State v. Fields
| Decision Date | 09 June 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 46511,46511,2 |
| Citation | 314 S.W.2d 723 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Lemon Junior FIELDS, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Morris A. Shenker, Bernard J. Mellman, St. Louis, for appellant.
John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., W. Don Kennedy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
STOCKARD, Commissioner.
Appellant Lemon Junior Fields was charged with the offense of robbery in the first degree. See Section 560.120 (). The information also contained the necessary averments pursuant to Section 556.280, known as the habitual criminal act, that he had previously been convicted of three separate felonies. The jury found appellant guilty of the offense charged, and also found that he had previously been convicted of a felony, and it assessed his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life.
Appellant has filed a brief in this court. He does not challenge the indictment or the sufficiency of the evidence. A brief statement of the evidence offered on behalf of the state will suffice.
On the night of April 12, 1957, Charles Gaston and Mrs. Barbara Taylor were in a shoeshine parlor located at 4385 St. Louis Avenue in the City of St. Louis. About midnight appellant entered, looked at the pinball machine and the music vendor and then left. Fifteen or twenty minutes later he again entered the parlor. A record was playing on the 'juke box' and after appellant played another record he walked to the front window. He asked Mrs. Taylor for a cigarette which she refused to give him. Neither Mrs. Taylor nor Mr. Gaston saw a cigarette, pipe or cigar in his hand. However, while facing the window appellant struck at least one match and possibly more. There is no testimony as to what he did with the lighted match or matches, that is, whether he waved them or held them near his face as though lighting a cigarette. Immediately thereafter three men entered the shoeshine parlor and by force took about $22 from Mr. Gaston. When Mrs. Taylor tried to leave, appellant attempted to restrain her. After a struggle she succeeded in leaving the parlor and she went to the Yukon bar. In a few minutes Mr. Gaston came to the bar, and shortly thereafter appellant came in. Later the three persons who took the money from Mr. Gaston also entered the bar and then they and appellant left together.
It was the position of the prosecution that appellant had intentionally aided and abetted the commission of the crime of robbery and was therefore equally guilty with the persons who actually committed the physical deed. See State v. Chernick, Mo.Sup., 303 S.W.2d 595. It was argued by counsel for the state that the act of appellant in lighting the match or matches while at the window constituted a signal to the three men who entered the parlor and took the money from Mr. Gaston. In the course of the argument to the jury by defense counsel the following occurred:
'Mr. Lang: [defense counsel] When he starts to strike these matches he is supposed to be facing the window. Did any one tell you that he didn't have a cigarette? We don't know whether he had one or not.
'Mr. Cahill: Now, I object to that, your Honor, that was not the testimony.
The girl said he did not have any in his hand.
'Mr. Lang: I asked her whether or not * * *.
'The Court: I heard the evidence, and the girl said he had none, and you cannot contradict the record.
'Mr. Lang: You will recall the evidence, ladies and gentlemen.'
Very shortly thereafter an objection was made to another matter unrelated to the evidence pertaining to the cigarette, and after ruling on the objection, the trial judge volunteered the following comment:
The substance of the evidence was that neither Mr. Gaston nor Mrs. Taylor gave appellant a cigarette and that they did not see a cigarette in his hand. However, when he lit the match or matches he was facing the window with his back to both of them. Under the circumstances the assistant circuit attorney could and did argue vigorously to the jury that appellant did not light a cigarette, but that his act of lighting the match or matches was a signal. In view of the evidence the defense counsel was equally entitled to argue that no witness unequivocally stated that he did not have a cigarette and that 'we don't know whether he had one or not.' Therefore, the trial court erroneously sustained the objection, and further aggravated the adverse effect of the ruling by making an oral comment on the evidence. Following this improper restriction on the right of defense counsel to comment on and draw inferences from the evidence, the trial judge then voluntarily stated, in the presence of the jury, that he had declared 'as a matter of law' that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Koonce
...any indications of the judge's belief as to the merits of the issue being tried. Montgomery, 251 S.W.2d at 657; See also State v. Fields, 314 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Mo.1958); State v. Lomack, 570 S.W.2d 711, 712-713 This does not mean, however, that the judge may not correct counsel when necessar......
-
State v. Treadway
...is that counsel may properly comment in closing argument on matters in evidence and may draw inferences from the evidence. State v. Fields, 314 S.W.2d 723 (Mo.1958). Since the photographs were in evidence, the trial court in this instance erred in sustaining the prosecutor's objection to de......
-
State v. Ball
...Counsel's argument may properly comment on matters in evidence and on any legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom. State v. Fields, 314 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Mo.1958). Here, appellant's counsel sought to argue that appellant lacked deliberation when he shot Percy Thomas because appellant bel......
-
State v. Mitchell, 48392
...for the jury. 6 We disagree. In order to ensure a fair trial, a trial judge must maintain absolute impartiality, State v. Fields, 314 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Mo.1958); State v. Lomack, 570 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Mo.App.1978), refraining from uttering comments which express or suggest an opinion as to an......