State v. Finley

• Citation: 12 S.W.2d 27
• Decision Date: 18 December 1928
• Docket Number: No. 29061.,29061.
• Parties: THE STATE v. CHARLIE FINLEY, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

12 S.W.2d 27

THE STATE v. CHARLIE FINLEY, Appellant.

No. 29061.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division Two.

December 18, 1928.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis — Hon. Claude O. Pearcy, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Roy A. Fish for appellant.

A non-expert may testify his opinion as to the sanity of a defendant, but this opinion must be based on a familiarity with the conduct and actions of a defendant as well as on an opportunity for the witness to observe his conduct. It is not sufficient for a witness who is not an expert to merely look at a defendant and then express his or her opinion as to the sanity of that defendant. Those who are not experts may be permitted to state whether they deem the accused to be sane or insane; but it can only be done in connection with their statements of the particular conduct and expressions which form the basis of their judgment. State v. Klinger, 46 Mo. 224; State v. Erb, 74 Mo. 199; State v. Williamson, 106 Mo. 162. A witness may testify as to the mental condition of another, but only when it appears that he has had an adequate opportunity of observing and judging of his capacity. State v. Bryant, 93 Mo. 273; Sharp v. Railway Co., 114 Mo. 94. A witness without any particular acquaintance with the defendant and without any knowledge as a medical man is not competent to testify as an expert as to defendant's sanity or insanity. State v. Crisp, 126 Mo. 605. In this case the police officers were placed upon the witness stand and asked the bare question if they believed the defendant to be sane; no preliminary evidence was introduced as to whether they had seen the defendant prior to his arrest or if they had ever had an opportunity to observe his actions. Because of the fact that an insanity defense was interposed the testimony of these officers was important and highly prejudicial to defendant.

Stratton Shartel, Attorney-General, and Walter E. Sloat, Special Assistant Attorney-General, for respondent.

(1) Instruction number seven complained of by defendant has been often approved by this court. State v. Hamilton, 263 S.W. 131; State v. Knowles, 185 Mo. 176. (2) A lay witness need not state the facts upon which he bases an opinion that a person is sane. State v. Soper, 148 Mo. 235; State v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 231; State v. Liolios, 285 Mo. 13; State v. Cockriel, 285 S.W. 443.

WALKER, J.

The appellant was charged by information in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis with robbery in the first degree. Upon a trial to a jury he was convicted and his punishment assessed at eight years' imprisonment in the penitentiary. From this judgment he appeals.

At about 10:30 o'clock on the night of November 21, 1926, the proprietor of a drug store located at 2804 Market Street, city of St. Louis, was preparing to close his store when he heard someone order him to hold up his hands. He turned around to find a man approaching him in a menacing attitude, holding something which looked like a pistol under the corner of his coat. The intruder proceeded to search the druggist and took from his person a small amount of money. He then backed the druggist into a corner behind the prescription case, took from the till or money drawer the day's receipts, $27.65, and fled. The druggist ran to a police station and notified the officers of the robbery, who at once went in pursuit of the robber. He was apprehended a few blocks distant from the drug store and on searching him the amount of money that had been taken from the druggist and a toy pistol were found on his person. He admitted that he had committed the robbery.

Testimony was offered by the defense to show that the appellant when under the influence of liquor acted like an insane man and that he had been drinking the evening before the robbery. It was also shown that his mental capacity was below normal. A doctor who was qualified as an expert testified that the appellant had the mind of a ten year old child and was not possessed of sufficient comprehension to distinguish between right and wrong. The father and uncle of the appellant and another testified that when he was under the influence of liquor he did not act like a sane man. The testimony of ...