State v. Sargent

• Decision Date: 17 August 1987
• Docket Number: No. 17492-4-I,17492-4-I
• Citation: 741 P.2d 1017,49 Wn.App. 64
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Joseph Sherman SARGENT, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 64

49 Wn.App. 64

741 P.2d 1017

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Joseph Sherman SARGENT, Appellant.

No. 17492-4-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 1.

Aug. 17, 1987.

Reconsideration Granted in Part and Opinion Amended Nov. 9, 1987.

Helen L. Halpert, King County Public Defender, Seattle, for appellant Joseph Sherman Sargent

Deborah J. Phillips, Senior Deputy Pros. Atty. Appellate Div., Michael Schwartz, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent State of Wash.

SCHOLFIELD, Chief Judge.

FACTS

Sargent was charged by information with one count of first degree murder and one count of first degree arson, arising from the death of his wife, Lori. On July 11, 1983, the crimes were discovered when the Seattle Fire Department was called to the Sargent home in West Seattle. A paramedic found a body, later identified to be that of Lori Sargent, lying on a waterbed. An autopsy revealed that the cause of death was two head wounds and severe skull fractures, apparently caused by blows with a blunt instrument. The fire was determined to have been caused by the igniting of a flammable liquid in the bedroom.

After discovery of the victim, the police attempted to find Sargent, who did not appear for work that day. He was eventually discovered at the home of relatives in Oregon and was charged with the crimes on July 19, 1983. The jury rendered a guilty verdict in Sargent's first trial.

Prior to sentencing, Ronald Bloom, a Department of Corrections community corrections officer (formerly designated a probation and parole officer) arranged to interview Sargent to prepare a presentence report.

Bloom testified that the interview in the jail never really focused on Sargent's version of the events because Bloom felt that Sargent was denying his participation in the crime. Bloom further testified that he told Sargent that if Sargent expected to benefit from mental health counseling in prison, he would have to "come to the truth with himself" Bloom did not at any time suggest to Sargent that he write out a statement. During that first interview, Bloom spent over 2 hours listening to Sargent complain bitterly about the "system" and the prosecutor and protest his innocence. Bloom's suggestion that Sargent "come to the truth with himself" was apparently based on considerations for his mental health and the beneficial effects of accepting responsibility for one's own actions.

                inferring that he should acknowledge his guilt to himself.   Bloom testified that he did not promise Sargent any leniency for confessing.   At the end of the interview, Bloom gave Sargent his card and told him that if he had any more to say, he could contact Bloom
                

Two days after the initial interview, Sargent telephoned Bloom and told him that he was willing to make a written statement regarding the crime. Bloom mentioned this to his supervisor, who told Bloom to return to the jail to take the statement. When the subject of Miranda rights arose, the supervisor reminded Bloom that community corrections officers were not required to give Miranda warnings. To the best of Bloom's recollection, the supervisor also told Bloom to contact both the prosecutor's office and Sargent's attorneys, but he did not do so until after the second interview with Sargent.

Bloom had no conversations before the two interviews with any law enforcement officer or the prosecuting attorney. When Bloom met with Sargent the second time, after a few brief remarks to one another, Bloom gave Sargent a legal pad and pencil. Sargent wrote out a 2 1/2-page statement in which he admitted killing his wife and setting fire to the house. Sargent told Bloom after he completed the statement that he was " 'coming clean with God' ".

Sargent's first trial was reversed by this court on several grounds, including prosecutorial misconduct in the State's closing argument. State v. Sargent, 40 Wash.App. 340, 698 P.2d 598 (1985) (Sargent I).

