State v. Finch

• Decision Date: 08 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. A14–0203.,A14–0203.
• Citation: 865 N.W.2d 696
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Alton Dominique FINCH, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

865 N.W.2d 696

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent
v.
Alton Dominique FINCH, Appellant.

No. A14–0203.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 8, 2015.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

OPINION

LILLEHAUG, Justice.

During a probation revocation proceeding, the probationer moved the district court judge for disqualification or to direct the chief judge of the district to determine whether the district court judge was disqualified, due to what the probationer alleged was a “reasonable question” about judicial impartiality. The court denied the motion in its entirety and revoked probation. The probationer appealed, arguing that Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14(3), requires the chief judge of the district court to hear requests to disqualify. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, holding that probationer's arguments failed both procedurally and on the merits.

We hold that the probationer's appeal is not procedurally flawed, that the district court erred when it declined to refer the request to disqualify to the chief judge of the district, and that the error was not harmless. Thus, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals, vacate the probation revocation order, and remand to the district court for further proceedings before a different judge.

I.

On December 24, 2012, Alton Finch shot at two victims as part of a drive-by shooting. He was charged with second-degree assault under Minn.Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2014), in addition to two other charges that were later dropped. Shortly after the proceedings commenced, the case was reassigned from the original judge. Finch made a motion to remove the new judge from the case, treated as both peremptorily and for cause. The judge denied the motion, as did the chief judge of the district. That denial is not before us.

Following a stipulated facts bench trial, Finch was convicted of second-degree assault. Finch was placed on supervised probation for three years, with a three-year prison sentence stayed. Finch was also sentenced to one year at the county workhouse.¹ Shortly thereafter, Finch left the workhouse for a furlough and did not return. The district court issued an arrest warrant, and Finch turned himself in.

Prior to the scheduled probation revocation hearing, Finch moved to disqualify the district court judge “based on a reasonable question of [judicial] impartiality.” In the alternative, Finch requested an order “directing the Chief Judge of the District Court to make a determination as to whether this [judge] should hear” the case, or an order “staying the proceedings so as to allow an independent tribunal to determine whether this [judge] has violated the Code of Judicial Ethics by not recusing....” The district court rejected Finch's motions “in their entirety as they lack merit,” without issuing a written order. Rather than referring Finch's motion to the chief judge, the court immediately

865 N.W.2d 700

commenced the probation revocation hearing. Following the hearing, which began that day and resumed five days later, the court revoked Finch's probation and executed his sentence.

Finch appealed the revocation of his probation. He argued that the district court erred when it declined to refer the disqualification motion to the chief judge of the district. State v. Finch, A14–0203, 2014 WL 4494409 at *1 (Minn.App. Sept. 15, 2014). The court of appeals affirmed.² Id. The court held that Finch should have sought a writ of prohibition, which it said is the “proper remedy for challenging the denial of a motion to remove a judge for cause.” Id. at *2. Even with that “technical error,” the court of appeals cited two additional reasons to reject Finch's appeal. First, the court of appeals held that Finch waived his right to a hearing before the chief judge when he presented his motion “to the district court judge he sought to remove.” Id. Second, the court of appeals held that Finch's motion failed on its merits, as Finch did not identify any evidence that the judge was biased against him. Id. at *2–3.

We granted Finch's petition for review, and consider in turn each of the issues decided by the court of appeals.

II.

A.

The court of appeals first held that the only “proper remedy for challenging the denial of a motion to remove a judge for cause” is a writ of prohibition, which Finch did not seek. Finch, A14–0203, 2014 WL 4494409 at *2; (citing State v. Laughlin, 508 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn.App.1993) ( “Prohibition is the appropriate remedy to pursue when a motion or notice to remove for cause has been denied.”)). “A motion to remove a judge is procedural and therefore governed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure.” In re Jacobs, 802 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Minn.2011). The interpretation of those rules “is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Ford v. State, 690 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Minn.2005).

Pursuant to the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, parties have a peremptory right to remove a judge assigned to preside at a trial or hearing. See Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14. Notice of removal must be given within seven days after the party receives notice of the name of the presiding judge, and the judge must not have already presided at the trial, omnibus hearing, or evidentiary hearing. Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14(4). So long as these procedural requirements are met, the judge is removed.

We have held that the denial of a peremptory removal must be challenged via a petition for a writ of prohibition. State v. Cermak, 350 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn.1984). A writ of prohibition “is an extraordinary writ issued out of [an appellate court] for the purpose of keeping inferior courts or tribunals or other officials invested with judicial or quasi-judicial authority from going beyond their jurisdiction.” State ex rel. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. Enersen, 230 Minn. 427, 438, 42 N.W.2d 25, 31 (1950). “[A] defendant's failure to seek a writ of prohibition constitutes waiver of further appellate review ‘when the issue involves the right of peremptory removal. ’ ” Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775, 789 n. 4 (Minn.2013) (quoting State v. Dahlin, 753 N.W.2d 300, 304–05 (Minn.2008) ).

865 N.W.2d 701

We require that peremptory removal denials be challenged via the writ in order to “avoid a waste of time, resources, and effort by the parties and the court system.” Dahlin, 753 N.W.2d at 304; see also State v. Azure, 621 N.W.2d 721, 725 n. 3 (Minn.2001). It makes sense that a denial of peremptory removal should be subject to immediate review; otherwise, the district court could be “clearly exceeding its legitimate power and authority” solely because of a technical error. State ex rel. Jonason v. Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 178, 99 N.W. 636, 636 (1904) ; see also McClelland v. Pierce, 376 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Minn.1985) (“[I]f a trial judge refuses to honor an affidavit of prejudice properly filed pursuant to [the civil removal rule], any further exercise of judicial power is unauthorized and a writ of prohibition is the appropriate form of relief.”).

In addition to peremptory removals, a party may seek to disqualify a judge at any point in the proceeding for cause:

A judge must not preside at a trial or other proceeding if disqualified under the Code of Judicial Conduct. A request to disqualify a judge for cause must be heard and determined by the chief judge of the district or by the assistant chief judge if the chief judge is the subject of the request.

Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14(3). Unlike the court of appeals, we have never held that the denial of a motion to remove a judge for cause must be challenged via a petition for a writ of prohibition. See Hooper, 838 N.W.2d at 789 n. 4. To the contrary, we have considered whether a judge was disqualified—the standard to remove a judge for cause under Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14(3) —when the issue was not even raised in the district court.³ See State v. Schlienz, 774 N.W.2d 361, 365–69 (Minn.2009) ; State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 245–49 (Minn.2005).

There are important distinctions between a peremptory removal and a removal for cause. On petition for a writ, an appellate court may determine that a district court erroneously denied a request for peremptory removal by examining three simple criteria: whether the notice to remove was properly filed, timely served, and effective. See Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14(4) ; Dahlin, 753 N.W.2d at 305–06. If those criteria are met, then a district court judge exceeds “legitimate power and authority” by remaining on the case, Crosby, 92 Minn. at 178, 99 N.W. at 636, and the issue is capable of immediate resolution. By contrast, a request to disqualify for cause might well involve a nuanced scrutiny of the record, not the summary examination required to decide a request for peremptory removal.

Accordingly, we conclude that a petition for a writ of prohibition is not required to obtain appellate review of a request to disqualify for cause under Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 14(3). The court of appeals...