State v. Sanders
| Decision Date | 18 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | A15-0963 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Mark Anthony Sanders, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Affirmed
Hennepin County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges his conviction of first-degree sale of a controlled substance, arguing that: (1) the search warrant did not contain sufficient facts to establish probable cause; (2) his custodial statement to the police officer was involuntary; (3) the district court abused its discretion by failing to disclose the identity of the confidential informant; (4) the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish possession of cocaine; (5) he was substantially harmed by the admission of evidence previously ruled inadmissible; (6) the district court abused its discretion by excluding alternative-perpetrator evidence; and (7) the district court abused its discretion by imposing the presumptive sentence. We affirm.
In October 2013, Minneapolis police officers with the FBI Safe Streets Task Force executed a no-knock search warrant at a residence occupied by appellant Mark Anthony Sanders and his roommate, Richard Fonzy. The search warrant application and supporting affidavit contained information from a Confidential Reliable Informant (CRI) that appellant was trafficking in the illegal sale of cocaine out of his apartment. The search warrant authorized police officers to look for controlled substances including cocaine. Appellant was the target of the warrant. Inside the apartment, police officers discovered baggies containing over 717 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II narcotic, hidden in a hamper in a hallway, as well as digital scales commonly associated with narcotic distribution, ammunition, residue from a white powdery substance, boxes of baking soda commonly used to cut cocaine, and several sandwich baggies with their corners removed, known as "tear-offs."
Police officers arrested appellant and transported him to the Minneapolis police station, where he agreed to be interviewed. The interviewing police officers and appellant discussed the cocaine found in appellant's apartment, the source of the cocaine appellantpurchased, the amount of the purchase, the quality of the cocaine, the process of cooking cocaine into crack, appellant's "track[er] phones" or throw-away phones for his customers, and the use of tear-away baggies in selling cocaine. Appellant admitted to purchasing cocaine shortly before the police officers executed the search warrant.
The state charged appellant with one felony count of first-degree controlled substance crime (sale), and one felony count of first-degree controlled substance crime (possession). Following a five-day jury trial, the jury convicted appellant of both offenses. Each offense carries a presumptive prison sentence of 86 months, with a lower range of 74 months and an upper range of 103 months. The Department of Community Corrections and Rehabilitation recommended a bottom-of-the-range sentence of 74 months executed for each offense. At sentencing, the state requested a sentence of 103 months and appellant requested both a downward-durational and dispositional-departure sentence. The district court declined to depart either durationally or dispositionally and denied the state's request to impose a sentence in the upper range of the guidelines. The district court committed appellant to prison for 86 months for first-degree sale of a controlled substance but did not enter judgment on the lesser-included possession charge. This appeal followed.
Appellant raises seven challenges on appeal. First, appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because the search warrant lacked sufficient facts to establish probable cause. Second, appellant claims his in-custody statement to police was not voluntary because the officer failed to properly advise him of his Miranda rights. Third, appellant argues that the identity of the CRI should have beendisclosed. Fourth, appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient to establish constructive possession of cocaine because the cocaine was found in a common area of the apartment. Fifth, appellant contends that he was substantially harmed when previously excluded evidence was mistakenly admitted during trial. Sixth, appellant argues the district court abused its discretion by excluding alternative-perpetrator evidence and eroding appellant's ability to present a complete defense. Lastly, appellant claims the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for a dispositional or durational departure and imposing the presumptive sentence. We address each argument in turn and conclude that appellant is not entitled to relief on any basis.
Appellant challenges the district court's determination that the warrant authorizing the search of his residence was supported by probable cause. The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures and provide that a warrant must be supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; see also Minn. Stat. § 626.08 (2012) (). Probable cause exists if there is a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985) (quotation omitted). The issuing judge may determine if the search warrant application is supported by probable cause. State v. Holiday, 749 N.W.2d 833, 839 (Minn. App. 2008). "We have repeatedly held that, when reviewing a district court's probable cause determination made in connection with the issuance of a search warrant, an appellate court should afford the district court's determination greatdeference." State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 2001) (citations omitted). "An appellate court reviews a district court's decision to issue a warrant only to consider whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed." Id. We utilize a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 268.
Here, the affidavit accompanying the search warrant application stated that the police officers received information from a CRI that appellant was selling cocaine out of his apartment. A police officer may rely on a CRI's tip to determine that probable cause exists "if the tip has sufficient indicia of reliability." State v. Cook, 610 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. App. 2000) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). "When assessing reliability, courts examine the credibility of the informant and the basis of the informant's knowledge in light of all the circumstances." Id. Further, "an informant who has given reliable information in the past is likely also currently reliable[.]" State v. Ross, 676 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn. App. 2004). This criteria is fulfilled "by a simple statement that the informant has been reliable in the past because this language indicates that the informant had provided accurate information to the police in the past and thus gives [the district court] reason to credit the informant's story." Id. (citing Wiley, 366 N.W.2d at 269). The police officer testified that the CRI provided reliable information in the past, leading to the discovery of narcotics and convictions of the defendants involved. Moreover, the police officers corroborated the CRI's information by surveilling appellant's residence for a month prior to executing the search warrant. The totality of thecircumstances, including the CRI's past performance coupled with the police department's independent surveillance, supports a probable-cause finding and we determine that the district court did not err in concluding that probable cause existed to search appellant's residence.
Appellant contends that the district court erred by determining that his statement to the police was voluntary. At the district court level, appellant challenged the admissibility of his police statement on the basis that he was unduly pressured, but he did not argue that the Miranda warnings were improperly provided. We address both arguments and determine that the district court did not err.
We first address appellant's argument that his police statements were not voluntary. "We review the district court's legal determination of whether a defendant's statement was voluntary de novo[,]" but "we accept the underlying factual determinations of the district court regarding the circumstances of the interview unless the findings are clearly erroneous." State v. Zabawa, 787 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2010). The district court stated that the voluntariness of a confession depends on the totality of the circumstances and cited to the factors outlined in Haynes v. State of Wash., 373 U.S. 503, 83 S. Ct. 1336 (1963), including: the defendant's age, maturity, intelligence, education, experience and ability to comprehend the lack of or adequacy of a warning, the length and the legality of the detention, the nature of the interrogation and whether the defendant was deprived of any physical needs or denied access to friends. The district court addressed each factor andfound that appellant was 25 years old, mature and intelligent, understood the questions, and...
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