At Sargent's second trial, the State sought to introduce his written confession and the telephone statements made The trial court also determined that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy did not bar a retrial, despite the intentional nature of the prosecutor's statements in the closing argument of the first trial. The double jeopardy issue was not raised in the motion for reconsideration. Following the CrR 3.5 hearing, Sargent entered a stipulation to the facts as contained in the police report, with the understanding that the court would make its determination based on those police reports. The court found Sargent guilty as charged. This appeal timely followed.

                to Bloom.   After extensive pretrial argument, the trial court suppressed the confession and statements.   On a motion for reconsideration, however, the court determined that the statements made on the telephone and the written statement taken in the second interview were admissible because 2 days had passed between the initial presentence interview and Sargent's phone call to Bloom, such that the confession was volunteered, not custodial.   However, the court found that the first interview constituted custodial interrogation and ruled that any statements made then were not admissible
                

Three of Sargent's assignments of error relate to the admission in his second trial of the confession he gave to Bloom. The fourth assignment asserts that the retrial violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Sargent asserts that admission of the confession violated both his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. Sargent also argues for a public policy prohibiting use in a subsequent trial of a confession obtained as part of an interview conducted for presentence purposes.

FIFTH AMENDMENT

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), held the prosecution could not use inculpatory statements stemming from custodial Miranda defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.

interrogation of the defendant without first showing the defendant was fully advised of the privilege against self-incrimination and of his right to counsel and that the defendant had knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived those rights.

Cases deciding the issue of whether Miranda applies to a given set of facts appear to be more concerned with whether a "custodial interrogation" took place than with whether the interrogation was by a law enforcement officer. In State v. LaRue, 19 Wash.App. 841, 845, 578 P.2d 66 (1978), this court said:

If such a custodial interrogation is established, it makes no difference that the interrogators were prison guards, rather than police officers. The duty to apprise a defendant of his constitutional rights has been assigned to persons other than police officers. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 381, 88 S.Ct. 1503 (1968) (statements made to IRS agent); United States v. Redfield, 402 F.2d 454 (4th Cir.1968) (statements made to a prison warden); and Biddy v. State, 127 Ga.App. 212, 193 S.E.2d 31 (1972) (statements made to a prison warden).

In State v. Cawley, 133 Ariz. 27, 648 P.2d 142 (1982), Cawley complained that he was interviewed for presentence purposes without being given his Miranda warnings. The Arizona court responded at page 29 as follows:

We hold that where the presentencing investigation is not accusatory in nature and merely a routine and integral part of the sentencing process, a defendant is not entitled to Miranda warnings since the incustodial coercive atmosphere of Miranda is not present and the questioning is not accusatory in nature.

We hold that Sargent's written statement was self-initiated and was entirely voluntary. None of the elements of Sargent argues that the suggestion made to him by Bloom that he "come to the truth with himself" amounts to interrogation for the purpose of eliciting an incriminatory response. We disagree. Bloom had listened to Sargent blame the system and the prosecutor for his conviction. Sargent was not accepting any of the blame himself. Bloom did nothing more than suggest to him that it would be beneficial to Sargent's mental health for him to face the truth. This suggestion was not designed to elicit an incriminatory response. Bloom did not ask him to make a public or written confession nor a statement of any kind. It was a suggestion as to how he could best cope with the extended incarceration that was sure to follow.

                coercion which are typically found in those cases where Miranda warnings are required are present in the case before us.   The record is clear that at the initial interview, Bloom asked no questions that were not directed toward development of the customary information needed for a presentence report
                

After the initial interview, Sargent waited 2 days before he contacted Bloom on his own initiative. It is an unavoidable conclusion that his decision to make a written confession was a decision arrived at entirely on his own after thinking about it for 2 days.

When Bloom went to the county jail for the second interview, there was no conversation in which Bloom encouraged Sargent to make a confession. There was virtually no conversation at all preceding Bloom's handing a pad of paper and a pencil to Sargent. Upon receiving the paper and pencil, Sargent wrote out the confession in his own hand without any prompting or assistance of any kind from Bloom.

The law does not require a probation or corrections officer, prior to developing information for a presentence report, to give Miranda warnings to a defendant whose guilt has been established either by plea, judgment or verdict. See State v. Cawley, supra. The reason for this is that the entire process of taking...