testimony need not be corroborated, and that this instruction was prejudicial. Appellant also argues that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in cross-examining appellant about previous theft allegations that the prosecutor had not given Spreigl notice on and that had not resulted in a conviction, so as to be potentially admissible for impeachment purposes. Finally, appellant argues that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in effectively vouching for the complainant's testimony and in arguing the defense failure to present contrary evidence.
We conclude that, standing alone, no individual issue raised by appellant would warrant a reversal, but, collectively, the cumulative prejudicial effect of the errors calls for a reversal and a remand for a new trial.
In approximately 1995, K.W.R, along with her mother, Joan Walters,1 and her brother and sister, moved from Baltimore to Georgia to live with her sister, Jennifer Fields, and her husband, William Leroy Fields, appellant.
Appellant and his wife later moved to Minnesota where appellant worked on a dairy farm.
K.W.R. was thereafter diagnosed with scoliosis which required medical treatment. Appellant's wife learned of K.W.R.'s condition and suggested that she and her family move to Minnesota so that she could be treated at the Shriner's Hospital in Minneapolis.
In 1997, K.W.R., along with her sister and mother, relocated to Minnesota to live with appellant, his wife, and their two young children. The two families resided together in a two-room mobile home.
Approximately one month after K.W.R. moved in with appellant and his family, appellant started touching her inappropriately on the breast and vagina through her clothing when no one else was around. Appellant also engaged in sexual "dirty talk" with K.W.R. telling her he wanted to conduct certain sexual acts with/on her. Following these incidents, K.W.R. avoided being alone with appellant whenever possible.
Several weeks after appellant's inappropriate touching and comments, K.W.R. alleged that appellant raped her while K.W.R.'s younger sister and appellant's daughters played outside. The rape occurred in a bedroom of the mobile home. After the rape, appellant instructed K.W.R. to act as if nothing had happened. Appellant threatened K.W.R. by telling her that if she told anyone about the incident, he would kick her and her family out of the house and that "something else" would happen to her. K.W.R. then went outside to join the other children.
K.W.R. and her family remained in the mobile home for a few months following the rape and subsequently moved to the Fergus Falls area. K.W.R. did not tell anyone about the incident for some time, feeling horrible, confused, and frightened, blaming herself for the incident.
Following the spring of 1997, K.W.R.'s personality changed substantially. She became quiet and shy, began staying in the house and avoiding friends, and did not want to go to school. Her academic performance deteriorated and she experienced several health problems, including weight gain and acid reflux.
In September 2001, K.W.R. partially shared with her aunt, Theresa Walters, what appellant had done.
In September 2003, K.W.R. noticed appellant's older daughter, D.F., acting in a manner similar as she had following appellant's sexual abuse: D.F. became withdrawn, quiet, and subject to mood swings. K.W.R. was worried about D.F. and following an inquiry from her mother, broke down and told her mother that appellant had raped her. Her mother notified the police.
Appellant was eventually arrested for sexual abuse and charged with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(g), one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a), and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(g).
During appellant's trial testimony, he denied ever sexually abusing K.W.R. Appellant testified his work and sleep schedule would have made it difficult to be alone with K.W.R. He testified that on several occasions when he was alone with K.W.R. she never expressed any fear about being alone with him. Appellant's wife testified, supporting appellant's testimony that he worked a time-consuming schedule and added that she was always home, essentially testifying that K.W.R. was never alone with appellant. K.W.R also testified as to what appellant had done. The bulk of the evidence presented by both sides included the testimony of appellant, K.W.R., and witnesses.
A jury found appellant guilty of all charges. The district court ruled that all four counts involved a single behavioral incident and sentenced appellant to a presumptive 86-month prison term. This appeal followed.
Appellant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by questioning appellant about his prior bad acts when the evidence was inadmissible as Spreigl or impeachment evidence and the prosecutor gave no notice of her intent to question him about the prior bad acts. He also argues the district court committed prejudicial error when it instructed the jury that the victim's testimony need not be corroborated. Finally, he argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for the credibility of her own witnesses and by implying that appellant had a duty to present evidence showing why the victim would make up the allegations against him.
Appellant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by questioning appellant on cross-examination about his prior bad act. He argues, because the evidence was not properly admissible and because the trial court's attempt to give limiting instructions exacerbated any damage caused by the misconduct, he is entitled to a new trial.
A district court's denial of a new trial motion based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct will be reversed only "when the misconduct, considered in the context of the trial as a whole, was so serious and prejudicial that the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial was impaired." State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720, 727-28 (Minn. 2000). There are two standards for determining whether prosecutorial misconduct is harmless error; serious misconduct will be found "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to the error," while for less serious misconduct, the standard is "whether the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict." State v. Powers, 654 N.W.2d 667, 678 (Minn. 2003) (citing State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2000)).
"If the defendant failed to object to the misconduct at trial, he forfeits the right to have the issue considered on appeal, but if the error is sufficient, this court may review." Id. (citing State v. Sanders, 598 N.W.2d 650, 656 (Minn. 1999)). Only when the misconduct is unduly prejudicial will relief be granted absent a trial objection or request for instruction. State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 450 (Minn. 1997). Error is "prejudicial" if there is a "reasonable likelihood" that it had a significant effect on the jury's verdict. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998) (citations omitted).
During appellant's cross-examination, the prosecution asked whether he had previously been in trouble for stealing money from an employer. The record shows zero notice by the prosecutor of her intent to introduce this evidence and, thus, obviously, the state had submitted no prior justification to the court, with an appropriate notice to defense counsel. Appellant's counsel did not object to the state's inquiry regarding this prior bad act. Appellant responded that such event had occurred and that he had, in fact, appeared in court as a result. Immediately after the state's inquiry, the district court provided the limiting instruction that this evidence was admitted "for the limited purpose of assisting you in determining whether Defendant . . . committed those acts with which he is charged . . . ."
The starting point for our discussion is that, generally, evidence of a defendant's other crimes or prior bad acts is not admissible to show behavior consistent with the character of that defendant suggested by those acts. State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 491, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (1965). Such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. The rationale is to prohibit the use of evidence for the improper purpose of suggesting that defendant's prior bad acts show that he has a propensity to commit the presently alleged bad acts, or that the defendant is a "proper candidate for punishment" for his past acts. State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 179, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284-85 (1967).
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is referred to in Minnesota law as ...
To continue reading
Request your trial