State v. Flanagan
| Decision Date | 06 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-0652,20-0652 |
| Citation | 967 N.W.2d 376 (Table) |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Dow FLANAGAN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
A jury convicted James Flanagan of operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2019). On appeal, he argues the district court improperly rejected his motion to suppress evidence gathered during a traffic stop. Because the state trooper extended the duration of the stop without cause, we reverse the suppression ruling and remand for further proceedings.
Seatbelts save lives. But, as James Flanagan learned, a passenger's failure to buckle up can be costly. Flanagan had been enjoying a September evening with friends at Yellow Banks Park campgrounds when a woman in the group suffered a coughing spell and needed a ride home. Flanagan volunteered to drive her, intending to return afterward.
But good deeds never go unpunished. Flanagan's passenger failed to wear her seatbelt, attracting the attention of Iowa State Trooper Kyle Ratzesberger. Infraction spotted, Ratzesberger initiated a traffic stop. As was his routine, the trooper ran the license plate through his database. He discovered a protective order against Flanagan, the vehicle's registered owner. But Ratzesberger recalled that he didn't "solidify" the name of the protected person before the stop. All he knew was the protected person was a woman. And Flanagan's passenger was also a woman. With the seatbelt infraction and a potential protective-order violation in mind, the trooper approached the passenger window of Flanagan's car, which pulled into a McDonald's parking lot.1
When the trooper asked the passenger why she wasn't wearing her seatbelt, she explained she recently had breast surgery. She believed that medical procedure exempted her from the seat belt requirement. But she didn't have the proper paperwork, so Ratzesberger said he would issue her a ticket. The trooper did not ask the passenger if she was the protected person.
During his minute-long exchange with the passenger, the trooper had little interaction with Flanagan.2 Yet Ratzesberger testified that he noticed Flanagan's nervousness and reddened eyes. And after those seconds of observation, Ratzesberger asked Flanagan to return to his patrol car with him.
The two were in the patrol car together for about five minutes. During this time, Ratzesberger processed the passenger's ticket and confirmed she was not the protected person under the Flanagan's order. But while looking at his computer screen, the trooper also shifted his investigation to Flanagan, having these exchanges:
Q. Do you have any medication that you're taking ...? A. Just Tylenol
.
Q. You say you're coming from the campgrounds? A. Yeah.
Q. Were you drinking there? A. No.
Q. Anything besides that? Were you doing marijuana? A. No.
Q. Meth? A. No. I'm on some anxiety meds. Antidepressants. A couple of migraine prescriptions. But none of them are ... you know, none of them prohibit me from driving.
As the trooper printed out the seatbelt ticket, he asked to see Flanagan's tongue. Flanagan complied. Flanagan said his anti-anxiety medication gave him "cotton mouth." The trooper then returned to the passenger and peppered her with questions about where they were coming from and what kind of drugs Flanagan had been using.
Learning nothing that would verify his suspicion, Ratzesberger handed the passenger her ticket, informed her that Flanagan would be completing field sobriety tests, asked her to stay in the car, and returned to his patrol car. But before starting the field sobriety tests, Ratzesberger checked Flanagan's pulse, and found it was higher than normal.
When Flanagan tried to perform the requested field sobriety tests, he could not maintain his balance. Flanagan took a breath test before being placed under arrest. At the station, Flanagan refused to provide a urine sample. But he did submit to another round of field sobriety tests, which went as poorly as the first set. And before the night's end, Flanagan acknowledged he might have consumed gummy worms "laced" with cannabis or used a "vape pen" containing cannabis oil.
The State charged Flanagan with OWI second offense. He moved to suppress evidence from the traffic stop, claiming: (1) trooper Ratzesberger "unlawfully extended" his detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, and (2) no reasonable cause justified the field sobriety tests. The district court denied the motion. A jury found Flanagan guilty. And he now appeals.
When, as here, a motion to suppress raises constitutional grounds, our review is de novo. State v. Coleman , 890 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Iowa 2017). This review "requires an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record." State v. Backes , 601 N.W.2d 374, 375 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). Although we may defer to the district court's factual findings, we are not bound by them. State v. Lane , 726 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Iowa 2007).
On appeal, Flanagan breaks his suppression argument into three claims: (1) the trooper unlawfully extended the stop's duration; (2) the trooper placed Flanagan in the patrol car without reasonable suspicion; and (3) the trooper impermissibly expanded the stop's scope by asking Flanagan questions unrelated to the seatbelt violation.
Before contesting the merits, the State contends Flanagan only preserved error on the first claim. It's true that Flanagan's motion to suppress focused on the extended detention. But at the suppression hearing, Flanagan's attorney developed this point with several "sub-arguments," stating:
Trooper Ratzesberger exceeded the lawful scope of his investigation under State versus Aderholdt [, 545 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa 1996) ]. The Iowa Supreme Court has concluded when the stop has been made, that a reasonable investigation of that stop does include asking the driver for the driver's license and requesting that the driver sit in the patrol car. However, we believe that Aderholdt is factually distinguishable from the current case because in this instance only the passenger had committed the offense.
Thus Flanagan challenged both the scope of Ratzesberger's investigation and the trooper's decision to bring him to the patrol car.
Although the State acknowledges Flanagan raised these "sub-arguments," it insists he waived error by accepting that Aderholdt was binding precedent. According to the State, rather than trying to factually distinguish Aderholdt , Flanagan now seeks to reinterpret it.
We agree appellants cannot create new arguments or flesh out undeveloped arguments. See, e.g. , City of Muscatine v. Northbrook P'ship Co. , 619 N.W.2d 362, 368 n.2 (Iowa 2000) (). But our error preservation doctrine has never required appellants to cut and paste their arguments from the district court. See JBS Swift & Co. v. Ochoa , 888 N.W.2d 887, 893 (Iowa 2016) (). We find Flanagan preserved error on all three arguments.
Flanagan argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Trooper Ratzesberger lacked sufficient cause to place him in the patrol car and pursue an OWI investigation.3 He alleges those acts extended the duration and scope of the stop.4 The State counters that the passenger's seat belt infraction, questions about the protective order, and suspicion about Flanagan's impairment justified the trooper's actions. We will address those reasons in turn.
Flanagan concedes the trooper had probable cause to stop him for the passenger's seatbelt violation. See Aderholdt , 545 N.W.2d at 563 ; State v. Godfrey , 491 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). It is the trooper's subsequent actions that Flanagan contests. Flanagan emphasizes that the authority for a seizure ends "when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed." See United States v. Rodriguez , 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015).
Here, the video shows that Ratzesberger's investigation of the seat belt violation was cut and dried—requiring a one-minute discussion with the passenger. When she handed the trooper her identification, he had all the information he needed to process her ticket. At oral argument, defense counsel acknowledged the trooper had authority to ask for Flanagan's driver's license as well.
But not only did Trooper Ratzesberger take their licenses, he also asked Flanagan to accompany him to the patrol car. The trooper gave three reasons for doing so: (1) it was his normal practice during traffic stops; (2) he wanted to resolve the protective-order issue; and (3) he was concerned the driver might be impaired. But none of the reasons was tied to the passenger's seatbelt violation.
We turn first to the routine-practice rationale. Routine practice is by definition not individualized suspicion. Still, the State maintains the trooper's normal practice is enshrined in our case law. In support, the State quotes Aderholdt :
Once a lawful stop is made, an officer may conduct an investigation reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. This reasonable investigation includes asking for the driver's license and registration, requesting that the driver sit in the patrol car, and asking the driver...
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