The State v. Crisp

• Decision Date: 12 February 1895
• Citation: 29 S.W. 699,126 Mo. 605
• Parties: The State v. Crisp, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

29 S.W. 699

126 Mo. 605

The State v. Crisp, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

February 12, 1895

Appeal from Webster Circuit Court. -- Hon. Argus Cox, Judge.

Affirmed.

""R. F. Walker, Attorney General, and ""Morton Jourdan Assistant Attorney General, for the state.

(1) The trial court did not err in excluding the testimony of witness Sullivan as to defendant's sanity. He was not an expert and did not otherwise qualify himself to give his opinion on the question presented. (2) The court did not err in refusing to suspend the trial and to make an order requiring physicians to examine defendant in order to enable them to express an opinion on his sanity. Besides the defendant not having assigned the foregoing as a ground for a new trial waived his objection to the court's action. ""State v. Kaiser, 28 S.W. 186; ""State v. Catlin, 118 Mo. 100; ""State v. Day, 100 Mo 242; ""State v. Gilmore, 100 Mo. 1. (3) The verdict was properly returnable on Sunday. R. S. 1889, sec. 3260.

OPINION

Gantt, P. J.

This is an appeal from a conviction of murder in first degree. The defendant Crisp was indicted at the August term, 1891, of the circuit court of Wright county for the murder of John Pruet in said county on the twenty-seventh day of July, 1891. The cause was delayed by continuances until the September term, 1893, when two unsuccessful attempts were made to secure another continuance and defendant applied for and obtained a change of venue to Webster county, where the cause was tried at the March term, 1894, and resulted in a verdict of guilty.

The conduct of defendant's counsel in incumbering this record with forty pages of typewritten matter relating entirely to the impaneling of the jury, when no objection was made to the qualification of any member of the panel, deserves a rebuke. The mass of immaterial matter that is daily dumped into this court is enormous. The science of making a correct bill of exceptions has apparently been lost. These bills no longer show the handiwork and learning of the skilled lawyer, but consist principally of immaterial questions and answers, through which we are compelled, in criminal cases, to grope in search for the facts of the case and the errors complained of.

The evidence for the state tends to show these facts: On the twenty-seventh day of July, 1891, the deceased resided in Montgomery township in Wright county; the defendant resided in the same neighborhood, being employed by, and living with, a Mr. Garrett. On this day the deceased was engaged in plowing corn upon the farm and near the house of his father; one horse was drawing the plow; double lines were being used; they were being carried over the right shoulder, across the back and under the left arm of the deceased. Near the field where the deceased was plowing was some wood land, through which and near to the field, ran a branch or ravine. The defendant, armed with a double-barrel shotgun, came down this branch or ravine to near where the deceased was, secreted himself behind a clump of volunteer corn, and when the deceased had driven down to the end of the corn row and was in the act of turning, the defendant fired the fatal shot. The deceased dropped, falling over the plow handles. The defendant ran down to a corner of the fence and again secreted himself. He was positively identified by a younger brother of deceased who was looking for some steers. The report of the gun was heard by the father and two younger brothers at the house. The smaller brother ran to the house with the information that his brother had been shot, and the father and two other brothers ran to the scene of the murder. When Riley Pruet, who was about one hundred yards ahead of his brother Joe and his father, reached the scene of the shooting the defendant fired from the secreted corner two shots at him, both of which took effect: after the last shooting he ran off up the hill. At the time of this shooting he was positively identified.

After being arrested, the defendant broke jail upon two different occasions. While in jail he made a voluntary statement to the witness, Hickman, in which he admitted the killing, and that he did the shooting.

The defense was three fold: First, an attack upon the veracity of the father and brothers of deceased by proving their reputation for truth and veracity was bad; second, proof of threats by the Pruets against defendant and self-defense; third, plea of insanity. There was some evidence tending to prove all these.

Defendant testified in his own behalf to an attack on him by the Pruets, and that he shot the two sons in self-defense. There is no other evidence tending to corroborate him on this point in the slightest degree.

The motion for new trial is based on the following grounds:

First. The admission of illegal and incompetent evidence second, the exclusion of competent evidence; third, because the jury reached a verdict by agreeing to abide by a majority vote; fourth, because the verdict was rendered...