State v. Fleming
| Decision Date | 13 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 6356-III-9,6356-III-9 |
| Citation | 701 P.2d 815,41 Wn.App. 33 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Dennis FLEMING, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Steven L. Michels, Sunnyside, for petitioner.
Jeffrey C. Sullivan, Pros. Atty., Steven Keller, Deputy, Yakima, for respondent.
Dennis Fleming's request for a jury trial was stricken for his failure to appear at a pretrial conference. He petitions this court to review that decision. We reverse and remand for jury trial.
On April 1, 1983, Mr. Fleming was charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. RCW 46.61.502. He filed a notice of appearance April 8 with the Yakima County District Court and requested a jury trial. 1 On April 20, Mr. Fleming's attorney was mailed a printed notice of jury trial with a typed message at the bottom of the form, "PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE IS SCHEDULED FOR THE 9th OF MAY, 1983 AT 2:00 P.M."
Mr. Fleming had not been arraigned, had not waived arraignment, and was not present at the May 9, 1983 pretrial conference. When Mr. Fleming's attorney appeared at the conference with a written waiver of Mr. Fleming's right to be present, the district court judge presiding over the hearing refused to accept the waiver and, based on Mr. Fleming's failure to appear at the pretrial conference, struck the demand for a jury trial. The jury demand was stricken as authorized by the Local Rules For Yakima County District Court, Rule 16, which provides in part:
Upon failure to appear the judge may proceed with the conference ex-parte, if necessary, and enter any appropriate order and may impose terms, including striking the jury demand.
(Italics ours.)
Following conviction but before sentencing the Superior Court granted Mr. Fleming's writ of certiorari, but summarily affirmed the district court and remanded for sentencing stating that "requiring the defendant to be present at the pre-trial conference upon penalty of losing his right to a jury trial was not inconsistent with the defendant's right to a jury trial; ..."
Mr. Fleming contends he was not afforded due process since he was not advised in the pretrial hearing notice that his absence might result in striking the jury trial. He also contends Yakima County Local Rule 16 is unconstitutional. We agree with both positions.
Mr. Fleming was not personally given notice of the pretrial conference, and he was not notified that failure to appear could result in the loss of his right to a trial by jury. Due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 3 of the Washington Constitution mandated notice to Mr. Fleming of potential consequences. Striking the jury trial without notice constituted deprivation of a constitutional right without due process.
We further conclude that had notice been given to Mr. Fleming and had he been advised of the possible consequences of his failure to appear at the pretrial conference, still, taking away his right to a trial by jury as a sanction is unconstitutional. The state and federal constitutions, not court rules, are the source of the right to a trial by jury, Seattle v. Williams, 101 Wash.2d 445, 680 P.2d 1051 (1984). Procedural rules of court cannot be used to take away substantive rights. State v. Fields, 85 Wash.2d 126, 530 P.2d 284 (1975); State v. Pavelich, 153 Wash. 379, 279 P. 1102 (1929); In re Marriage of Hermsen, 27 Wash.App. 318, 617 P.2d 462 (1980). That portion of Local Rule 16 which authorizes the court to strike the jury for defendant's failure to appear at the pretrial conference is unconstitutional.
The State concedes Mr. Fleming is entitled to a jury trial and asks that we remand to so allow it. Mr. Fleming contends the appropriate remedy is dismissal since a remand would subject him to double jeopardy. We agree with the State's position. Double jeopardy does not bar a retrial after a tainted conviction is reversed unless the defendant can show the taint was a product of deliberate harassment or overreaching, State v. Funkhouser, 30 Wash.App. 617, 622-23, 637 P.2d 974 (1981). This record will not support a finding of either harassment or overreaching. Moreover, the rule is well...
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City of Seattle v. Klein
...of a substantial right. City of Seattle v. Agrellas, 80 Wash.App. 130, 136-37, 906 P.2d 995 (1995) (citing State v. Fleming, 41 Wash. App. 33, 35-36, 701 P.2d 815 (1985)). The right to appeal is a fundamental constitutional right that applies in "all cases" and may be waived only by a volun......
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State v. Jaime, No. 21726-4-III (Wash. App. 3/4/2004)
...due process requires that a criminal defendant be given notice prior to deprivation of a substantial right. See State v. Fleming, 41 Wn. App. 33, 35-36, 701 P.2d 815 (1985). The court's role is not to define due process according to its own "`personal and private notions' of fairness." Stat......
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Westberg v. All-Purpose Structures Inc.
...rule unconstitutional because it conditioned a right to a jury trial on participation in a pretrial conference. 5 State v. Fleming, 41 Wash.App. 33, 701 P.2d 815 (1985). In Fleming, the defendant was charged with DUI. He filed a notice of appearance and demanded a jury trial. The defendant'......
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State v. Sargent
...of deliberate harassment or overreaching. State v. Funkhouser, 30 Wash.App. 617, 622-23, 637 P.2d 974 (1981). Accord, State v. Fleming, 41 Wash.App. 33, 701 P.2d 815 (1985). We have reviewed the Sargent I opinion. Apparently, the deputy prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of a......